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ABSTRACT  
ABSTRACT  
This thesis focuses on the relationships between corporate governance structures and the 
interactions between corporate governance actors. It places the audit committee at its central focus 
point, but within a holistic corporate eco-system.  
To develop a more rounded understanding of corporate governance phenomena, the relationships 
between governance structures and the interactions between governance actors are framed 
through the lenses of both agency theory and institutional theory. In particular, the different sets of 
assumptions underlying these two grand theories are assessed against the evidence of audit 
committees’ structures, policies and actor behaviours within their wider corporate eco-systems. 
Case-based methods are used to gather the evidence for this thesis and qualitative analysis is 
applied. Corporate governance phenomena associated with a large corporation and four local 
government entities in Australia is investigated. In particular the thesis adopts a three stage coding 
scheme and a two-step analysis approach. 
To reiterate, this thesis addresses the way in which governance actors and their structures interact 
as part of an organisation’s holistic corporate eco-system. A pluralistic approach to perceiving and 
interpreting this phenomenon is taken by invoking both agency and institutional theoretical 
perspectives. It is the assumptions about organisational structures and key players’ behaviours on 
which these two grand theories are founded that are especially assessed in this thesis. Therefore, 
while agency theory and institutional theory have spawned their own sub-branches and sub-
theories, these two theories are only addressed in this thesis at their broad level where their original 
assumptions have been formulated.  
The findings of this thesis suggest that the classical agency perspective of western-derived corporate 
governance can be better explained adopting a mixed theoretical framework which draws on both 
agency theory and institutional theory. In particular, agency theory better explains the purpose and 
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function of corporate governance and its mechanisms, while institutional theory better explains its 
homogeneity and isomorphic change. Further, the thesis proposes an expanded governance model 
which incorporates both agency theory and institutional theory. This expanded governance model 
can be viewed as a theoretical Frankenstein which fits together an amalgam of assumed behaviours 
to better illustrate and more holistically capture the governance phenomena. Nonetheless, the 
model may also be disaggregated to explain the governance phenomenon applying either agency or 
institutional theory.  Apart from this theory testing, the thesis provides insights into the descriptive 
governance workings of a large Australian listed company and also of Victorian local governments 
(i.e., city councils).    
The expanded governance model proposed in this study has implications for corporate and public 
sector regulators, as well as an organisation’s independent directors. They should re-think any 
myopic agency theory perspective that uses solely agency-based policies for developing governance 
mechanisms. The evidence in this study infers that relevant regulators and directors need to design 
mechanisms that are structured to accommodate multilayers of homogeneous institutional groups. 
They also should orient policies towards achieving the desired effect on the legitimacy standards of 
the superordinate social system within which institutional groups interact under the expanded 
governance model. 
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FOREWORD 
This study parallels Mary Shelley’s fictional character Victor Frankenstein’s pursuit of knowledge. In 
his pursuit Victor attempts to bestow life upon an inanimate body by collecting and infusing limbs of 
proportion and beauty. In this thesis, my pursuit is to better theoretically define the corporate 
governance phenomena by “bestow*ing+ animation upon lifeless matter” (Shelley 1818, p. 42). This 
pursuit is achieved by collecting and then infusing the combined assumptions of agency theory and 
institutional theory. Each chapter embraces a quote from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as a form of 
mirrored reflection. 
“I shall satiate my ardent curiosity with the sight of a part of the world never before 
visited, and may tread a land never before imprinted by the foot of a man. These are 
my enticements, and they are sufficient to conquer … and to induce me to commence 
this laborious voyage” (Shelley 1818, p. 4).   
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
This is a study on the relationships between corporate governance structures and the interactions 
between corporate governance actors. It places the audit committee at its central focus point, but 
within a holistic corporate eco-system (i.e., a corporate ecological system consisting of economic, 
legal, political and social elements). Moore (1993, p.76) suggested that a firm should be “viewed not 
as a member of a single industry but as part of a business ecosystem that crosses a variety of 
industries”. As such a firm is considered to exist within an open interacting corporate eco-system 
with various influences and power relations among internal and external actors (Moore 1993; 
Pettigrew 1992; Roberts et al. 2005). Moore (1996, p.26) defined this corporate eco-system concept 
as 
“An economic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and 
individuals—the organisms of the business world … organisms also include suppliers, 
lead producers, competitors, and other stakeholders. Over time, they coevolve their 
capabilities and roles, and tend to align themselves with the directions set by one or 
more central companies”. 
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To develop a more rounded understanding of corporate governance phenomena, the relationships 
between governance structures and the interactions between governance actors are framed 
through the lenses of both agency theory and institutional theory. In particular, the different sets of 
assumptions underlying these two grand theories are assessed against the evidence of audit 
committees’ structures, policies and actor behaviours within the wider corporate eco-system. Case 
based methods are used to gather the evidence for this thesis and qualitative analysis methods are 
applied. 
This thesis diverges from most prior empirical corporate governance research within the accounting, 
financial economics and management disciplines. Such prior research has predominantly relied on 
secondary data reported under regulatory guidelines by listed companies and, to a lesser extent, by 
government and non-for-profit entities. This body of research typically takes a deductive approach 
generated from agency theory assumptions and perspectives, using readily available secondary data 
and quantitative analysis. Actual board and management behaviour is not explored in these studies, 
even though many use proxies for actual behaviour (Huse 2005). This ‘mainstream’ corporate 
governance research has been criticised in two areas in particular: (a) not using a pluralistic 
approach to board and board committee role theories (Johnson et al. 1996; Roberts et al. 2005); and 
(b) not understanding governance structures within an open interacting system with various 
influence and power relations among internal and external actors (Pettigrew, 1992; Roberts et al. 
2005). Further, Young and Thyil (2008) believe that the study of corporate governance would greatly 
benefit from the addition of a more holistic governance model as previous models provide an 
incomplete picture.  
To reiterate, this thesis addresses the corporate governance phenomena associated with large 
corporations and government entities in Australia. It focuses on the way in which governance actors 
and their structures interact as part of a holistic corporate governance eco-system. A pluralistic 
approach to perceiving and interpreting this phenomenon is taken by invoking both an agency and 
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institutional theoretical lens. It is the assumptions about organisational structures and key players’ 
behaviours on which these two grand theories are founded that are especially assessed in this thesis. 
Therefore, while agency theory and institutional theory have spawned their own sub-branches and 
sub-theories, these two theories are only addressed in this thesis at their broad level where their 
original assumptions have been formulated.  
This chapter is structured to first provide a brief introduction to corporate governance concepts and 
practices. It then proceeds to state the research aim and objectives of this thesis. Third, an outline is 
given of the case study based research method adopted. Fourth, arguments are given on the 
motivation and significance of this thesis. Fifth, the scope of the thesis is clarified. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with an outline of the organisation of this thesis.  
1.2 BACKGROUND ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Firms predominately need economic resources to expand and grow; as, firms eventually grow 
beyond the means of single ownership, i.e., beyond an owner who is capable of meeting a firm’s 
increased economic needs and obligations (Davis et al. 1997). Accordingly, firms need to be able to 
attract external funding, which would be funding otherwise allocated by investors (Mallin 2010; 
Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Consequently, investors need assurance that firms will be well managed 
and continue to be profitable (Mallin 2010). Published annual reports and other informational 
releases form part of the assurance process; investors expect firm disclosers to represent a true and 
fair view of firm activities (Mallin 2010).  
Good corporate governance serves as the process set which forms part of the assurance process. It 
serves to: (1) improve the credibility of financial reports, (2) safeguard against earnings 
manipulation, and (3) ensure a fair return on investor investment (Bhagat et al. 2010, Dechow et al. 
1996).  Collier and Zaman (2005) and Mallin (2010a) note that governance models and mechanisms 
have been driven by corporate collapses and financial scandals, while being motivated by investor 
desire for increased transparency, accountability and market confidence. Moreover, Todd (2010) 
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identifies the proposition of corporate governance is to direct and control firm activities by 
establishing structures, processes and procedures for decision making.  Sir Adrian Cadbury (cited in 
Mallin 2010, p. 7) stated that 
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals … between individual and common goals … the aim is [to] align as nearly 
as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society”. 
Modern firms identify the board (i.e., board of directors) as a governance mechanism with diverse 
duties and responsibilities; further, it is regarded as the most important decision-making vehicle in 
modern firms (DeZoort et al. 2002; Ferreira 2010). Boards typically delegate some of their oversight 
and compensation functions to various board sub-committees, including an audit committee, 
nomination committee, risk and compliance committee, and remuneration committee (DeZoort et 
al. 2002; Rezaee 2010; Vera-Munoz 2005). However the board retains the ultimate responsibility and 
accountability over any delegated functions (Rezaee 2010; Vera-Munoz 2005). These board sub-
committees are viewed as monitoring mechanisms formed to aid the board in fulfilling its fiduciary 
duties by making efficient use of individual director’s time and expertise (Rezaee 2010).  
Of the board sub-committees, the one that is mandated in several countries is the audit committee. 
It is a governance mechanism which is distinctly responsible for monitoring the external auditor and 
internal controls, and vetting of published annual reports. The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
(2010a, p.29) identifies the role of an audit committee as reviewing “the integrity of the company’s 
financial reporting and oversee[ing] the independence of the external auditors”. 
Previous literature on audit committees has examined the notion of audit committee effectiveness 
by benchmarking effectiveness outcomes against the widely recognised monitoring roles of audit 
committees. Audit committees are typically considered to have three principal monitoring roles: 
monitoring of external financial statements, monitoring of external auditors, and monitoring of 
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internal controls (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993). The notion of audit committee effectiveness is 
considered critical to corporate governance as it reinforces the underlining propose of corporate 
governance; i.e., to improve the credibility of financial reports; safeguard against earnings 
manipulation; and ensure a fair return to investors on their investments (Bhagat et al. 2010, Dechow 
et al. 1996).  
As was noted above corporate governance has been driven by financial scandal and corporate 
collapses as a result of self-interested decisions and behaviour of decision makers (Mallin 2010). 
Consequently, agency theory has been the primary underlying paradigm for corporate governance 
practice and its literature (Anderson et al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2008).  Accordingly, while this literature 
has been predominantly driven by agency theory, some researchers have addressed corporate 
governance through other theoretical paradigms. Other widely recognised corporate governance 
theoretical frameworks include institutional theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, 
resource dependence, and managerial hegemony (Cohen et al. 2008; Mallin 2010; Todd 2010).  
(Kalbers and Fogarty 1998) believe that by combining both the agency and institutional perspectives 
the governance phenomena can be better explained. Extending on this preliminary research by 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1998), this thesis takes a similar pluralistic theoretical perspective (agency and 
institutional) in understanding the way in which corporate governance mechanisms and actors 
interact as part of a holistic corporate eco-system. 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM  
The aim of this thesis is to contribute a deeper understanding of the way in which corporate 
governance mechanisms and actors interact as part of a holistic corporate eco-system in order to 
more pluralistically define corporate governance phenomena. This is a broad aim, so the 
contribution of this study will be limited in scope to an identification and assessment of sets of 
assumptions related to agency theory and institutional theory, each of which are ‘grand theories’ 
that have been separately invoked in corporate governance research.   
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1.3.1 Research Objectives and Questions 
In addressing the aim of this thesis, this thesis has developed three primary objectives and two 
research questions. 
Objective 1: Identify a firm’s internal and external actors who exist within the formal 
governance structures and the corporate eco-system 
Objective 2: Examine the impact of these actors on the shaping of outcomes within the 
corporate eco-system 
Objective 3: Develop an integrated model of internal and external mechanisms which co-
exist within a corporate eco-system 
RQ1: To what extent do governance mechanisms and actors interact as part of a holistic 
corporate eco-system? 
RQ2: Does agency or institutional theory more pluralistically (pluralistic is used in the sense 
of a system that recognises more than one ultimate worldview or paradigm) define the 
governance phenomena?  
1.4 RESEARCH METHODS  
This thesis adopts more of an interpretivist than a positivist epistemological position. The method of 
gathering and analysing data resides towards the qualitative end of the continuum (Creswell 2009). 
The qualitative approach is more suited as a means of meeting the thesis’s aim of exploring and 
understanding the interactions of corporate governance actors and mechanisms within a corporate 
eco-system.  
Consequently, the case study research strategy is adopted. The case study strategy for gathering and 
interpreting evidence can enable an in-depth holistic focus on corporate governance relationships 
and interactions to be pursued. The sampling frame adopted for the thesis is determined by the ‘key 
case unit’ method (Thomas 2011). This allows the deliberate selection of a case organisation that is 
reputed to demonstrate sound governance practices and a strong commitment to the protection of 
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shareholder interests. As a supplement to the ‘key case’ method, this thesis also separately 
embraces a ‘nested case unit’ method (Thomas 2011).  
These two types of case units will be used to provide illustrations, through qualitative analysis and 
interpretations, as the basis for addressing the research objectives of the thesis. The key case unit (a 
single listed corporation) will be central to the wider case while the nested case unit (a set of local 
governments) will be complementary. The evidence collected from the key case unit involved semi-
structured taped interviews conducted with the company secretary, audit committee chair and 
external audit partner. Additionally, it collected evidence from multiple documents available online. 
Similarly, the nested case unit involved evidence collected from the transcripts of semi-structured 
taped interviews conducted with two local government audit committee chairs, as well as written 
documents obtained from the interviewers. 
1.5 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Existing corporate governance literature has provided insights into the need and purpose of various 
corporate governance mechanisms. Additionally, the literature on audit committees has provided 
insights into the factors or characteristics which improve the effectiveness of audit committees. 
However, this literature has relied on publicly available disclosures of corporate governance 
mechanisms, often set in the context of publicly known failure of these mechanisms.  
This thesis will extend the literature by proposing a more rounded governance framework which can 
be interpreted by employing either an agency or institutional theoretical lens or both. This thesis 
chooses to address the issue of whether an integration of both agency and institutional theoretical 
perspectives can provide improved insights about governance phenomena, Integration of key 
behavioural assumptions underlying these respective theories may provide a richer governance 
framework. For example, an agent’s opportunistic behaviour (i.e., agency assumption) is likely to be 
moderated by a need to use information asymmetry in a way that is perceived to be legitimate by 
conforming to the institutional environment’s expectations (i.e., institutional theory). This 
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framework may lay the foundations for new directions for governance research. The strength of the 
framework is that it can allow for a more flexible examination of corporate governance mechanisms 
and their various actors. In addition, this thesis will fill the gap in current corporate governance 
literature by providing insights into the corporate governance mosaic of local governments. The 
literature gap is due to the general paucity of qualitative research into corporate governance, 
including the absence of any qualitative research on corporate governance phenomena in the 
context of local government. 
Results can provide insights into the inter-compositional dynamics of corporate governance 
mechanisms; this can facilitate a better understanding of how corporate governance mechanisms 
work collectively in fulfilling their governance role(s). This information may be used to improve 
communication channels and reduce role conflicts. The exploratory testing of this framework 
through the joint evaluation of the presence of agency and institutional assumptions has pointed to 
the potential for developing a practical way forward for evaluating whether, and in what 
circumstances, current corporate governance mechanisms and regulations are effective in fulfilling 
their monitoring and assurance roles.   
1.6 RESEARCH SCOPE 
This thesis seeks to identify potential governance actors both internal and external to a firm’s 
corporate eco-system. Moreover, this thesis explores the impact these actors have in shaping the 
corporate eco-system.  Consequently, it develops an integrated model of a corporate eco-system 
which encompasses both the firm’s internal and external actors. The thesis focuses on the audit 
committee of a large listed Australian firm and the audit committees of a small set of Australian local 
governments to assist in developing a theoretical framework for governance, which is the focus of 
this thesis. These audit committees are viewed within the context of their relationships and 
interactions with the corporate eco-system. Therefore, the thesis seeks to identify the extent to 
which an audit committee’s collective operating mode is characterised by either an institutional 
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(rituals, myths, taken-for-granted behaviours) or agency (independence, rational economic decision 
making, diligence) phenomena. Finally, the thesis attempts to provide insights into the structures 
and behaviours of audit committees to better align theoretical frameworks and organisational 
practice.  
1.6.1 Beyond the Research Scope 
This thesis will not seek to directly measure the overall effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms in fulfilling their purpose, roles and responsibilities. In addition, the thesis will not 
address the agency costs incurred in relation to the carrying out of the roles of audit committees; 
e.g., the costs allocated to the external auditor and to the company’s financial reporting systems. 
These are costs that could be benchmarked against the effectiveness of the external audit and 
financial reporting functions. Unlike numerous quantitative studies, this thesis does not address 
cause and effect relationships between various models of governance mechanisms and 
organisational financial or market performance, together with the associated endogeneity issue. 
Further, this thesis does not address how firms balance stakeholder interests. Additionally the thesis 
does not address the effects of firm ownership in affecting the firm’s responses to the pressures of 
the corporate eco-system. Nor does this thesis address the firm responses to the pressures of the 
corporate eco-system. 
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. The remaining six chapters are as follows: 
1. A review of corporate governance literature and its underling theoretical perspectives 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed review of the literature on corporate 
governance and the main theories which underpin the corporate governance 
phenomenon. The chapter is primarily focused on boards and their audit committees as 
governance mechanisms. The chapter presents an introduction to corporate 
governance, synthesis of previous audit committee literature, the theoretical paradigms 
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which underpin the corporate governance phenomena, and present an integrated 
model which adopts elements from the primary theoretical paradigms. 
2. Research methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide insights into the adopted research design and 
strategy of this thesis, including its evidence collection methods.  
3. A case study of corporate governance policies and practices focusing on the audit committee 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of the selected corporate case. It 
presents a qualitative analysis of the text obtained from company documents and 
interview transcripts. The chapter is primarily focused on the board and its audit 
committee. As it was a formal condition and request, the name of the Company and 
identities of participants are kept confidential. 
4. A case study of local government corporate governance focusing on the audit committee 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed understanding of the policies, 
practices and interfaces of the bodies and key players within the corporate governance 
mechanisms of four Victorian local governments. The focus of this case based analysis is 
centred primarily on the audit committee. This chapter presents the findings from a 
qualitative analysis of the text obtained from Victorian local governments’ documents 
and interview transcripts. As it was a formal condition and request, the identities of 
participants and consequently the names of the Victorian local governments are kept 
confidential.  
5. Discussion of findings and the generation of an expanded governance model 
The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the policies, practices and interfaces, as were 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 into the expanded governance model presented in 
Chapter 2. This chapter begins by examining the agency assumptions of the expanded 
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governance model in light of the findings of Chapters 4 and 5. It continues by examining 
the institutional assumptions. It concludes by re-examining and modifying the expanded 
governance framework.  
6. Conclusions  
This chapter begins by providing an overview for the thesis and presents the main 
findings and conclusions. It then addresses the research objectives and questions. It 
continues by disclosing the limitations of this thesis. It later, discusses the implications of 
this thesis. It finally, provides suggestions for future research. 
1.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the main issues, concepts and methods of this thesis. 
The chapter has defined corporate governance as a process set forming part of the assurance 
process, which serves to improve the credibility of financial reports; safeguard against earnings 
manipulation; and ensure a fair return on investor investment (Bhagat et al. 2010, Dechow et al. 
1996). The assurance process is important for firms as firms are dependent on external economic 
resources to expand and grow (Davis et al. 1997). Moreover, current governance models and 
mechanisms have largely been driven by corporate collapses and financial scandals, while being 
motivated by investor desire for increased transparency, accountability and market confidence 
(Collier and Zaman 2005; Mallin 2010). Consequently, agency theory has been the primary 
underlying paradigm for corporate governance practice and its literature (Anderson et al. 2007; 
Cohen et al. 2008).  
This thesis aims to examine the way in which corporate governance mechanisms and actors interact 
as part of a holistic corporate eco-system; to better theoretically define the corporate governance 
phenomena by adopting either or both agency and institutional assumptions.  
The thesis adopts a qualitative research design, as it provides an enhanced means of exploring and 
understanding the interactions of corporate governance actors and mechanisms within a corporate 
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eco-system. Moreover, the thesis adopts a case study research strategy, as it will enable an in depth 
holistic focus of a firm’s corporate eco-system. The thesis adopts the key case method and the 
nested case unit process.  
The thesis will extend current literature by proposing a more comprehensive governance framework 
which can be interpreted by employing both an agency and institutional theoretical lens. This 
framework can allow for a more flexible examination of corporate governance mechanisms and their 
various actors. 
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“The labours of men of genius, however erroneously directed, scarcely ever fail in 
ultimately turning to the solid advantage of mankind” (Shelley 1818, p. 37). 
CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITERATURE 
AND ITS UNDERLYING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITERATURE AND ITS UNDERLYING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature on corporate governance, 
emphasising board-related governance, and the main theories which underpin the corporate 
governance phenomenon. A large body of literature exists on corporate governance.  This chapter 
focuses on corporate boards and their audit committee as governance mechanisms. It then 
broadens to a review of major theories that have been invoked to model and explain corporate 
governance structures and behaviours and their effects. The chapter first provides a background into 
the rationale for corporate governance. Second it focuses on a synthesis of previous literature on 
audit committees. Third it presents the current theoretical perspectives which underpin the 
corporate governance phenomena, with emphasis on the detailed examination of elements of 
agency and institutional theories. Fourth it re-examines how corporate governance phenomena is 
viewed through the lens of agency theory and the lens of institutional theory. It concludes by 
constructing a new corporate governance model which integrates elements from these two primary 
theoretical lenses.  
2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Firms can eventually grow beyond the means of a single owner, i.e., beyond the financial capability 
of an owner who is able meet the firm’s increased economic needs and obligations (Davis et al. 
1997). As such, firms need to be able to attract funding from investors (i.e., additional owners) to 
expand and grow; however this funding may be otherwise allocated. Therefore, these investors need 
assurance that the firm will be well managed and continue to be profitable (Dowling and Pfeffer 
1975; Mallin 2010). Published annual reports and other informational releases provide part of this 
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assurance. But investors expect these firm disclosers to represent a true and fair view of the firm’s 
activities (Mallin 2010). Corporate governance is the process set which forms the final part of this 
assurance process, it serves to: (1) improve the credibility of financial reports, (2) safeguard against 
earnings manipulation, and (3) ensure a fair return on investors’ investment (Bhagat et al. 2010, 
Dechow et al. 1996). Collier and Zaman (2005) and Mallin (2010a) note that governance models and 
mechanisms have been driven by corporate collapses and financial scandals, while being motivated 
by investor desire for increased transparency, accountability and market confidence. Table 2.1 
(below) lists some key corporate cases of financial scandals and collapses which have motivated the 
rise of corporate governance. According to Todd (2010), the proposition of corporate governance is 
to direct and control the activities of firms by establishing structures, processes and procedures for 
decision making. Sir Adrian Cadbury (cited in Mallin 2010, p. 7) stated  
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals … between individual and common goals … the aim is [to] align as nearly 
as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society”.  
Table 2.1: Key Corporate Cases which have Motivated Corporate Governance 
Case Apparent Lessons    
Barings Bank Lack of effective internal controls – complete trust in one person without adequate 
supervision and understanding of that individual’s activities. 
Enron Lack of director independence, integrity and honesty; and the independence of external 
auditors and concern over non-audit consultancy fees.  
Royal Ahold Suppressed investor involvement – chief executive officer (CEO) dominance enabled 
directors to have overgenerous remuneration packages. 
Parmalat Lack of independent directors and timely discloser. 
HIH Risk framework complexity – boards need to be informed of and understand their risk 
framework and management system. 
Centro Lack of director knowledge – directors need to be financially competent, to critically 
understand the reports they are meant approve; and directors cannot solely rely on 
executive management and auditors on producing financial reports.   
Source: BDO Australia 2012; Mallin 2010  
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Ferreira (2010) identifies the board (i.e., board of directors) as the most important decision making 
body in modern corporate firms. The board is a governance mechanism with diverse duties and 
responsibilities (DeZoort et al. 2002). These include overseeing a firm’s strategic decisions, financial 
reporting processes and producers, internal controls, risk framework, audit practices, executive 
oversight and compensation, promotion and protection of shareholder interests, and stakeholder 
protection (Andres et al. 2010; DeZoort et al. 2002; Fama and Jensen 1983; Rezaee 2010). Boards 
typically delegate some of their oversight and compensation functions to various board sub-
committees (typically these are an audit committee, nomination committee, risk and compliance 
committee, and remuneration committee) (DeZoort et al. 2002; Rezaee 2010; Vera-Munoz 2005). 
However the full board retains the ultimate responsibility and accountability over any delegated 
functions (DeZoort et al. 2002; Rezaee 2010; Vera-Munoz 2005). 
2.2.1 Audit Committees: their nature and role 
Board sub-committees are monitoring mechanisms formed to aid boards fulfil their fiduciary duties 
by making efficient use of individual director’s time and expertise (Rezaee 2010). Of the board sub-
committees, the one that is mandated in several countries (e.g., US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada) is the audit committee. Audit committees were first proposed by the American Institute of 
CPAs in 1937 (Sommer 1991). The New York Stock Exchange provided its mandate in 1977, the 
mandate stated that “each domestic company, with common stock listed on the Exchange … [will] 
establish no later than June 30, 1978 and maintain … *an audit committee+ comprised solely of 
directors independent of management” (Spangler & Braiotta 1990, p.135). The Australian mandate 
regarding the formation of audit committees was introduced by the ASX in March 2003 (ASX 2010b).  
The Blue Ribbon Committee (cited in Abbott et al. 2003b, p. 29) asserted that the characteristics of 
“independence, expertise and diligence could lead to better overall audit committee oversight … *as 
the role of the audit committee+ is clearly one of oversight and monitoring” and in carrying out this 
role it acts in reliance on executive management and external auditors. In addition, according to 
Abbott et al. (2003b), these characteristics of the audit committee rather than its presence, critically 
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impacts its ability to effectively execute its duties. Further McMullen (1996) argues that audit 
committees are a mechanism for maintaining balance in the relationship between executive 
managers and external auditors. According to Bedard and Gendron (2010, p. 184), “investor 
confidence in the quality of financial reporting and financial markets is an important objective for 
regulators”. Consequently, audit committees also act as a mechanism that should increase investor 
confidence.  
Both the academic and professional literature concur that an audit committee is to have three 
principal monitoring roles: monitoring of external financial statements, monitoring of external 
auditors (i.e., handle all matters that relate to the external audit and act as liaison between the 
external auditors and the board of directors), and monitoring of internal controls (ASX 2010a; Collier 
& Gregory 1996; Kalbers and Fogarty 1993; DeZoort 2002; Spira 1998). The role of the audit 
committee is to: 
“Review the integrity of the company’s financial reporting and oversee the 
independence of the external auditors” (ASX 2010a, p.29); 
Provide, on behalf of the Board an oversight responsibility over the firm’s financial 
reporting process (Klien 2002b); 
“Provide assistance in the form of assurance regarding its financial reporting, internal 
controls, reporting structure and internal and external audit responsibilities. The 
Committee’s role is to assist the Board to independently verify and safeguard the 
integrity of the Group’s financial reporting” (Ausenco Ltd 2008, p.12). 
As such, the audit committee is regarded as a governance mechanism, distinctly responsible for 
monitoring the external auditor, internal controls, and vetting of published annual reports. However, 
according to Sarens et al. (2009) audit committees are facing an ever-expanding monitoring role. 
Accordingly, this monitoring role of the audit committee is one of change and adaptability; at times 
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it must act as a threat, arbiter or ally to executive management (Turley and Zaman 2007). 
Nevertheless, Collier and Zaman (2005) suggest that there has been an increased conformity 
internationally in governance models and mechanisms. International conformity is identified in the 
appointment of non-executive directors, the actual formation of board sub-committees, and the 
separation between the board chair and CEO roles (Collier and Zaman 2005). Further, Collier and 
Zaman (2005) suggest that the adoption of governance models and mechanisms maybe a symbolic 
concept used to signal the addressing of monitoring and control concerns regardless of their 
efficacy.  
The incidence of high profile corporate failures (as discussed above) involving fraud and corruption, 
failure of internal controls and poor accounting processes have raised concerns with regulators, 
government bodies and researchers in many countries in relation to the adequacy and effectiveness 
of audit committee monitoring (Turley and Zaman 2004). It has been noted that effective audit 
committees’ may assist the board which is charged with safeguarding and advancing the interests of 
shareholders by enhancing the creditability of audited financial reports and disclosers (Fama and 
Jensen 1983; McMullen 1996). Further, an audit committee can potentially shield auditors from 
executive management pressure, therefore shifting the balance of power in the auditors’ favour 
(Abbott 2003b).  
Consequently, the notion of audit committee effectiveness has received significant attention across 
regulative, professional and academic fronts. As such, monitoring mechanisms are positioned on the 
forefront against fraudulent financial reporting (Bedard and Gendron 2010). Given the audit 
committee’s role as a vehicle for monitoring the external auditors, financial reports and internal 
controls, its effectiveness is an important concept in the context of good corporate governance. 
Audit committee effectiveness is commonly benchmarked against its widely recognised original 
roles. According to DeZoort (1998) an audit committee is only as effective as its members. Following 
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DeZoort (1998) this thesis defines audit committee effectiveness as a collective ability to fulfil its 
original oversight duties.  
Both Sommer (1991) and Spira (1998) suggest that an audit committee is and should be established 
to protect its stakeholder’s interests and not a mere symbolic signal (i.e., cosmetic purposes). 
Further, according to Bradbury (1990) an audit committee should be established to enhance the 
credibility and objectivity of annual audited financial statements, enhance the external auditor 
independence, and assist company directors in meeting their fiduciary duties and responsibilities. 
Moreover, Abbott et al. (2003b) and Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) note the mere formation of an audit 
committee will not translate into an effective monitoring body. Alternatively, Spira’s (1998) findings 
suggest that this mere symbolic formation will overtime translate into effective monitoring. 
Effective boards and audit committees are expected to: (1) lead to higher transparency and 
reliability in financial statements; (2) reduce the risk that the auditor will provide an incorrect audit 
opinion; (3) protect auditor independence by assuming responsibility for their appointment, 
termination and remuneration; and (4) provide an independent platform for auditors to express 
their opinions and concerns in relation to management policies (Zaman et al. 2011). As such an 
effective audit committee is to be competent, inquisitive, and decisive (Palmer 1977). In addressing 
the notion of audit committee effectiveness this thesis follows previous literature and adopts the 
below definition: 
“An effective Audit Committee is to have qualified and well informed members, with a 
majority of independent members …  [the audit committee is to have] the authority 
and resources to protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, 
internal accounting controls, and risk management through … diligent oversight 
efforts” (Lary and Taylor 2012, p. 337). 
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The audit committee can directly improve the quality of information (which leads to improved 
investor confidence), by overseeing the financial reporting process; it can indirectly do this by 
overseeing internal controls and external auditing (Bedard and Gendron 2010). The Institute of 
Internal Auditors (cited in Sarens et al. 2009, p. 92) defined internal auditing as an activity that 
“helps an organization to accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes”. 
The audit committee holds the responsibility for the monitoring of internal controls and effective 
monitoring leads to improved internal control quality (Bedard and Gendron 2010). Consequently, 
Zain et al. (2006) identify the internal control function as a key control mechanism for assessing and 
improving the quality of internal control systems. In monitoring the external audit function, it 
includes auditor selection, compensation, work and independence; as such effective auditor 
oversight leads to improved audit quality (Bedard and Gendron 2010). 
2.2.2 Audit Committee Effectiveness: an annotated literature review 
In addressing the effectiveness of audit committees in fulfilling their original roles, previous studies 
have provided findings about the following matters: its member characteristics (Abbott and Parker 
2000; Abbott et al. 2004; Aier et al. 2005; Beasley 1996; Klien 2002a; McDaniel et al. 2002), external 
audit quality (Abbott and Parker 2000; Abbott et al. 2003b), incidences of restatements in published 
financial reports (Abbott et al. 2004; Aier et al. 2005; Kinney et al. 2004; Stanley and DeZoort 2007), 
incidences of fraud (Beasley 1996; Klien 2002a), the audit to non-audit fee (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; 
DeFond et al. 2002; Kinney et al. 2004; Raghunandan et al. 2003; Stanley and DeZoort 2007), and the 
level of earning management (Klien 2002a; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991; Xie et al. 2003). In essence, 
effective audit committees are considered to improve the integrity and quality of published financial 
statements, by monitoring internal controls and maintaining auditor independence (McMullen 
1996).  
Table 2.2 (below) provides an annotated summary of the literature on the notion of audit committee 
effectiveness. The table summary is categorised into three sections: (1) literature which has focused 
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on governance characteristics, i.e., director independence, director competence, committee size and 
committee meeting frequency; (2) literature which has focused on governance mechanisms, i.e., on 
general governance structures and issues; and (3) literature which has focused on non-audit services, 
auditor independence, audit quality and the integrity of financial reports. 
Table 2.2: Annotated Literature Summary on Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Authors (year) Research Questions/ 
Objectives 
Theory (actual or 
implied)/ Method 
Central Findings/ Conclusions 
(1) Governance Characteristics 
Abbott and 
Parker (2000) 
Investigate the relationship 
between the governance 
characteristic of independence 
and audit committee meeting 
frequency on auditor selection, 
i.e., an industry specialist. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Independent and active (i.e., meet 
at least twice a year) audit 
committees are more likely to the 
select an industry specialist (an 
indicator of external auditor 
quality). 
Abbott et al. 
(2003a) 
Investigate the association 
between the governance 
characteristic of independence 
and audit committee meeting 
frequency on the ratio of non-
audit service fees to total audit 
service fees.  
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Solely independent and active 
(i.e., meets at least four times a 
year) audit committees are more 
likely to purchase less non-audit 
services. 
Non-audit service fees are 
considered as a threat to external 
auditor independence. 
Abbott et al. 
(2003b) 
Investigate the association 
between the governance 
characteristics of 
independence, financial 
expertise and diligence (i.e., 
audit committee meeting 
frequency) on audit service 
fees. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Independent and financially 
expert audit committees are 
associated with higher audit 
service fees, which proxy for audit 
quality. 
Audit committee meeting 
frequency was not associated with 
higher audit service fees. 
Abbott et al. 
(2004) 
 
Investigates whether audit 
committee structures that are 
consistent with the Blue Ribbon 
Committee recommendations 
are less likely to experience a 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Finding support the hypotheses, 
i.e., Blue Ribbon Committee’s 
governance recommendations. 
Audit committees solely 
composed of independent 
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restatement in published 
financial reports. 
 
directors are less likely to 
experience a restatement. 
Audit committees composed of at 
least three directors are less likely 
to experience a restatement. 
Audit committees composed with 
at least one financially literate 
director are less likely to 
experience a restatement. 
Audit committees that meet 
frequently are less likely to 
experience a restatement. 
Beasley (1996) Examines the relation between 
board compositions (i.e., 
independent non-executive 
members) on the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud.  
 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Non-fraud firms have boards with 
significantly higher percentages of 
independent non-executive 
members than fraud firms. 
Board composition rather than 
audit committee presence, is 
more critical for reducing the 
likelihood of financial statement 
fraud. 
Beasley et al. 
(2000) 
Investigates the association 
between audit committee and 
board characteristics of fraud 
and non-fraud firms across the 
technology, health care and 
financial services industries. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Results suggest that different and 
unique fraud opportunity exist for 
each industry. 
Non-fraud firms are more likely to 
have more independent boards 
and audit committees. 
Non-fraud audit committees are 
associated with an increased 
meeting frequency. 
Fraud firms are less likely to have 
an internal control framework. 
Bedard and 
Gendron 2010 
Reviews the literature on audit 
committees to evaluate their 
effectiveness in strengthening 
financial reporting. 
N/A The financial reporting process is 
strengthened with the presence of 
an audit committee and its 
composition in relation to its 
independence, competence, 
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meeting frequency and size.   
Carcello and 
Neal 2000 
Examines the association 
between audit committee 
independence on the likelihood 
of the auditor issuing a going-
concern report for financially 
distressed firms. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
The less independent the audit 
committee the less likely the 
auditor will issue a going-concern 
report. 
Carcello et al. 
(2002) 
Examines the relation between 
the board characteristics of 
independence, diligence 
(meeting frequency) and 
expertise (other directorships 
held) on the audit service fee. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Results indicate that more 
independent, diligent, and expert 
boards seek to protect their 
reputational capital, to avoid legal 
liability, and promote shareholder 
interests by purchasing higher 
quality audit services (cost of such 
services is reflected in the audit 
service fee). 
DeZoort (1998) Examines whether audit 
committee members with 
auditing experience (in internal 
control evaluation) will affect 
their oversight judgments. 
Focuses on the individual 
member level rather than the 
group level. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Results indicate that members 
with experience made internal 
control judgments more like 
auditors than did members 
without experience.   
Provides support for suggestions 
that prior auditing experience may 
improve individual audit 
committee member oversight 
ability. 
DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) 
Investigates whether audit 
committee members with 
audit, corporate governance 
and financial reporting 
knowledge and experience will 
affect their judgments in 
conflict situations between 
auditors and executive 
management. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Results indicate that more 
experienced independent 
directors with greater audit 
knowledge were more likely to 
support the external auditor in 
conflict situations. 
Results provide justification for 
calls that audit committees should 
be completely composed of 
independent directors with mix of 
knowledge and experience. 
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DeZoort et al. 
(2002) 
To synthesise empirical 
literature on audit committee 
effectiveness to guide future 
thinking and research. 
N/A An effective audit committee is to 
have qualified members with the 
authority and resources to protect 
stakeholder interests by ensuring 
reliable financial reporting, 
internal controls, and risk 
management through diligent 
oversight efforts.  
Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) 
Examines how the monitoring 
effectiveness of audit 
committees is affected by the 
personal characteristics of 
accounting experts and the 
presence of non-accounting 
financial experts on audit 
committees. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Accounting experts who are 
independent, held fewer 
directorships, and have a lower 
tenure with the firms had a 
positive impact on accrual quality 
(proxy for financial reporting 
quality). 
Insignificant corresponding results 
for non-accounting financial 
experts. 
Farber (2005) Examines the association 
between the credibility of the 
financial reporting system and 
the quality of governance 
mechanisms.  
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Results indicate that fraud firms 
have poor governance 
mechanisms relative to the 
control sample.  
Fraud firms had fewer 
independent members, meet less 
frequently and had less financial 
expertise on their audit 
committee. 
Klien (2002a) Examines the association 
between audit committee and 
board characteristics on the 
occurrence of biased financial 
reporting.  
Agency/  
Quantitative 
More independent audit 
committees and boards are more 
effective in monitoring the 
financial accounting processes and 
ensuring the firm is less likely to 
be involved in biased financial 
reporting. 
Lary and Taylor 
(2012) 
Examines the association 
between the governance 
characteristics of audit 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Audit committee’s require all 
three measured governance 
characteristics (i.e., 
Akeel M. Lary 
26 
committees and their role 
effectiveness in maintaining the 
integrity financial reports.   
independence, competence and 
diligence) to effectively fulfil their 
various roles of maintaining 
financial statement integrity 
(occurrence and severity of 
financial restatements) and 
external auditor independence 
(lower non-audit service fees to 
audit service fees).  
Turley and 
Zaman (2004) 
To synthesise and evaluate 
current research on the 
governance effects associated 
with audit committee.    
N/A No association between the 
formal adoption of audit 
committee structures or 
characteristics on the 
achievement of governance 
outcomes.  
Vera-Munoz 
(2005)   
Examines audit committee 
effectiveness literature to 
discuss the new expectations in 
relation to audit committee 
responsibilities in the wake of 
corporate governance reforms.     
N/A As the ultimate monitor of the 
financial reporting process; the 
audit committee members must 
be informed, vigilant, and 
financially literate or have a 
general understanding of the 
firms risk framework. 
Xie et al. (2003) Examines the role of the board, 
audit committee and executive 
committee in preventing biased 
financial reporting (i.e., 
earnings management)  
Agency/  
Quantitative 
More independent, financially 
expert and frequently meeting 
boards and audit committees are 
less likely to be involved in biased 
financial reporting.   
Zaman et al. 
(2011) 
Examines the possible influence 
of corporate governance 
quality, i.e.,  audit committee 
effectiveness (independence, 
expertise, meeting frequency 
and size) on auditor 
remuneration. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
More effective audit committees 
are associated with higher audit 
service fees. 
More independent and expert 
audit committees are associated 
with lower non-audit service fees.  
(2) Governance Mechanisms  
Anderson et al. 
(2007) 
Examines the perspectives and 
behaviour of directors and 
Stewardship/ 
Quantitative 
The role of the Board is evolving 
as a strategic partner to 
Akeel M. Lary 
27 
institutional investors. management. 
Directors are seeking a balance 
between their monitoring and 
strategic partnering roles. 
Institutional investors have 
increased their monitoring role. 
Bradbury 
(1990) 
Examines the association 
between agency characteristics 
on the voluntary formation of 
audit committees. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Audit committees are not 
voluntary employed to reduce the 
incentive problems arising from 
the separation of ownership and 
control. 
Cohen et al. 
(2010) 
Examines external auditor 
experiences in their interactions 
with the audit committee, 
board and internal auditors to 
determine whether external 
auditors experiences with these 
governance mechanisms are in 
line with an effective 
monitoring (agency) or 
symbolic (institutional) 
approach in the post Sarbanes-
Oxley era. 
Agency and 
Institutional/  
Qualitative 
In the post Sarbanes-Oxley era 
auditors experiences pointed to 
an effective monitoring approach 
(agency) as opposed to a symbolic 
approach (institutional) as 
indicated by Cohen et al. in 2002 
(pre Sarbanes-Oxley era).    
Dey (2008) Investigates whether corporate 
governance mechanisms are a 
result of firm agency conflicts. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Results support the notion that 
the existence and roles of various 
governance mechanisms are a 
function of the degree of the 
firms’ agency conflicts. 
Gendro and 
Bedard (2006) 
Examines whether audit 
committee effectiveness is 
internally developed and 
sustained by the people who 
attend audit committee 
meetings. 
Agency/  
Qualitative 
Analysis suggests that every 
attendances sense of 
effectiveness is dependent on 
symbolic and reflective acts of the 
audit committee processes and 
outcomes. 
Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1993) 
Investigates the audit 
committee effectiveness in 
terms of the type and extent of 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Audit committee effectiveness is 
perceived as a function of the 
types and extent of its power. 
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its power. 
 
Power Typology 
- Legitimate, significantly related 
to all effectiveness measures. 
- Sanctionary, highly related to 
external auditing effectiveness. 
- Institutional support, highly 
related to external auditing 
effectiveness. 
- Expert, significantly related to 
financial reporting effectiveness. 
- Referent, no significant 
relationship with any 
effectiveness measures. 
- Diligence, strongly related to 
internal auditing effectiveness. 
Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1998) 
Contrast two competing 
theoretical governance 
orientations of agency and 
institutional theory in an 
attempt to better understand 
the effectiveness of audit 
committees. 
Agency and 
Institutional/  
Quantitative 
Effectiveness is a function of audit 
committee processes. 
Results suggest that firms will not 
naturally invest in a degree of 
board oversight to protect 
shareholder interests. 
Finds significant correlations 
between agency and institutional 
theory variables.   
McDaniel et al. 
(2002) 
Investigate the difference 
between judgements made by 
financial experts and literates in 
relation to financial reporting 
quality.    
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Financial literates assess the 
quality elements for reporting 
treatments of prominent and non-
recurring items comparatively 
lower than experts.  
Financial experts assess the 
quality elements for reporting 
treatments of less prominent and 
recurring items comparatively 
lower than literates. 
McMullen 
(1996) 
Examines the association 
between the formal audit 
committee presence and the 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
The presence of an audit 
committee is linked to improved 
financial reporting quality.  
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quality of financial reports. 
Menon and 
Williams (1994) 
Looks for evidence that firms 
actually rely on audit 
committees, i.e., board reliance 
on the audit committee as a 
mechanism to control executive 
management. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Majority of firms voluntarily 
formed audit committees, 
however many did not rely on 
them. 
Audit committee reliance is 
related to board composition (the 
more independent the greater the 
reliance on the audit committee). 
Audit committee activity 
appeared to increase, as the 
proportion of non-executive 
directors increased on the board. 
Audit committee meeting 
frequency is associated with firm 
size.  
Sarens et al. 
(2009) 
Examine the relationship 
between the audit committee 
and the internal audit function. 
Agency and 
Comfort/ 
Qualitative 
Audit committees rely on internal 
auditors to reduce the 
information asymmetry (between 
itself and executive management) 
in relation to the control 
environment and internal 
controls. 
Spangler and 
Braiotta (1990) 
Investigate the audit committee 
effectiveness, in terms of the 
leadership style of its chair.  
Agency/  
Quantitative 
The leadership style of the audit 
committee chair was found to 
influence the effectiveness of the 
audit committee. 
Spira (1998) Examines the link between 
audit committee establishment 
and its effectiveness. 
Institutional/  
Qualitative 
Audit committee effectiveness is 
linked to its purpose and role, 
which are influenced by the initial 
reason for its establishment. 
However, an audit committee will 
evolve into an effective 
monitoring body over its life; its 
reason for establishment will 
affect the speed in which the 
audit committee becomes an 
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effective monitoring body. 
Turley and 
Zaman (2007) 
Examine the conditions and 
processes which affect the 
orientational effectiveness of 
audit committees. 
Institutional/  
Qualitative 
Audit committee effectiveness is 
not solely the result of formal 
structures, characteristics and 
process but is additionally 
dependent on informal voluntary 
interactions and communications. 
The existence and operation of an 
audit committee has behavioural 
effects which influences the 
importance of the functional 
activities of the internal audit. 
The role of the audit committee 
within the governance mosaic 
may be regarded as an ally, arbiter 
and threat. 
(3) Non-audit Services, Auditor Independence, Audit Quality and the Integrity of Financial Reports  
Aier et al. 
(2005) 
Investigates the link between 
accounting restatements and 
the financial expertise of the 
chief financial officer (CFO). 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
The greater the expertise and 
experience of the CFO, the lower 
the probability of restatements. 
Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) 
Investigates Frankel et al. 
(2002)’s results which indicated 
that higher non-audit service 
fees are associated with biased 
financial reporting. 
 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Finds no evidence to support 
Frankel et al. (2002)’s finding that 
external auditors may violate their 
independence due to the 
performance of more non-audit 
services to audit services. 
DeAngelo 
(1981) 
Examines the relation between 
audit firm size and overall audit 
quality. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Ceteris paribus, the larger the size 
of the audit firm (measured by 
number of current clients)and the 
smaller the size of the client as a 
fraction of the auditors total 
returns in excess of the short-term 
opportunity cost, the less 
incentive the auditor has to 
behave opportunistically, and the 
higher the perceived audit quality.    
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Dechow et al. 
(1996) 
Investigates the potential 
causes (relation between 
earnings manipulation and 
governance structure 
weakness) and consequences 
(capital market reactions to 
alleged earnings manipulation) 
of earnings manipulation. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
No evidence to support notion 
that managers manipulate 
earnings for self-interest. 
Poor oversight management 
(governance structure weakness) 
are catalyst for earnings 
manipulation. 
Motivation for earnings 
manipulation is linked to the 
desire for low cost external 
financing. 
Manipulating firms are:  
- More likely to have boards 
dominated by executive 
management; 
- Role duality as the CEO and 
board chair; 
- Less likely to have outside 
blockholders. 
DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 
(1991) 
Examines the incidence of 
accounting errors (i.e., prior-
period adjustments). 
 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Results consistent with the view 
that overstatements errors are 
result of managers responding to 
economic incentives. 
Overstating firms are less likely to 
have audit committees.   
DeFond et al. 
(2002) 
Examines the association 
between non-audit service fees 
and external auditor 
independence. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
No association between non-audit 
service fees and impaired auditor 
independence (i.e choice to issue 
going concern opinion). 
Suggest that market based 
institutional incentives, such as 
reputational loss and litigation 
costs, promote auditor 
independence and outweigh the 
potential economic dependency 
created by higher non-audit 
service fees. 
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Frankel et al. 
(2002) 
Examine whether non-audit 
service fees are associated with 
biased financial reporting. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Results indicate that external 
auditors may potentially violate 
their independence due to the 
performance of more non-audit 
services to audit services. 
Kinney et al. 
(2004) 
 
Examine whether non-audit 
service fees are associated with 
financial restatements. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
No association between non-audit 
service fees for financial 
information system design and 
implementation or internal audit 
services and the occurrence of 
financial restatements. 
Find some evidence of an 
association between unspecified 
non-audit service fees to total 
audit fees and financial 
restatements. 
Tax service fees were associated 
with reduced probability of a 
restatement, which suggests 
improved audit quality. 
Raghunandan 
et al. (2003) 
Examines the association 
between financial restatements 
and the magnitude of non-audit 
service fees to total fees paid to 
the auditor. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Findings are not consistent with 
concerns that non-audit service 
fees influence the audit such that 
financial reports are restated. 
Simunic (1984) Examines the cost efficiency 
from the joint production 
between managerial advisory 
services and the audit service 
fee. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
The audit service fee of clients 
who purchase managerial advisory 
services is significantly higher than 
those who did not. 
Srinivasan 
(2005) 
Examines the career and 
litigation consequences of 
financial restatements (income-
decreasing, income-increasing, 
and technical) for non-
executive directors. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Income-decreasing and income-
increasing restatements, non-
executive directors face a high risk 
for turnover, likelihood for 
departure is increased for audit 
committee members 
(responsibility for overseeing the 
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financial reporting process), and 
are likely to lose positions on 
other boards. 
No evidence of plenty for 
technical restatements. 
Overall results suggest that non-
executive directors, particularly 
audit committee members bare a 
reputational plenty for poor board 
or audit committee oversight.      
Stanley and 
DeZoort (2007) 
Examine the relation between 
the length of the audit firm 
engagements and financial 
restatements. 
Agency/  
Quantitative 
Long-term audit firm 
engagements increased the 
likelihood of financial 
restatements. 
No relation between long-term 
audit engagements and non-audit 
services on the likelihood of 
financial restatements. 
Short-term audit engagements 
lower industry specialisation and 
audit fees increased the likelihood 
of financial restatements, suggests 
that lowballing may impair audit 
quality during initial years of audit 
engagement. 
Lack of client specific knowledge 
(industry specialisation) in short-
term audit engagements may 
impair audit quality.   
 
2.2.3 Audit Committee Characteristics 
Based on the literature summary in Sections (1) and (2) of Table 2.2, the effectiveness of audit 
committees can be regarded as a function of the characteristics of the audit committee and its 
members and related governance mechanisms. The characteristics of the committee include, for 
example, the financial literacy of committee members, the proportion of independent directors on 
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the committee and the frequency of committee meetings. These characteristics and related 
governance mechanisms can be conceived as producing four types of attributes, namely, 
coerciveness, independence, competence and diligence (Lary and Taylor 2012). It is these four 
attributes that can indicate the effectiveness of an audit committee. Each attribute is discussed in 
turn in the next sub-sections. 
2.2.3.1 Coerciveness 
The notion of coerciveness is defined as a function of an audit committees’ responsibilities (formal 
and informal), authority and influence (Abbott et al. 2003b; Carcello et al. 2002; and Lary and Taylor 
2012). Conger et al. (1998) suggest effective boards and audit committees require the power and 
authority to act as a governing body in making key recommendations and decisions; and probing 
executive management in implementing board decisions. Kalbers and Fogarty’s (1993) findings 
suggest the type and extent of audit committee authority is fundamental to its effectiveness. 
Further, Turley and Zaman’s (2007) findings suggest that an audit committee’s ability and authority 
to influence the decisions over its formal responsibilities is critical to its effectiveness, more so than 
its members independence, competence and diligence. Therefore, the formal adoption and 
appointment of an audit committee is without significance if it lacks the authority and influence in 
making key recommendations. A watchdog without teeth is merely a symbolic illusion.   
2.2.3.2 Independence 
From the governance literature, the notion of director independence can be regarded as a 
precedent concept in sound corporate governance practice (Lary and Taylor 2012). Non-executive 
director presence and leadership in monitoring governance mechanisms is considered desirable as it 
ensures the occurrence of proper management oversight (Davis et al. 1997). Further, Fama (1980) 
regards non-executive directors as professional referees tasked with the oversight and stimulation of 
executive management.  
Beasley (1996) identifies that as an internal control mechanism, the viability of a board is enhanced 
with the inclusion of independent non-executive directors. As such directors have incentives to 
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develop their reputations as experts, and such expert reputation is dependent on their performance 
as decision managers (Beasley 1996). Moreover, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) suggest that independent 
directors have less economic incentives to collude with executive management and are more likely 
to objectively monitor executive management performance. Further, Zaman et al. (2011) conclude 
that the potential director litigation risk and reputation impairment acts as an incentive for the 
effective discharge of responsibilities. Therefore, independent board members are considered to 
benefit from prestige, reputational enhancement, learning opportunities and networking (Fama and 
Jensen 1983; Sirinivasan 2005). Accordingly, members who perform their duties effectively are likely 
to be rewarded with additional board appointments, while poor performing members are likely to 
be penalised with termination (Fama and Jensen 1983; Sirinivasan 2005). 
However in relation to the composition of boards, Klien (2002b) identifies that the degree of board 
independence is a reflection of the trade-off between director independence and expertise, which 
reflects the balancing of the firm’s monitoring needs and its requirement for specialised information. 
Klien (2002b) views non-executive directors as independent monitors, while executive directors 
possess specialised expertise in relation to the firm’s activities. Such directors have direct 
information and knowledge about firm operations and investment opportunities, further provide 
insights in relation to suppliers, customers, financial opportunities and legal issues (Klien 2002b). As 
such boards composed of both executive and non-executive directors are better positioned to 
evaluate and ratify a firm’s future strategic plans (Klien 2002b). 
As the audit committee holds an oversight role its independence is critical for ensuring monitoring 
quality (Bedard and Gendron 2010). Bradbury (1990) hypothesises that the establishment of audit 
committees is to: (1) increase the creditability of audited financial statements; (2) enhance auditor 
independence; and (3) assist directors in meeting their fiduciary duties and responsibilities. This 
indicates that a corporate board will have the incentive to form an audit committee in order to fulfil 
these three essential functions articulated by Bradbury (1990). Further, McMullen (1996) suggests 
Akeel M. Lary 
36 
that audit committees composed of non-executive directors are more likely to enhance the 
effectiveness and independence of auditors. The ASX considers audit committees as efficient 
monitoring mechanisms when primarily composed of non-executive and independent directors (ASX 
2010a).  
The concept of independence is regarded to improve the monitoring ability of audit committees’ 
because independent directors lack the economic ties to executive management which may 
interfere with their ability to question and probe executive management (Abbott et al. 2004). 
Further, directors that are independent of executive management are more likely to demand higher 
quality audits, display better financial reporting quality, be more interested in reducing the 
likelihood of fraud and earnings management, and be concerned with threats which are likely to 
impair auditor independence (Zain et al. 2006; Zaman et al. 2011). Independent audit committee 
members are considered to demand greater levels of audit assurance, as independent directors are 
concerned with the enhancement and preservation of their professional reputation and liability 
minimisation (Abbott et al. 2003a; 2003b). Consequently, independent members are regarded to 
provide stronger support for auditors during scope negotiations with management (Abbott et al. 
2003b). 
2.2.3.3 Competence  
Conger et al. (1998) contend business environments are so complex and intricate that they can be 
regarded as labyrinths. Consequently, it is nearly impossible for any one person or small group of 
individuals to completely comprehend issues that come before a board (Conger et al. 1998). 
Therefore, to be effective boards require a broad range of information in relation to their firm’s 
operations and its environment (Conger et al. 1998). Presented information should be clear and 
concise as board time is scarce (Conger et al. 1998). However, board members should be competent 
to ensure an understanding and comprehension of presented information. Accordingly, competent 
members are regarded as more able monitors (Abbott et al. 2003b; DeZoort and Salterio 2001; Lary 
and Taylor 2012; Zaman et al. 2011). Therefore, it is critical to ensure regular assessments of board 
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expertise and experience, to ensure maintenance in the right mix of expertise and experience, which 
matches a firm’s strategic demands (Conger et al. 1998). 
Given the nature of board and audit committee operations and functions, i.e., operating as a group, 
their effectiveness is often defined as a collective ability to fulfil original roles and oversight 
responsibilities (Conger et al. 1998; DeZoort 1998). In this respect, Lindell (cited in DeZoort 1998) 
suggested that the competence of audit committees is largely dependent on the competence of its 
members. In addition, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) find that directors holding prior directorships or 
industry experience are better equipped to address board and audit committee issues and concerns. 
Accordingly, a competent audit committee is considered to have a mix of both financial and industry 
sophistication (DeZoort and Salterio 2001; Lary and Taylor 2012). Such audit committees are 
considered better equipped and prepared to monitor the integrity of audited financial statements 
(Lary and Taylor 2012; Vera-Munoz 2005).  
Moreover, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) identify that the effectiveness of audit committees may be 
improved with the inclusion of members skilled in the function areas of accounting, finance and 
corporate relations. For effective audit committees, their members need to be able to comprehend 
the various financial and operational issues confronting the firm’s executive management (Abbott et 
al. 2004). DeZoort et al. (2002) suggest that audit committee members should be financially 
competent to the extent that the group does not heavily rely on one financial expert, to avoid 
situations where other members add little value and fail to address issues.  
The literature identifies financially competent and knowledgeable audit committees as being better 
equipped for overseeing and understanding the complexities of the financial reporting process and 
detect material misstatements (Abbott et al. 2003b; Zaman et al. 2011). Accordingly such members 
are better able to understand auditing issues, risks, and the audit pressures proposed to address 
these issues and risks (Abbott et al. 2003b; Zaman et al. 2011). Zain et al. (2006) believe that more 
financially competent audit committees are able to enhance internal audit structures and processes, 
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which increases the probability that external auditors will rely on internal auditors and their work. As 
the external auditor is to assess the risk of a material misstatement in clients’ financial statements, 
this includes a review of the internal control system (Zain et al. 2006). The internal audit function is 
part of this internal control system; as such external auditors will seek to understand tests of internal 
controls and substantive testing procedures as part of the audit planning process (Zain et al. 2006). 
2.2.3.4 Diligence  
Diligence is regarded as an audit committee process factor required for effective operations; it refers 
to individual member desire to carry out their monitoring roles (Lary and Taylor 2012). Factors 
include number of meetings and member behaviour; this includes member preparation before 
meetings, attentiveness and participation during meetings, and post-meeting follow-ups (Carcello et 
al. 2002; Lary and Taylor 2012). Conger et al. (1998) suggest that directors require sufficient and well 
organised periods of time together as a group to make effective decisions.  
Prior studies have often used audit committee meeting frequency and size as indirect proxy 
measures for board and audit committee diligence. Such studies find audit committees which are 
composed of at least three members and which meet frequently are more likely to be effective 
monitors. Such audit committees are believed to have adequate resources and are continually up to 
date with current firm issues. Accordingly, the literature identifies frequently meeting audit 
committees as diligent; that is, frequently meeting audit committees are more likely to be informed 
and knowledgeable on current auditing issues (Abbott et al. 2003b; Abbott et al. 2004). Therefore, 
they are better positioned to address such issues in a timely manner, which leads to a reduced 
incidence of financial statement restatement and a more diligent discharge of their duties (Abbott et 
al. 2003b; Abbott et al. 2004). 
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2.2.4 External Auditor Issues, Financial Statement Integrity and Audit Committee 
Effectiveness  
Based on the literature summary in Section (3) of Table 2.2, the effectiveness of an audit committee 
can also be manifest in the external auditor’s extent of non-audit services and independence, as well 
as the level of integrity of financial statements.  
2.2.4.1 Concern over non-audit service fees 
Levitt (2000) identifies the complexity of the relationship between the external auditor and auditee, 
and regards non-audit service fees as intensifying this relationship. This is particularly relevant 
because approximately 50% of revenue earned by large audit firms is generated by non-audit 
services (Levitt 2000). Concern regarding the significance of the non-audit service fee was 
exacerbated by the Enron case, where their auditors reported having received $25m in audit service 
fees and $27m in non-audit service fees (Beattie et al. 2011). Abbott et al. (2003a) found that while 
non-audit services are likely to have little impact on the auditor’s ability to detect material 
misstatements, such services may create a perceived reduction in the auditor’s willingness to report 
a material misstatement. In addition, Raghunandan et al. (2003) found that audit firms have become 
far too dependent on revenue generated from non-audit service fees and are unwilling to risk such 
revenues by opposing executive management.  
The major concern of the debate on non-audit service fee is over auditor independence. Abbott et 
al. (2004) believe that the most critical auditor characteristic in reducing financial statement 
restatement occurrence and severity is independence. DeFond et al. (2002, p.1251) defined auditor 
independence “as the probability that the auditor will report a discovered breach in the financial 
reports … auditor independence is synonymous with auditor objectivity and the ability to withstand 
client pressure to acquiesce to substandard reporting”. The debate over the non-audit service fee 
recognises that income from non-audit services may strengthen the economic bond between the 
audit firm and audit client (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Frankel et al. 2002; Kinney et al. 2004). This 
economic bond is regarded as threatening to an auditor’s independence as it creates fear of revenue 
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loss (Frankel et al. 2002). This fear in turn increases the audit firms’ financial dependence on the 
audit client, thereby deteriorating the auditors’ wiliness to oppose executive management pressure 
and increasing the auditor’s incentive to acquiesce to executive management pressure, e.g., 
pressure to allow earnings manipulation and object to executive management’s accounting choices 
(Ashbaugh et al. 2003; DeFond et al. 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Kinney et al. 2004). Frankel et al. 
(2002) and Defond and Jiambalvo (1991) find that the performance of non-audit services potentially 
impairs auditor’s independence; however, Ashbaugh et al.’s (2003) and Raghunandan et al.’s (2003) 
finding is contra. 
Alternatively, Simunic (1984) finds that the audit service fee of firms that purchased non-audit 
services (i.e., managerial advisory services) is significantly higher than those that did not. This 
suggests that firms which purchase non-audit services are experiencing unusual problems, which 
motivates their purchase of non-audit services and the consequential increase in the audit service 
fee (Simunic 1984). Moreover, non-audit service fees are correspondingly regarded as improving 
audit quality and reducing the audit service fee through knowledge spillovers; i.e., when an auditor 
provides both services, the auditor aims to gain insider knowledge (DeFond et al. 2002; Frankel et al. 
2002; Kinney et al. 2004).  
Therefore, this view identifies market-based incentives as motivating auditors (Raghunandan et al. 
2003). Consequently, an auditor has an overarching concern over their professional reputation 
which acts as an incentive in the maintenance of independence and audit quality (Raghunandan et 
al. 2003). According to Simunic (1984), the degree of competition among auditing firms is a critical 
factor in ensuring the efficiency of these market-based incentives. Meanwhile, DeFond et al. (2002) 
recognise the presence of market-based incentives for auditors to remain independent.  However 
they note that non-audit service fees are a force which may potentially threaten the auditors’ 
independence by increasing the economic bond, i.e., the auditors’ financial dependence on the audit 
client (DeFond et al. 2002).  
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Turning to the association between external auditors’ services on audit committees, Carcello et al.’s 
(2002) findings suggest that effective boards and audit committees are associated with increased or 
higher external audit service fees. Alternatively, Abbott et al. (2003b) explain that an auditor may 
view an effective audit committee as improving the overall control environment, in turn reducing 
the auditor’s control risk and the amount of audit work deemed necessary, i.e., effective audit 
committees are likely to reduce the external auditor’s service fee. Ashbaugh et al. (2003, p. 612) 
address the overall significance and relevance of the fee ratio by offering the following consideration 
“two firms in our sample have a fee ratio of 73 percent; one firm reports total fees of $71,000 and 
the other firm reports total fees of $5.7 million. Based on their fee ratios, both firms are considered 
threats to independence, whereas only the latter is economically significant to the auditor”. This 
view is in line with DeAngelo’s (1981) findings which identifies that the lower the economic benefit 
from non-audit services proportional to the audit firms total economic benefit, the lower the 
incentive of the auditor to behave opportunistically. 
2.2.4.2 Integrity of financial statements 
Dechow et al. (1996, p.4) note that initial motivations for fraud, misrepresentation and manipulation 
of financial reports are  “*1+ To encourage investors to buy an interest in a company's stock as 
owners, or in bonds as creditors … *2+ To increase the value of the stock of present shareholders of 
the company”. Accordingly, Stanley and DeZoort (2007) identify financial statement or 
announcement restatements resulting from either error or fraud as de facto reporting failures. This 
is because the originally released financial information is not free from material errors (Stanley and 
DeZoort 2007). This financial reporting integrity literature does not regard occurrences of 
restatements as direct manifestations of financial report fraud, misrepresentation or manipulation, 
but rather as an irregularity occurrence (e.g., Abbott et al. 2004; Aier et al. 2005).  Only Farber 
(2005) and Beasley (1996) have considered malfeasance based on a proxy of fraud disclosures to 
assess the effectiveness of audit committees to maintain the integrity of financial statements. 
Moreover, Sirinivasan (2005) believes that the occurrence of a restatement merely implies that an 
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irregularity occurred and that this irregularity has been detected and corrected. However the 
integrity of financial statement preparation and assurance processes would have been weakened in 
the process. 
This financial reporting integrity literature typically regards financial restatements as explicit 
acknowledgments of material omissions or misstatements in previously released financial reports 
(Abbott et al. 2004). Figure 2.1 (below) identifies and illustrates the typical process of financial 
report restatement incidence, occurrence and detection (see Eilifsen and Messier 2000 for a review). 
Accordingly, Abbott et al. (2004) and Eilifsen and Messier (2000) identify four conditions for the 
occurrence of financial report restatement: 
(1) The occurrence of a material misstatement as a result of some type of inherent risk (e.g., 
executive management’s aggressive accounting practices or accounting standard 
misapplication);  
(2) The firm’s internal controls fail to prevent and detect the material misstatement, due to 
ineffective or poorly designed internal controls; 
(3)  The external auditor fails to detect the misstatement and financial statements are issued; 
(4) The misstatement is subsequently discovered and if deemed material corrected. 
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Figure 2.1: Process of Financial Report Restatement Incidence, Occurrence and Detection 
 
Source: Eilifsen and Messier 2000, p.4 
2.3 CURRENT GOVERNANCE THEORIES  
As previously mentioned, corporate governance has been driven by financial scandal and corporate 
collapses due largely to executive management’s self-interested decisions and behaviour (Mallin 
2010). Hence, agency theory is considered the fundamental underlying paradigm for corporate 
governance research and policy-making (Anderson et al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2008).  While corporate 
governance literature has been predominantly driven by agency theory, some researchers have 
addressed corporate governance through other theoretical lenses. These other recognized corporate 
governance theoretical paradigms include institutional theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder 
theory, resource dependence, and managerial hegemony (Cohen et al. 2008; Mallin 2010; Todd 
2010). In this thesis, the application of underpinning theory to a case study based investigation of 
audit committees will be limited in scope to aspects of two theoretical paradigms, known as grand 
Akeel M. Lary 
44 
theories – namely, agency theory and institutional theory. Consequently, the theoretical 
perspectives of stewardship, stakeholders, resource dependence, and managerial hegemony are 
briefly reviewed as to their possible use in corporate governance research. They also provide a point 
of departure from agency and institutional theories. The following sections then go on to review in 
detail the use of agency theory and institutional theory in corporate governance research. 
2.3.1 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory is viewed as an alternative paradigm to agency theory. It asserts that the model 
of man is self-actualising and collective, as opposed to self-serving and individualistic (Anderson et 
al. 2007; Davis et al. 1997). The behaviour of stewards is regarded as collective, because stewards 
seek to adhere to and attain the objectives of their principals (Davis et al. 1997).  
Stewardship theory identifies executive mangers as stewards and not as agents as they are not 
motivated by individual goals (Davis et al. 1997). Following stewardship theory’s behavioural 
assumption, executive mangers would act in the best interests of principals, regardless of whether 
monitoring and incentive mechanisms are put in place. Executive managers’ behaviour is assumed to 
be self-actualising and collective. Therefore stewards place greater emphasis on the firm rather than 
self-serving behaviour (Anderson et al. 2007; Davis et al. 1997). In summary the steward's utility 
functions are maximised by protecting and maximising the principal’s wealth (Davis et al. 1997).  
The stewardship paradigm “presumes that managers are inherently good stewards of corporations 
and can be trusted to work diligently at attaining high levels of corporate profit and shareholders’ 
returns … this presumption leads … *to the+ conclusion that boards … *and their sub-committees] are 
redundant” (Todd 2010, p. 59). Alternatively, Anderson et al. (2007) note that following the 
stewardship paradigm the role of the board and its sub-committees would have to be revised to act 
in ways which empower executive managers, rather than a means of control through monitoring. 
The stewardship paradigm while relevant may be more directly suited to contractual relationships in 
non-commercial contexts, e.g., volunteer workers in charitable organisations. However, stewardship 
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theory would not be directly suited to addressing the governance phenomenon which has been 
driven by corporate collapses and financial scandals (i.e., greed and self-serving behaviour), while 
being motivated by investor desire for increased transparency, accountability and market confidence 
(Collier and Zaman 2005; Mallin 2010). 
2.3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory maintains that firms are not only accountable to shareholders but rather to the 
larger community within which the firm operates and interacts (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Riahi-
Belkaoui 2003). Traditionally the stakeholder view identifies a firm as accountable to all actors whom 
have a stake in the firm (Donaldson and Preston 1995). This includes investors, employees, 
customers, suppliers, lenders, local communities, governments and political groups (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995; Riahi-Belkaoui 2003). However, the traditional stakeholder view has been criticised as 
too narrow, since it only includes actors which the firm is dependent upon for its continued survival 
(Riahi-Belkaoui 2003). Consequently, the modern stakeholder view defines a stakeholder to include 
any actor or group which can affect the achievement of firm objectives, or is affected by the 
achievement of firm objectives. Hence, this view accounts for mute (e.g., environment) and absent 
(e.g., future generations) stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997; Riahi-Belkaoui 2003). Stakeholder 
theory is useful for identifying and determining stakeholder salience, which can aid firms in 
prioritising and addressing stakeholder demands, needs and concerns (Mitchell et al. 1997).  
Adopting the stakeholder paradigm means that the establishment and strengthening of specific 
governance mechanisms is rationalised as responses to stakeholder concerns.  Additionally, it 
suggests that boards will promote stakeholder interests as opposed to firm objectives. The 
stakeholder paradigm is useful for identifying firm stakeholders and how firms will address 
stakeholder concerns. While holding great prospective significance to governance research and 
policy-making, it creates high complexity and uncertainty in designing corporate governance 
mechanisms and decision-rules that can align diverse and competing stakeholder interests, some of 
whom will have no direct voice.  
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Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that stakeholder theory has been invoked to give deeper insights 
into governance (e.g., Greenwood 2007; Van Buren and Greenwood 2009). This thesis, however, is 
primarily focused on the audit committee, where direct demands or pressures from stakeholders 
such as shareholders or ratepayers and regulators are filtered  through the relevant corporate board 
or local government. 
2.3.3 Resource Dependence 
Developed in the strategic management literature, the resource dependence paradigm can be 
viewed as a contrast to the institutional paradigm (Cohen et al. 2008). Where the institutional 
paradigm assumes that actors are motived to comply with external pressures, the resource 
dependence perspective assumes actors are motivated to optimise available economic choices 
(Oliver 1997). Consequently, resource dependency actors make economically rational choices, as 
opposed to the normative rational choices of actors under institutional theory (Oliver 1997). 
Resource dependency theory postulates that resource selection and accumulation is a function of 
internal firm decision making and external strategic factors (Oliver 1997). Internal firm decision 
making suggests that actors are guided by economic rationality and are driven by motives of 
efficiency, effectiveness and profitability (Oliver 1997). In comparison, external strategic factors 
include buyer and supplier power, competition intensity, and market structure, i.e., industry factors 
which impact the firm (Oliver 1997).  
In terms of corporate governance issues, resource dependence theory focuses on the contribution of 
governance mechanisms as vehicles which help firms achieve and further their strategic objectives 
(Cohen et al. 2008). Additionally, it suggests that both shareholders and executive managers may 
rely on the board as a means to manage and access scarce resources (Cohen et al. 2008). Further, it 
suggests that the board is also to help set the strategy of the firm (Cohen et al. 2008). Consequently 
the role of the board is more of a partner to executive management rather than its monitor (Cohen 
et al. 2008). Cohen et al. (2008) identify that the resource dependence paradigm enhances long-
term firm success as board members are focused on firm strategy. The resource dependence 
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paradigm holds some significance in addressing the governance phenomena, but it potentially fails 
to address the importance of the board in acting as a monitor of executive managers.   
2.3.4 Managerial Hegemony 
Managerial hegemony was originally proposed in the management strategy literature (Cohen et al. 
2008). Similarly to agency theory it views actors as self-serving, yet simultaneously concerned with 
firm legitimacy as with institutional theory. However, unlike institutional theory, actors are more 
likely to conceal legitimising type pressure. It suggests that executive managers will select associates 
and colleagues who are willing to be passive participants and who will not curtail their actions 
(Cohen et al. 2008).  
Consequently, the board is composed of members who are selected to be ‘yes-men’ to executive 
managers’ decisions and actions. Therefore the board and its sub-committees are viewed as passive 
participants in the governance process, and are additionally dependent on executive managers for 
information and insights about the firm and its industry (Cohen et al. 2008). This paradigm views 
governance mechanisms as symbolic, i.e., meeting regulatory requirements, rather than of 
substance, i.e., a tool for executive manager control and oversight (Cohen et al. 2008). Therefore, 
the managerial hegemony perspective views the board and its sub-committees as being under 
management control and existing merely to fulfil regulatory requirements (Cohen et al. 2008). While 
this paradigm reveals alarming concerns regarding the governance phenomenon, it holds more 
relevance in a US setting due to the duality in the roles of the CEO and board chair.  
2.4 THE AGENCY PARADIGM 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that the theory of agency is a theory of firm ownership 
structure, associated with property rights and finance. Additionally, Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests that 
agency theory is of practical use in understanding contractual relationships and why certain 
contractual relationships arise. Agency theory’s application to the understanding of contractual 
relationships has much to do with testing the veracity of the theory’s assumptions. These 
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assumptions are that (1) actors are self-interested, rationally bounded and risk adverse; (2) firms 
have conflicting objectives among its actors; and (3) information is a purchased commodity 
(Eisenhardt 1989a). However, Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) noted that at the broadest level the heart 
of agency theory is economic self-interest. Accordingly, the agency paradigm views a firm as a nexus 
of “a set of contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest” 
(Fama 1980, p. 289). Moreover, according to Alchian-Demsetz (cited in Fama 1980, p. 291) adopting 
the agency paradigm suggests that  
“The essence of the classical firm is identified … as a contractual structure with: 1) 
joint input production; 2) several input owners; 3) the classical firm one party who is 
common to all the contracts of the joint inputs; 4) who has the right to renegotiate 
any input's contract independently of contracts with other input owners; 5) who holds 
the residual claim; and 6) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual 
status. The central agent is called the firm's owner and the employer”. 
Further, Jensen and Meckling (1976) believed that a firm is not an individual but a legal fiction; which 
serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships and a focus for the complex process for the 
equilibriumisation of conflicting objectives. As such, the agency paradigm defines a firm as a legal 
entity which serves as a nexus for a complex set of contracts (both written and unwritten), and these 
contracts determine the rules of the game and its critical dimensions; that is the performance 
evaluation system, reward system, and assignment of decision rights (Jensen 2001b). Accordingly, 
Fama (1980) contended that the view of a firm as a nexus for a set of contracts has an ulterior 
motive. It is to dispel “the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders [this] is 
important because it is a first step toward understanding that control over a firm's decisions is not 
necessarily the province of security holders” (Fama 1980, p. 290). That is, firm owners are principals 
as they contract individuals (agents), who are to manage their firm on their behalf (Davis et al. 
1997). 
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As such, agency theory is underpinned by the notion that ownership (or risk bearing) and control (or 
management) are separate factors within the nexus of contracts which makes up the firm (Fama 
1980). As a result of this separation, an agency relationship is created. Jensen and Meckling (1976, 
p.308) define this agency relationship as a 
“contract  under  which  one  or  more persons  (the  principal(s))  engage  another  
person  (the  agent)  to  perform  some service  on  their  behalf  which  involves  
delegating  some decision  making  authority to  the  agent”. 
Moreover, parties within this contractual relationship are utility maximisers; accordingly, the 
interests of agent(s) may diverge from those of the principals, and therefore the agent will not 
always act in the best interests of the principal (Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Further, 
Davis et al. (1997, p. 22) state “given the opportunity, agents will rationally maximize their own 
utility at the expense of their principals”. As such, the contractual relationship between principals 
and agents is fraught with conflicting interests resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control (Dey 2008). This conflict produces divergent objectives and information asymmetries (Dey 
2008). Information asymmetry refers to the principal’s resource scarcity and/or inability to observe 
and verify the actions of agents (Eisenhardt 1989a; Kalbers and Fogarty 1998). This creates a power 
imbalance that can bring about behaviours of adverse selection and moral hazard (Akerlof 1970; 
Eisenhardt 1989a; Kalbers and Fogarty 1998). 
In explaining the separation of ownership and control, the notion of control is typically referred to as 
management which is a type of labour with a specialised role of “coordinating the activities of inputs 
and carrying out the contracts agreed among inputs” (Fama 1980, p. 290). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976, p. 308) refer to the process of creating control as the principals’ engagement of an agent(s) 
“to perform a service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority”. 
Further, Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 303) identify the exercise of decision making authority as a 
process or system which involves four steps:  
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1. “initiation – generation of proposals for resource utilization and structuring of 
contracts;  
2. ratification – choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented;  
3. implementation – execution of ratified decisions; and  
4. monitoring –  measurement of the performance of decision agents and 
implementation of rewards”.  
“Because the initiation and implementation of decisions typically are allocated to the 
same agents, it is convenient to combine these two functions under the term decision 
management. Likewise, the term decision control includes the ratification and 
monitoring of decisions. Decision management and decision control are the 
components of the organization's decision process or decision system” (Fama and 
Jensen 1983, pp.303-304). 
As a result, Fama and Jensen (1983) identify three principle contract mechanisms within the nexus of 
contracts, decision management, decision control, and residual risk bearing. Additionally, Fama and 
Jensen (1983, p. 305-306) noted that without the “separation of decision management from decision 
control, residual claimants have little protection against [the potential] opportunistic actions of 
decision agents”. 
Therefore, as a result of the separation of ownership and control, agency theory views control 
agents as self-interested actors who may engage in opportunistic behaviour, i.e., control agents have 
the incentive and ability to manipulate firm outcomes to maximise their own utility (Carcello et al. 
2002; Cohen et al. 2008; Dey 2008; Jenson and Meckling 1976). Consequently, principals need to 
establish mechanisms to monitor, control, and limit the potential undesirable actions and 
behaviours of these self-serving agents, and align agent actions, behaviours, and objectives to the 
interests of their principals (Dey 2008; Todd 2010). Jensen (2001a, p. 49) noted that the “central 
Akeel M. Lary 
51 
proposition of agency theory is that rational self-interested people always have incentives to reduce 
or control conflicts of interest, so as to reduce the losses these conflicts engender”. 
The essence of agency theory is summed up in the concept of the ‘agency problem’. The agency 
problem is defined by the separation of ownership and control, as control is in the hands of 
contracted individuals whom act as agents on behalf of the owners (Anderson et al. 2007). It arises 
due to conflicting interests and information asymmetries (Eisenhardt 1989a). Anderson et al. (2007, 
p.781) noted that the debate in relation to the agency problem “began in earnest with Berle and 
Means’ (1932) seminal work on the separation of ownership … and control”. Furthermore, the 
essence of the agency problem is that agents will behave in opportunistic ways which serve their 
own interests at the expense of their principals (Anderson et al. 2007; Eisenhardt 1989a).  
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that agency problems arise as firm contracts may not be 
costlessly written and enforced. As such, in controlling the agency problem, principals need to incur 
interest alignment costs because, given the opportunity, agents will rationally maximise their own 
utility at the expense of their principals; such costs are referred as agency costs (Cohen et al. 2008; 
Davis et al. 1997). Costs of agency include the costs of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of 
contracts among agents with conflicting interests; it also includes lost output value when the full 
cost of contract enforcement exceeds its benefits (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
The relationship between firm owners (shareholders) and executive managers is regarded as a pure 
agency relationship, as it is uniquely associated with conflicting interests, i.e., divergent objectives 
and information asymmetries which arise due to the separation of ownership and control (Davis et 
al. 1997; Dey 2008). Agency theory depicts shareholders as principals whose interests need 
protection from executive managers, as these executive managers are self-interested agents who 
could engage in opportunistic behaviour and whose interests may diverge from their principals; 
where both executive managers and firm owners are utility maximisers (Cohen et al. 2008; Davis et 
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al. 1997; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Figure 2.2 (below) depicts this traditional agency governance 
model.  
Figure 2.2: The Traditional Agency Governance Model 
 
Todd (2010) notes that the agency paradigm presumes that executive managers are self-interested 
agents of firm owners who need to be monitored and controlled in order to limit self-interested 
behaviour and to align their behaviour with the interests of firm owners. As executive managers are 
presumed to have conflicting interests, they are regarded as having the incentive and ability to 
maximise their own utility at the expense of corporate owners (Dey 2008). However, Dey (2008) 
noted that contracts alone may not always be enough to resolve such conflicting interests. 
“Consequently, the owners (and in some situations the managers themselves) have reason to 
establish mechanisms to monitor managerial activities and limit undesirable managerial behaviour” 
(Dey 2008, p. 1144). 
The solution to constraining such opportunistic behaviours is to impose a combination of monitoring 
and incentives (Anderson et al. 2007). Monitoring serves to increase the quality and flow of 
information to firm owners in relation to the behaviours of management while incentives serve to 
align the interests of agents with those of the firm owners to promote and encourage desired 
behaviour (Anderson et al. 2007). Therefore, adopting an agency paradigm assumes that the agency 
separation constitutes the primary motivation for the existence of corporate governance 
mechanisms (Bedard and Gendron 2010; Bradbury 1990). As such, corporate governance is regarded 
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as a contractual mechanism, presumed to reduce agency costs resulting from the information 
asymmetries between principals and agents (Cohen et al. 2008).  
“A common contractual means for reducing these agency costs is the provision for an 
independent party (the board) to monitor the agent (the management) while 
reporting back to the owner (the stockholders). Hence, the primary attributes for a 
board member in the agency perspective are independence from management and 
expertise in monitoring and control” (Cohen et al. 2008, p. 183).  
Governance mechanisms and compensation schemes are established to protect the interests of firm 
owners and to ensure an alignment of agent-principal interests (Davis et al. 1997). Therefore, to 
enhance the viability of the board as an internal control mechanism, appropriate incentive schemes 
need to be established to align director interests with those they are meant to represent, i.e., 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Beasley 1996; Conger et al. 1998). Lary and Taylor (2012) 
explained that governance mechanisms need to function effectively to limit the potential agency 
problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. 
Following the agency paradigm, the purpose of the board is to constrain opportunistic behaviour 
and control agents (executive management) by acting as monitors (Anderson et al. 2007). “The 
board is viewed as a market-induced institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the set of contracts 
called a firm, whose most important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm” 
(Fama 1980, p. 294). The board (the decision controller) delegates the decision management and 
many decision control functions to internal agents; however it retains ultimate control over these 
internal agents (Fama and Jensen 1983). Moreover, Spangler and Braiotta (1990) note that with the 
increasing complexity and size of firms and the separation of ownership and control, firm owners 
require assurance with respect to the integrity of the financial reporting process, as well as the 
internal and external auditing processes. Accordingly, the agency paradigm presumes the role of the 
board is to monitor executive management, while the audit committee is to reduce agency costs by 
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monitoring and ensuring financial reporting quality (Dhaliwal et al. 2010). As such, boards and audit 
committees act as important signalling mechanisms to stakeholders (in particular current or 
potential stockholders) by conferring control transparency and competency (Cohen et al. 2008). 
Further, adopting the agency paradigm the role of the auditor is one of assurance, which is to 
provide assurance that management reports and the financial statements conform to the 
contractual relationship between firm owners and control agents (Eilifsen and Messier 2000). 
Moreover, this role of the auditor extends to giving assurance that financial statements are free 
from material misstatements (Eilifsen and Messier 2000).  
The agency paradigm views the audit committee as a mechanism which strengthens information 
quality by monitoring executive managers and auditors (Bedard and Gendron 2010; McMullen 
1996). An audit committee attempts to protect the principal’s interests by monitoring the actions of 
agents, in relation to financial reporting, risk management and internal control (McMullen 1996). 
That is the audit committee is expected to reduce information asymmetries between principals and 
agents, and executive and non-executive board members (McMullen 1996; Sarens et al. 2009). 
Sarens et al. (2009) note the inherent existence of an informational asymmetry between the audit 
committee and executive management in relation to the risk framework and internal controls; they 
identify the internal audit function as a key mechanism for reducing this informational asymmetry. 
Therefore, adopting an agency paradigm, principals’ have clear reason to establish such mechanisms 
to monitor agent activities and limit their potential undesirable behaviours (Dey 2008). However, 
since principal-agent contracts do not always resolve conflicting interests and informational 
asymmetries, corporate governance mechanisms may evolve to help mitigate the informational 
asymmetry and conflicting interests (Dey 2008).  
Nevertheless, agency theory has been criticised for its generalisation that human behaviour is at all 
times self-interested as historically humans have displayed signs of altruistic behaviour. However, 
Jensen (2001a) argues that there is no inconsistency between self-interested and altruistic 
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behaviour, i.e., the notion of altruistic behaviour does not imply a perfect agent. Jensen (2001a, p. 
42) defines a perfect agent as a person “who makes decisions with no concern for his or her own 
preferences”. However, he also argues that the “willingness to sacrifice some of one’s own time, 
energy, and resources for the benefit of others by no means indicates that a person is a perfect 
agent” (Jensen 2001a, p. 42). Jensen (2001a, p. 43) stated that 
“Mother Teresa was not a perfect agent because she would have been willing to 
devote her time and energy to arbitrarily chosen ends of an employer. Her 
preferences evidenced a strong desire to help the poor of Calcutta over all sorts of 
alternatives, and to that extent she was self-interested although altruistic”. 
While Kalbers and Forgarty (1998) state that economic self-interest is placed in the centre of the 
theoretical explanation of agency theory, Jensen (2001a) alternatively argues that self-interested 
behaviour (i.e., personal preferences) is placed in the centre of the theoretical explanation of agency 
theory. He, therefore, contends that the nature of human behaviour is defined as dualistic (i.e., both 
rational and irrational) and coexisting in inherent contradiction (Jensen 2001a). This contradiction is 
not an aberration from normality but rather an integral part of normality (Jensen 2001a). The use of 
incentives addresses self-control problems, i.e., resist self-destructive impulses or irrational 
behaviour (Jensen 2001a). Consequently, the agency model inherently remains opportunistic, 
regardless of the fact that the interest divergence between principal and agent may differ to varying 
degrees (Davis et al. 1997). Therefore the viewpoint stands that governance mechanisms are to be 
regarded as tools of control. 
2.5 THE INSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM 
Institutional theory provides a basis for understanding the process of how certain structures develop 
and change (Dillard et al. 2004). According to Cohen et al. (2008) institutional theory considers a 
comprehensive set of firm dynamics, this includes the institutional environment and the ceremonial 
structures that actors within this dynamic display. Additionally Dillard et al. (2004) identify the 
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primary concern of institutional theory as a firm’s interaction within its institutional environment, 
and the effects of social expectations on the firm, including the incorporation of these expectations 
as reflected in firm practices and structures.  
Institutional theory identifies the existence of a firm in a superordinate social system, which utilises 
resources that may otherwise be allocated, where firm survival is dependent on the legitimate 
utilisation of these resources (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Oliver (1997, p.699) notes that from an 
institutional paradigm “firms operate within a social framework of norms, values, and taken-for-
granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic behaviour”. 
Moreover, Scott (1987) argues that such a paradigm suggests that a firm’s structure is an adaptive 
vehicle which is shaped in reaction to internal and external factors – namely, the characteristics and 
commitments of participants, and the influences and constraints from the external environment. 
The notion of institutionalisation underpins institutional theory; institutionalisation is viewed as a 
social process by which a shared definition of a social reality (i.e., legitimacy) comes to be accepted 
by the actors within an institutional environment (Scott 1987). Accordingly, legitimacy is considered 
an outcome of the institutionalisation process which is enacted by focal institutional actors and the 
relevant norms and values of other institutional actors (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). This makes the 
notion of legitimacy at heart of institutional theory.  Firms will actively engage in convergence so 
their practices and processes align to the prevailing definitions of institutional legitimacy, set by the 
superordinate social system, in an attempt to enhance or protect their legitimacy by conforming to 
the expectations of institutional actors (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). 
Additionally, firm activities are motivated by an imperative of legitimacy-seeking behaviour, such 
behaviour is influenced by institutionally constructed norms (Dillard et al. 2004).  Firm survival is 
dependent on firm interaction within its institutional environment as perceived as acceptable by the 
various constituents of that environment (Dillard et al. 2004). Consequently, the notion of legitimacy 
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may be viewed as a resource which can enhance firm survival, although survival is loosely dependent 
on legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Zucker 1987).   
Legitimate processes, practices, structures and actions are defined within the firm’s institutional 
environment (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009). This institutional environment transcends the 
industry in which firms directly compete (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009). It is an environment that 
establishes the idiosyncratic rules, belief systems, and practices deemed to be legitimate (Berrone 
and Gomez-Mejia 2009). As such, firms are legitimate to the extent their activities and resource 
utilisations are congruent with the goals of the superordinate social system (Dowling and Pfeffer 
1975). Specifically, firms can gain legitimacy: (1) by adapting or adopting structures, practices and 
processes which conform to the prevailing definitions of legitimacy, (2) though communication, alter 
the definition of legitimacy so it conforms with the organisations, and (3) though communication, 
adopt symbols, values, or institutions with a strong sense of legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). 
Additionally, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 133) state 
“While legitimacy is a constraint on all organizations, it is likely that it affects some 
organizations more than others. This is because (1) some organizations are 
considerably more visible, and (2) some organizations depend relatively more heavily 
on social and political support”. 
Importantly, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify change innovations (e.g., new firm structures, 
practices or processes) as being commonly driven by the desire to improve firm performance. But 
they argue that these same change innovations may, alternatively, be adopted due to legitimacy 
rather than performance improvement reasons (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Oliver (1997) points 
out that the institutional paradigm assumes actors within an institutional environment are 
motivated by peer pressure compliance (institutional environment pressure). However, institutional 
players remain motivated to comply with institutional pressures, to ensure the legitimate utilisation 
of stakeholder resources (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Oliver 1997). Because firms which can 
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legitimately utilise stakeholder resources are rewarded with increased support, resources and 
survival prospects (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Oliver 1997).  Moreover, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) 
suggest that by focusing on the legitimacy problem, firm legitimisation activities (firm behaviour and 
responses) may be examined. 
Therefore, adopting an institutional paradigm assumes that firms are influenced by institutional 
pressures which arise from a combination of internal sources, i.e., the firm is an institution, and 
external sources, i.e., the institutional environment (Zucker 1987). The passive acquiesce to 
institutional pressure as a sociological norm is generally formed by an external institutional actor 
(i.e., firm) that is hierarchically superior (Zucker 1987). Consequently, firm choice is “limited by a 
variety of external pressures … environments are collective and interconnected … *and firms+ must 
be responsive to external demands and expectations in order to survive” (Oliver 1991). However, 
while the institutional paradigm assumes acquiesce and conformity to institutional pressure, Oliver 
(1991) identifies the typical response strategies firms may adopt in relation to such pressure. These 
are acquiesce (i.e., comply with pressures); negotiate (i.e., attempt to balance with external 
constituents); avoid (i.e., concealing non-conformity); defy (as firm values dramatically divergent 
from institutional values); or control and manipulate (i.e., attempt to co-opt, influence or control 
institutional pressures) (Oliver 1991). 
The basic thesis of the institutional paradigm is that firms will adapt and conform to the institutional 
forces of predominant institutional norms and traditions (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Oliver 1997). 
Since this conformity causes change in firms and overtime, there will be an increasing convergence 
in firm structures, activities, practices, processes, and values, i.e., institutional homogeneity (Dowling 
and Pfeffer 1975; Oliver 1997; Zucker 1987). However this institutional homogeneity is considered 
costly, problematic and complex for firms (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Even as firms conform and 
adapt, social values and beliefs are constantly changing, i.e., definitions of legitimacy change 
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Nonetheless firms must take steps to ensure their continued legitimacy 
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as the adoption of legitimated elements increases the possibility of firm survival (Dowling and 
Pfeffer 1975; Zucker 1987). Conformity to institutional homogeneity pressure increases firm support, 
in terms of the flow of societal resources and enhances long-term survival prospects (Oliver 1997; 
Zucker 1987). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), while homogeneous change by firms is 
likely to be driven by competition or a need for efficiency, it alternatively may be a result of some 
other factor or process which is forcing firms to be more homogeneous without necessarily 
improving structural or operational efficiency.  Additionally, Scott (1987) suggests that firm tendency 
toward conformity and homogeneity is not because it constitutes institutional or social reality, but 
rather because firms are rewarded with increased legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities. 
Isomorphism and decoupling are considered the prevailing responses to these institutional 
pressures. Institutional isomorphism reflects the notion that institutions (or firms) adopt policies, 
practices, and structures similar to those around them (Cohen et al. 2008). However, decoupling is 
based on the notion that institutions are loosely coupled and are simultaneously open and closed to 
external pressure (Orton and weick 1990; Weick 1976).  
Isomorphism is a response to the formal internal and external pressures, exerted on firms by 
stakeholders which the firm is dependent upon, and by the cultural expectations of the 
superordinate social system (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Isomorphism is a concept that best 
captures the homogenization process (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). “Isomorphism is a constraining 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 149). Isomorphism is defined as pressure 
mechanisms which force firms towards institutional convergence (Cohen et al. 2010). Further, 
isomorphic pressures arise through three institutional mechanisms; coercive isomorphism, 
normative isomorphism, and mimetic isomorphism (Cohen et al. 2008; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Coercive isomorphism is the result of regulatory or political pressures (Cohen et al. 2008; DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). Normative isomorphism suggests convergence through professionally accepted 
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policies, practices, and structures (Cohen et al. 2008; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Mimetic 
isomorphism is the standard response to significant environmental uncertainty, a process where an 
organisation will mimic organisations pioneering the current expectations of social legitimacy (Cohen 
et al. 2008; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Loose coupling is a concept which considers a firm as operating in a system which is closed from 
external pressures yet simultaneously open to external pressures (Orton and weick 1990; Weick 
1976). Such firms respond to institutional pressure to protect their technical activities by decoupling 
sociological norms into their structure and activities (Zucker 1987). Moreover, decoupling refers to a 
situation where the formal structure or practice of the firm is separate and distinct from actual firm 
practice; i.e., firm practice is not integrated into firm processes (Dillard et al. 2004; Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). The formal structure acts as a means of presentation rather than an actual operational 
reflection (Dillard et al. 2004; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Therefore, firms operate in a loosely coupled 
superordinate social system which is open yet simultaneously closed to external pressures. 
Therefore, loose coupling addresses the firms’ response to institutional pressures of the 
superordinate social system. 
Consequently, this concern over legitimacy forces firms to adopt managerial structures and practices 
which are expected to have social value (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009). Dillard et al. (2004) 
importantly addresses the relevance of social culture on accounting practice, particularly the use of 
accounting practices which enhance or maintain legitimacy. By adopting formal structures which 
adhere to institutional prescriptions (i.e., environmental norms and behaviour expectations), firms 
demonstrate and reflect an alignment of corporate and societal values (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 
2009; Dillard et al. 2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977). Accordingly, they are able to protect themselves 
from having their conduct questioned (Dillard et al. 2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977).  
Applying an institutional lens to the governance phenomena allows for the behavioural observation 
of boards and their sub-committees (Cohen et al. 2008). In periods of ambiguous and uncertain 
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environments, the board and its sub-committees may emphasise ceremonial and symbolic roles 
(Cohen et al. 2008). For example, a ceremonial role of an audit committee is the formal engagement 
and termination of the external auditor (Cohen et al. 2008). As such, institutional theory “suggests 
that it is necessary to understand the substance of the interactions between different governance 
parties and how these parties use at times symbolic gestures and activities to maintain their form to 
all relevant parties” and it “considers a comprehensive set of organizational dynamics including the 
institutional environments and the ceremonial structures that actors within this dynamic display” 
(Cohen et al. 2008, p. 181; p.186). In essence, the institutional lens emphasises the notion that 
governance mechanisms fulfil ceremonial and symbolic roles which help legitimise the interactions 
between the various actors within the governance mosaic (Cohen et al. 2008). 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) believe that institutional theory suggests that firm structures within an 
institutional environment become symbolic displays for conformity and accountability. 
Consequently, Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) argue that the forming of board sub-committees 
may be a mere response to institutional pressure following the high profile corporate case failures 
and collapses. Similarly, Turley and Zaman (2004) contend that the adoption of audit committees 
may be primarily symbolic, and their associated benefits may be more rhetorical than substantive. 
Further, Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) findings suggest that changes in firms’ corporate governance 
structures are symbolic displays. Nonetheless, from an institutional perspective boards and audit 
committees fulfil an important signalling mechanism to stakeholders (in particular current or 
potential stockholders) by conferring and conforming to the social perceptions of transparency and 
competency (Cohen et al. 2008). 
2.6 THE GOVERNANCE DILEMMA: AGENCY THEORY, INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
As stated earlier corporate governance is a process set which forms part of the investor assurance 
process, i.e., that firms will be well managed and continue to be profitable (Bhagat et al. 2010; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Mallin 2010). This investor assurance process is 
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critical for firms as they eventually grow beyond the financial means of a single owner, and need to 
attract funding from investors to expand and grow (Davis et al. 1997; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; 
Mallin 2010). Further, it serves to improve the credibility of financial reports, safeguard against 
earnings manipulation, and ensure a fair return on investor investment (Bhagat et al. 2010, Dechow 
et al. 1996). 
Under accepted corporate governance policies and practices, the board is viewed as a governance 
mechanism with diverse duties and responsibilities, which include overseeing a firm’s strategic 
decisions, financial reporting processes and producers, internal controls, risk framework, audit 
practices, executive oversight and compensation, promotion and protection of shareholder 
interests, and stakeholder protection (Andres et al. 2010; DeZoort et al. 2002; Fama and Jensen 
1983; Rezaee 2010). Consequently, the board is regarded as the most important decision making 
body in modern firms (Ferreira 2010). However, boards typically delegate some of these duties and 
responsibilities to internal agents by forming board sub-committees (DeZoort et al. 2002; Rezaee 
2010; Vera-Munoz 2005). But the board retains the ultimate accountability over all delegated duties 
and responsibilities (Rezaee 2010). The authority delegated to the audit committee by the board, 
together with the requirement for the audit committee to comprise a majority of independent 
directors, will allow the audit committee to credibly take discretionary actions to fulfil its roles. 
Importantly, the audit committee is viewed as a board sub-committee distinctly responsible for 
monitoring external auditors, internal controls and vetting of published financial reports. Audit 
committees have faced an expanding monitoring role since the early-2000s, so a main issue for the 
audit committee is to adapt to change (Sarens et al. 2009; Turley and Zaman 2007). 
The formal structure of a firm is the blueprint for its activities and links its goals and policies (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977). As part of the firm’s formal structure, the structuring of the monitoring functions 
and responsibilities of the board and its sub-committees is central in ensuring proper accountability, 
probity and openness in the conduct of a firms business (Lary and Taylor 2012). Bradbury (1990) 
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argues that the control of a firm is delegated to the board by residual claimants; however these 
claimants, though vote, retain approval rights on board membership, mergers and the issuing of new 
stock. The board (the decision controller) then delegates the decision management and many 
decision control functions to internal agents (Fama and Jensen 1983). However it retains ultimate 
control over these internal agents, including the right to ratify and monitor policies, and to appoint, 
terminate and set compensation of decision agents (Fama and Jensen 1983). However, only the 
relationship between firm owners and decision managers is regarded as a pure agency relationship, 
as it is uniquely regarded as being associated with the separation of ownership and control (Davis et 
al. 1997). Consequently, due to this separation of ownership and control, decision managers 
potentially have incentives to misreport financial reports for self-interested opportunistic purposes 
(Carcello et al. 2002). 
A review of previous governance literature suggests that traditional agency assumptions provide an 
adequate basis for the explanation of the formation of governance mechanisms (Kalbers and Fogarty 
1998). Agency theory identifies the role and purpose of the board as the ultimate monitor of 
management and assurer that managers will maximise shareholder value; and audit committees are 
established to reduce agency costs by monitoring financial report quality (Dhaliwal et al. 2010; 
Anderson et al. 2007; Eisenhardt 1989a).  
However, Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) suggest that in situations where information is difficult to 
verify (e.g., by an audit committee), agents (e.g., management) may mimic quality messages. An 
example could be that when shareholders have difficulty verifying information about the quality of 
management performance, management may provide selected information that not only serves 
their own interests but also is perceived as conforming to the institutional environment’s 
expectations. This latter point about an agent’s opportunistic behaviour being moderated by a need 
to use information asymmetry in a way that is perceived to be legitimate by conforming to the 
institutional environment’s expectations; this provides a bridge from the agency paradigm into the 
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institutional paradigm. Institutional theory potentially provides useful insights into a firm’s political 
struggle of power and survival (Cohen et al. 2008; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  It potentially 
provides a means for evaluating prior agency theory-based research (Cohen et al. 2008). Institutional 
theory offers a sociological approach for understanding corporate governance (Kalbers and Fogarty 
1998). 
Parkinson (cited in Brennan and Solomon 2008) states that corporate governance is “the process of 
supervision and control … intended to ensure that the company’s management acts in accordance 
with the interests of shareholders”. Therefore, agency theory is considered the mainstream 
paradigm for governance, as it provides a rational economic explanation for the existence and form 
of control mechanisms (Kalbers and Fogarty 1998). Consequently, traditional agency literature has 
focused on providing evidence on relationships between the strength of governance mechanisms’ 
characteristics and financial reporting quality. However this literature yields inconclusive findings 
(Cohen et al. 2008).  The traditional hierarchical governance model conceives sets of contractual 
relationships based on economic considerations. It depicts executive managers interacting with 
auditors, who interact with the audit committee, who interact with the board (Beattie et al. 2011). 
However, recent governance models show governance actors interacting in a more dynamic and 
interdependent way (Beattie et al. 2011).  
The traditional agency paradigm views the existence of the board and its sub-committees to be a 
direct result of the separation of firm ownership and control on the grounds that firm owners need 
to be protected from the opportunistic self-interested behaviour of corporate agents (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Jensen 2001a). This basic agency view extends to defining a firm as a contract 
labyrinth of conflicting interests, while firm behaviour is defined by the resulting equilibriumisation 
of conflicting interests (Jensen 2001a). This suggests that the establishment of boards and audit 
committees is a response to the firms’ need for equilibriumisation of conflicting interests. 
Accordingly, boards and audit committees that comply with best practice governance 
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recommendations will reduce informational asymmetries by monitoring control agents. Boards and 
audit committees are intended to act as signalling mechanisms to firm owners by conferring control 
transparency and competency (Cohen et al. 2008). Klien (2002b) contends that the monitoring role 
of audit committees is becoming more essential as stakeholders demand for scrutiny in the 
accounting processes of firms. 
However, the achieving of equilibriumisation of conflicting interests through efficient contracts may 
not be enough. Davis et al. (1997, p. 27) identify that “humans need to grow beyond their current 
state and reach higher levels of achievement … the assumptions of the economic view of man 
limit*s+ people from attaining their full potential”. Further, Dey (2008) suggests that because 
principal-agent contracts (i.e., governance mechanisms) may not have an effect on conflicting 
interests and informational asymmetries alone, governance mechanisms may evolve beyond basic 
agency theory purposes. Anderson et al. (2007) find that the role of broads has been evolving 
towards more of a partner to management, and departing from the monitoring role under the 
agency concept.  
These concerns about the limited scope of agency theory give rise to the need for some alternative 
supplementary theoretical perspective. Institutional theory views a firm as a closed system yet 
simultaneously open to external pressure as a legitimacy seeking institution. From this perspective, 
firm behaviour is defined by the superordinate social system within which the firm operates. The 
adoption of legitimated elements and conformity to prevailing rules increases the firm’s ability to 
justify and defend its actions and decisions (Ocasio 1999; Zucker 1987). This increases the possibility 
of firm survival (Ocasio 1999; Zucker 1987). Therefore the formation of boards and audit committees 
may be considered a response to internal and external institutional pressure. The institutional 
theory argument would be that boards and audit committees that comply with best practice 
governance recommendations are actively responding to isomorphic pressures and actively engaging 
in legitimacy seeking behaviour. The perspective is that the adoption of legitimated elements and 
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conformity to prevailing rules increases the firm’s ability to justify and defend its actions and 
decisions, which increases the possibility of firm survival (Ocasio 1999; Zucker 1987).  
Under an institutional worldview, boards and audit committees will act to conform, therefore over 
time these mechanisms will adopt similar structures, roles and responsibilities to conform to other 
institutions and their mechanisms within their institutional environment (Cohen et al. 2008). Scott 
(1987) importantly contends that a firm’s tendency toward conformity may not be because it 
constitutes cultural social reality, but rather because firms may be rewarded with increased 
legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities. Additionally, Ocasio (1999) holds that prevailing best 
practices and processes help directors justify and defend their actions and decisions.  
Institutional theory goes a step further into ceremonial and symbolic roles played out by members 
within an institutional group. Cohen et al. (2008, p. 187) states that the institutional paradigm 
“emphasizes how governance mechanisms fulfill ritualistic roles that help legitimize the interactions 
among the various actors within the corporate governance mosaic”. Cohen et al. (2008) goes on to 
argue that in periods of ambiguous and uncertain environments boards and their committees may 
emphasize ceremonial and symbolic agency roles. Institutional theory provides a means of exploring 
such phenomena which, in this thesis, will be undertaken in relation to audit committees.   
Returning to the agency roles of audit committees, Abbott and Parker (2000) emphasise the 
importance of an audit committee to the monitoring of financial reporting quality.  Likewise, 
Bradbury (1990) points out that audit committees are established to increase quality and credibility 
of financial statements, assist directors in meeting their duties and responsibilities, and enhance 
audit independence. These primary functions, according to Bradbury (1990), provide the underlying 
basis and incentive for their formation. Again, McMullen (1996) views the role of audit committees 
as improving financial reporting integrity and credibility, through their monitoring of: (1) the whole 
financial reporting process, which includes internal controls and use of accounting principles and (2) 
the full audit process, i.e., both the internal and external  audit functions. Hence, researchers like 
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Bradbury (1990), McMullen (1996) and Abbott and Parker (2000) invoke an agency theory 
perspective in identifying the fundamental role of an audit committee as overseeing the financial 
reporting process, i.e., monitoring financial reporting quality, and serving as a vehicle for the 
maintenance of auditor independence. The empirical evidence on whether audit committees are 
driven by agency considerations in shaping and fulfilling their roles, however, is mixed. For example, 
Dey (2008) provides findings in support of this notion. Dey (2008, p. 1143) concludes that “the 
existence and role of various governance mechanisms in a firm are a function of the level of agency 
conflicts in the firm”. However, Bradbury’s (1990) findings are contrary. And reaches the conclusion 
that audit committees are not employed to improve the quality of external financial reports nor 
reduce the agency cost arising from the separation of ownership and control (Bradbury 1990). 
Further, Cohen et al. (2010, p. 777) “Prior literature suggests that audit committees play a more 
passive, ceremonial role that is consistent with institutional theory, rather than the monitoring-
focused role implicit in agency theory”. Additionally, Cohen et al. (2008) identified that auditors take 
a broader governance view which includes executive managers as part of the governance mosaic; 
i.e., acknowledging the role of executive mangers in influencing the effectiveness of governance 
structures. Such a notion is inconsistent with the agency perspective as governance actors are to 
monitor it suggests that the decision management function is an important actor within the 
governance mosaic (Cohen et al. 2008). Moreover, Turley and Zaman (2007) find governance 
outcomes are significantly influenced by informal processes and power relationships.  
This leads into literature that seeks to address the interface between the agency and institutional 
paradigms in corporate governance research. Studies which take an agency perspective assume that 
boards and audit committees that comply with best practice governance recommendations are 
more likely to be effective monitors of executive managers (Cohen et al. 2008). For example, 
DeZoort (1998) defines an effective audit committee as one which can collectively fulfil its 
fundamental agency roles. On the other hand, an institutional paradigm assumes that boards and 
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audit committees that comply with best practice governance recommendations are more actively 
responding to isomorphic pressures and are engaging in legitimacy seeking behaviour. This 
institutional perspective focuses attention on the influence of external pressures. However, Kalbers 
and Fogarty (1998) argue that effective governance is embedded within firm culture, not enforced 
by external mandate or fiat. They contend that effective governance is more attributable to firm 
internal logic rather than external structure (Kalbers and Fogarty 1998). 
Nevertheless, there is a clear fundamental difference in the way governance structures and 
behaviours are perceived to be affected under the agency versus the institutional paradigm. The 
agency perspective suggests that governance innovations are driven by agency conflicts within firms, 
whereas the institutional perspective suggests that social legitimacy would drive such innovations 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Dey 2008). For example, agency conflicts due to management acting in 
self-interest has led to high profile corporate collapses (e.g., Enron) which have resulted in major 
corporate governance innovative reforms. Empirical studies on corporate governance phenomena 
which separately adopt either an agency paradigm or institutional paradigm have presented 
inconsistent and at times contrary findings. Interestingly, Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) find 
correlations between the agency and institutional variables when used in models to explain the 
governance phenomena. The implication, they suggest, is that combining both the agency and 
institutional perspectives to better explain the governance phenomena (Kalbers and Fogarty 1998). 
Further, Young and Thyil (2008, p. 94) note the need for “new theoretical perspectives and new 
models of governance”. Extending on this preliminary research by Kalbers and Fogarty (1998), this 
thesis takes a similar pluralistic theoretical perspective (agency and institutional) in understanding 
and interpreting the policies, processes and practices of audit committees. As discussed in the next 
section, the agency paradigm arising from the separation of ownership and control will be interfaced 
with prevailing pressures for institutional legitimacy in explaining the structures, policies, activities 
and interconnections of audit committees.  
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2.7 THE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
The premise of this thesis is that an audit committee functions within the context of a firm which is 
viewed as a nexus of contracts within a superordinate social system. Smith and Watts’s (cited in 
Deegan 2007, p. 227) define the contract nexus   
“as a set of contracts among various parties who have a claim to a common output … 
parties include stockholders, bondholders, managers, employees, suppliers and 
customers … [the firm is considered to have] an indefinite life … [and this] set of 
contracts … evolves over time”. 
As mentioned above, traditional governance models show governance actors interacting in a 
bureaucratic way, where executive managers interact with auditors, who interact with the audit 
committee, who interact with the board; however more recent governance models show 
governance actors interacting in a more dynamic and inter-dependent way (Beattie et al. 2011). This 
thesis seeks to embrace the model of governance actors interacting within and beyond the audit 
committee in an inter-dependent way. In doing so, this thesis will view the ‘corporate governance 
process set’ from an institutional perspective in which audit committee members and other 
governance actors interact in a dynamic rather than a linear bureaucratic way. But the audit 
committee’s ‘governance process set’ is set up within a framework that expects adherence to 
structures and processes put in place on the rationale of agency theory. These agency-based 
governance structures and processes emphasise the need for the independence of actors 
undertaking the assurance and monitoring processes, not the inter-dependency among governance 
players.  
By taking an institutional theory perspective, this thesis aims to investigate the social structures and 
behaviours of governance mechanisms and actors as part of a holistic corporate eco-system. 
Specifically, it investigates the internal and external institutional impacts on the audit committee’s 
operating mode and role fulfilment (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009). As explained by Dowling and 
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Pfeffer (1975, p.123), an institution exists within a superordinate social system and its activities are 
“legitimate to the extent that … *they] are congruent with the goals of the superordinate system”. As 
such, the audit committee is viewed as ‘an institution’ which exists within an open interacting 
corporate eco-system with various influences and power relations among internal (e.g., the board 
and executive management) and external (e.g., the external auditor and Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC)) actors or ‘institutions’ (Moore 1993; Pettigrew 1992; Roberts et al. 
2005). This thesis will view a firm is a contractual institution (nexus of contracts) with self-interested 
factors, within a superordinate social system, i.e., corporate eco-system (Fama 1980; Fama and 
Jensen 1983; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Moore 1993).  
Figure 2.3 (below) presents the conceptual model developed as a framework to address the 
objectives of this thesis and provide a guide for their investigation. While the model in Figure 2.3 
depicts two broad institutional environments – internal and external to a firm, it also depicts the 
principal-agent (ownership-control) actors or relationship that exists within a firm. Accordingly, the 
thesis identifies the principal-agency separation as the driving force behind the governance 
phenomena. However its form, integration and evolution into a firm as a contractual institution 
within the corporate eco-system are more likely to be driven by the notion of legitimacy. By 
incorporating elements from both the agency and institutional paradigms, Figure 2.3 allows the 
audit committee’s structure, policies, processes, activities and behaviours of its members to be 
examined and explained by zooming in or zooming out using either an agency or institutional 
paradigm or both.  
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Figure 2.3: The Expanded Governance Model 
  
 
In Figure 2.3, the firm’s formal governance model for this thesis adopts an agency rationale, and it 
therefore remains inherently opportunistic. The expanded governance model, however, identifies 
that human behaviour is dualistic, with both economic and social rationality coexisting in inherent 
contradiction (Jensen 2001a). Therefore the model argues that internal governance actors remain 
self-interested, but this self-interested behaviour is not purely economic. Accordingly such self-
interested behaviour is driven by personal preferences which can be economic, social or political.    
McMullen (1996) identifies audit committees as monitoring mechanisms which reduce information 
asymmetries between executive and non-executive board members. Audit committees are 
considered to be key governance mechanism for enhancing the creditability of audited financial 
reports, therefore assisting the board in fulfilling its fiduciary duties and responsibilities, i.e., the 
ratification and monitoring of decisions to safeguard and advance shareholder interests (Fama and 
Jensen 1983; McMullen 1996). Therefore, the notion of audit committee effectives has been an 
interesting concept for researchers.  In addressing audit committee effectiveness from an agency 
Akeel M. Lary 
72 
perspective, audit committee effectiveness is defined in terms of its collective ability to fulfil its 
original agency roles and oversight duties (DeZoort 1998). However, an institutional perspective 
defines audit committee effectiveness in terms of ensuring its own survival. This suggests that the 
audit committee is effective to the extent that it is perceived by the other actors of the institutional 
environment (e.g., the board or external auditor) as acting legitimately in balancing and satisfying 
the different interests and demands of these institutional actors. Alternatively, following Figure 2.3 
and adopting the hybrid perspective. Audit committee effectiveness is defined in terms of its 
collective ability to fulfil its original agency roles and oversight duties while balancing and satisfying 
the different interests and demands of its institutional actors.  
From an agency perspective, the quality of the audit is dependent on the joint probability that an 
auditor will both (a) discover a breach, and (b) report the breach (DeAngelo 1981). The probability of 
breach discovery is dependent on the auditor’s capabilities, and the audit processes and procedures 
employed on a given audit (DeAngelo 1981; DeFond et al. 2002). Moreover, the probability that an 
external auditor will report the breach is dependent on the auditor’s independence (DeAngelo 
1981). From an institutional perspective, the probability than an external auditor will report the 
breach is dependent on balancing the different pressures in the institutional environment that could 
affect that auditor’s survival (Dillard et al. 2004; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). However, the hybrid 
perspective suggests that the reporting of the breach is dependent on the auditor’s independence 
and on the balancing of the different institutional environment pressures. Again, under agency 
theory, the role of the auditor in the principal-agent relationship is to provide assurance that 
financial reports are free of material misstatements and conform to the contractual relationship 
between both parties (Eilifsen and Messier 2000). But from an institutional perspective, the auditor 
will conform to the expectations and norms of the institutional environment that govern auditor 
engagements. On the other hand, the hybrid perspective suggests that the auditor will conform to 
the contractual relationship to the extent it conforms to the expectations and norms of the 
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institutional environment. Young and Thyil (2008) believed that to explain governance systems in 
truly holistic sense an integrated view is necessary. 
2.7.1 Agency Assumptions  
Focusing on the internal institutional environment, Figure 2.3 separates the traditional roles of the 
contracted agents into decision management and decision control. This would mean that a firm’s 
shareholders would typically entrust decision management to the CEO and executive managers, and 
would typically entrust decision control to the board and its committees.  As was stated earlier, the 
central premise of agency theory is the separation of ownership and control, where control refers to 
a principal’s (owner’s) contracting of an agent to perform some service on the principal’s behalf. This 
contract involves delegating some decision making authority (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Fama and 
Jensen (1983) identify this notion of decision making authority as a process of four steps. These four 
steps were explained earlier as initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring. As stated by 
Fama and Jensen (1983p. 303-304)  
“Because the initiation and implementation of decisions typically are allocated to the 
same agents, it is convenient to combine these two functions under the term decision 
management. Likewise, the term decision control includes the ratification and 
monitoring of decisions. Decision management and decision control are the 
components of the organization's decision process or decision system”. 
In fact, Fama and Jensen (1983) identify three principle contract mechanisms within the nexus of 
contracts: decision management, decision control, and residual risk bearing. Without the 
“separation of decision management from decision control, residual claimants have little protection 
against [the] opportunistic actions of decision agents” (Fama and Jensen 1983, pp. 305-306). Both 
the internal and external audit functions are considered as critical mechanisms in the firm’s investor 
assurance process. However the external auditor, while providing a service internal to the firm, 
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simultaneously remains external to the firm. So the external audit is depicted in Figure 2.3 are 
straddling both the internal and external institutional environments of the firm.  
In this thesis, the framework in Figure 2.3 will be used to guide the examination of governance 
phenomena concerning the audit committee. In doing so, it is to be noted that this framework is 
underpinned by the following agency assumptions, as drawn from the agency literature reviewed in 
this chapter: 
 Governance actors are self-interested; 
 Governance actors are solely economic utility maximisers; 
 The firm is a contract nexus, i.e., a series of contractual relationships; 
 There exists a separation between decision control and decision management; 
 The board is the decision controller, and it then delegates the decision management and 
some decision control functions to internal agents; 
 Governance mechanisms act as monitors;  
 Governance mechanisms evolve to better address agency problems; 
 The external audit function is external (independent) yet simultaneously internal to the 
client; and 
 Actor interactions and processes are bureaucratic. 
Some of these agency behavioural assumptions will be in dispute with assumptions from the 
institutional paradigm. This creates a key point for analysis in this thesis, given that it is expected 
that both the agency and institutional paradigms will underpin the framework in Figure 2.3. 
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2.7.2 Institutional Assumptions 
In this thesis, the firm will be depicted as a contract nexus of self-interested actors, which operates 
and interacts within a superordinate social system. For any actors in the firm’s governance system, 
the effects of the firm’s superordinate social system are likely to come into play. This thesis will 
centre mainly on the decision control agent (i.e., the audit committee) in the firm’s governance 
system. When the firm’s superordinate social system is factored into an understanding of the actions 
or behaviours of the decision control agent such as the audit committee, then actors in the external 
institutional environment such as the audit committees of the firm’s competitor firms need to be 
considered. Such an external institutional environment can place mimetic or normative isomorphic 
pressures on the decision control agent.  The decision control agent (e.g., audit committee) may 
acquiesce to such pressure imposed by the competitor; consequently the decision control agent may 
adopt practices, processes or structures for its own legitimation reasons. Similarly, the external 
auditor which, as a distinct institution, that lies within both a firm’s external and internal 
institutional environments,  may put mimetic or normative isomorphic pressure or demands on the 
client firm’s decision control agents (e.g., the audit committee).  
As discussed above the term decision control includes the ratification and monitoring components of 
the decision making authority. The board is regarded as the decision control agent. The board and its 
committees can also be perceived as simultaneously operating as an institution within an 
environment of institutions. In that sense, they make up a decision control institution. Moreover, 
the board alone and the audit committee alone could be perceived as separate institutions. In this 
sense, multiple institutions can be perceived to exist within the firm’s decision control structures. 
Further adding to the complexity, each institution within the decision control structures is able to 
impose and acquiesce to institutional pressure in both the internal and external institutional 
environments. Following the institutional literature discussed earlier in the chapter, the framework 
in Figure 2.3 is deemed to be underpinned by the following institutional assumptions which need to 
be taken into account when examining a firm’s governance phenomena: 
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 Legitimacy is a resource; 
 Actors interact in a dynamic and interdependent way; 
 Firms operate and interact within a superordinate social system; 
 Firms are closed yet simultaneously open to the pressures of the superordinate social 
system and consequently, there exists some form of peer pressure or institutional 
compliance pressures; 
 There exists some institutional homogeneity; 
 Governance mechanisms are adaptive; 
 Change innovations are driven by performance enhancement and legitimacy; 
 Governance mechanisms are merely symbolic displays for conformity and legitimacy; and 
 Governance mechanisms use symbolic gestures to legitimise interactions. 
If the framework in Figure 2.3 was viewed solely from the institutional paradigm, then it would 
reflect the superordinate system within which an organisation operates, it would focus on the 
interactions between various governance mechanisms, and it would indicate that a mechanism may 
at times use symbolic gestures to maintain its legitimacy to other mechanisms (Cohen et al. 2008).  
The main premise of institutional theory is that organisations will acquiesce to institutional pressure, 
e.g., adopting managerial practices that have social value, to enhance or protect their legitimacy 
(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a background into the literature and the main theoretical paradigms behind 
the governance phenomena. The chapter defines corporate governance as a process set which 
forms part of the investor assurance process (Bhagat et al. 2010; Dechow et al. 1996; Dowling and 
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Pfeffer 1975; Mallin 2010). This assurance process becomes critical for firms, as firms eventually 
grow beyond the financial means of a single owner, therefore firms need to attract investor funding 
to expand and grow (Davis et al. 1997; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Mallin 2010). The assurance 
process serves to improve the credibility of financial reports, safeguard against earnings 
manipulation, and ensure a fair return on investor investment (Bhagat et al. 2010, Dechow et al. 
1996). 
Bradbury (1990) noted that the control of a firm is delegated to the board by residual claimants. 
However these claimants though vote retain approval rights on board membership, mergers and the 
issuing of new stock (Bradbury 1990). Accordingly, the board is viewed as a governance mechanism 
with diverse duties and responsibilities (DeZoort et al. 2002). Consequently, it is regarded as the 
most important decision making body in modern firms (Ferreira 2010). However, boards typically 
delegate some of these duties and responsibilities to internal agents, but it retains the ultimate 
accountability vehicle (DeZoort et al. 2002; Rezaee 2010; Vera-Munoz 2005). Importantly, the audit 
committee is viewed as a board sub-committee distinctly responsible for monitoring external 
auditors, internal controls and vetting of published financial reports.  
Under the agency paradigm, the agency separation problem is identified as the driving force behind 
the formation and maintenance of governance mechanisms. A firm is defined as a contract nexus 
with conflicting interests. All contract agents are assumed to be self-interested utility maximisers. 
Therefore due to this inherent self-interested behaviour, control agents will serve their personal 
preferential interests at the expense of residual claimants. Accordingly, these self-serving agents 
need to be monitored and controlled, consequently the agency paradigm views governance as a tool 
of control.   
Alternatively, under an institutional paradigm, governance is viewed as a form of legitimacy though 
homogeneity. The notion of legitimacy is regarded as a resource which firms are dependent upon, 
because legitimate firms have better survival prospects. The institutional paradigm defines a firm as 
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an institution which operates and interacts within a larger social institutional environment. In this 
environment each institution is closed yet simultaneously open to isomorphic pressures, and each 
institution is capable of imposing isomorphic pressures. However, while the institutional paradigm 
assumes acquiesce to such pressures, firms may negotiate, conceal, defy or control and manipulate 
isomorphic pressures. Consequently, the institutional paradigm views governance mechanisms as 
symbolic displays of conformity.  
Of special interest to this thesis is the limited evidence that there are links between the governance 
phenomena and both the agency and institutional paradigms. It is speculated that the potential 
combination of elements of both the agency and institutional paradigms could better explain the 
governance phenomena. Accordingly, this thesis identifies the agency separation problem as the 
driving force behind the governance phenomena, however its form, integration and evolution into a 
firm as set of institutions determined by their agency contracts and their larger social system is more 
likely to be driven by the notion of legitimacy.  
The next chapter will identify a research method which will investigate the governance phenomena 
to identify whether a sole theoretical paradigm (i.e., agency or institutional) or a combination of 
these paradigms better explains the phenomena.  
 
“… the theory which he relates soon changed this feeling into enthusiasm. A new light 
seemed to dawn upon my mind, and, bounding with joy” (Shelley 1818, p. 28). 
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“In order studies you go as far as others have gone before you, and there is nothing 
more to know; but in a scientific pursuit there is continual food for discovery and 
wonder” (Shelley 1818, p. 40). 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide insights into the adopted research design and strategy of 
this thesis. The chapter is structured to flow as a broader reflection on research design and methods 
which leads into the specific research design and methods to be used in this study. It begins by 
defining research, which leads to the concept of a research design and its various assumptions. It 
continues by providing a summary of multiple research strategies, and then provides justification for 
the case study research strategy to be adopted in this thesis. A detailed explanation of the case 
study research strategy is then provided, including details of the evidence collection methods and 
analysis approaches used for the thesis.  
3.2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
Research is defined by Merriam-Webster (2013, para. 2) as an “investigation or experimentation 
aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts”. Its purpose is to gain knowledge though the 
examination and interpretation of raw data or pre-existing facts to answer a question which solves a 
problem (Booth et al. 2008). As previously stated this thesis aims to address the following questions: 
RQ1: To what extent do governance mechanisms and actors interact as part of a holistic 
corporate eco-system? 
RQ2: Does agency or institutional theory more pluralistically define the governance 
phenomena?  
Denscombe (2007, p. 3) notes that the virtuous social research process cannot be attained by the 
“slavishly following *of+ a set of rules about what is right and wrong”. The social researcher is faced 
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with a variety of options and alternatives and must be strategic in making decisions, with each 
choice bringing a set of advantages and disadvantages (Denscombe 2007). While there is no one 
right direction, some strategies are better suited than others (Denscombe 2007). In choosing among 
strategies the social researcher must ensure that the chosen strategy will lead to accurate and 
objective conclusions (Denscombe 2007).   
The first decision the social researcher must make is the research design. The research design is 
defined as the underlying foundation or blueprint for a study, it spans across broad philosophical 
assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis (Creswell 2007; 2009). The selection 
of a particular research design is dependent on the nature of the research problem (Creswell 2009). 
The research design may be defined as qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods (Creswell 2009; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Creswell (2009) noted that the qualitative and quantitative approaches 
are not to be regarded as polar opposites or dichotomies but rather as different ends on a 
continuum. A study will either tend to be more qualitative than quantitative or vice versa (Creswell 
2009). A mixed methods approach will reside in the middle of this continuum, as it incorporates both 
elements of the qualitative and quantitative approaches (Creswell 2009).  
Table 3.1 presents the basic distinctions between the qualitative and quantitative approaches. In 
summary the qualitative approach adopts open-ended questions and analyses words while the 
quantitative approach adopts closed-ended questions (hypotheses) and analyses numbers (Creswell 
2009; Denscombe 2007).  
Table 3.1: Basic distinctions between the qualitative and quantitative approaches 
Qualitative approach Quantitative approach 
Open-ended questions (themes) Closed-ended questions (hypotheses) 
holistic perspective Specific focus 
Description or word analysis Analysis 
A means for exploring and understanding the 
meanings of individuals or groups 
A means of testing objective theories by examining 
the relationship among variables 
Emerging questions and procedures Measurable variables 
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Interpretive analysis Statistical analysis 
Non-generalisable findings Generalisable findings 
Non-replicable findings (findings are generally specific 
to the study and researcher) 
Potentially replicable findings  
Source: Creswell 2009; Denscombe 2007 
 
This thesis examines the way in which corporate governance structures (with a particular focus on 
the audit committee) interact within a corporate eco-system. As stated earlier, the corporate eco-
system consists of internal and external economic, legal, political and social elements, including the 
firm’s internal organisational and behavioural systems.   To pursue such an examination, this thesis 
adopts the qualitative research approach. This choice of research strategy is dictated by the nature 
of the research problem. As this study seeks to address the complexities of the audit committee’s 
interactions within its wider environment, therefore it is deemed to reside more towards the 
qualitative end of the continuum.  
The qualitative research approach provides an enhanced means of exploring and understanding the 
behaviours and interactions of governance actors and structures within a firm’s wider system. 
Therefore, the study resides more towards the qualitative approach on the research design 
continuum.  As stated by Creswell (2009, p.19)  
“The logic that the qualitative researcher follows is inductive, from the ground up, 
rather than handed down entirely from a theory or from the perspectives of the 
inquirer … research questions change in the middle of the study to reflect better the 
types of questions needed to understand the research problem. In response, the data 
collection strategy … needs to be modified to accompany the new questions”.  
This thesis will draw heavily on theoretical perspectives and behavioural assumptions of agency 
theory and institutional theory, the approach in this study is to follow a more inductive line of 
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reasoning in order to critically assess and identify linkages at the ‘ground level’ between the 
perspectives and assumptions underlying these two ‘grand’ theories. 
3.2.1 Philosophical Assumption Underlying the Qualitative Research Design Strategy 
By choosing a qualitative research design strategy in this study, certain philosophical assumptions 
will be invoked by the researcher. “The philosophical assumptions consist of a stance toward the 
nature of reality (ontology), how the researcher knows what she or he knows (epistemology), the 
role of values in the research (axiology), the language of research (rhetoric), and the methods used 
in the process (methodology)” (Creswell 2007 p.16). The orientation of these philosophical 
assumptions towards a qualitative research design is summarised in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2: Philosophical Assumptions of Qualitative Research Design 
Assumption  Question  Characteristics  Implications for Practice 
Ontological What is the 
nature of reality? 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple, as seen by 
participants in the study 
Researcher uses quotes and 
themes in words of participants 
and provides evidence of 
different perspectives   
Epistemological  What is the 
relationship 
between the 
researcher and 
that being 
researched 
Researcher attempts to 
lessen distance between 
himself or herself and that 
being researched  
Researcher collaborates, spends 
time in the field with 
participants, and becomes an 
“insider” 
Axiological  What is the role 
of values? 
Researcher acknowledges 
that research is value-laden 
and that biases are present  
Researcher openly discusses 
values that shape the narrative 
and includes his or her own 
interpretation in conjunction 
with the interpretations of 
participants 
Rhetorical  What is the 
language of 
research? 
Researcher writes in a 
literary, informal style using 
the personal voice and uses 
qualitative terms and 
limited definitions  
Researcher uses an engaging 
style of narrative, may use first-
person pronoun, and employs 
the language of qualitative 
research  
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Methodological  What is the 
process of 
research? 
Researcher uses inductive 
logic, studies the topic 
within its context, and uses 
an emerging design 
Researcher works with 
particulars (details) before 
generalizations, describes in 
detail the context of the study, 
and continually revises 
questions from experiences in 
the field  
Source: Creswell 2007, p. 17 
 
As previously stated, the purpose of this thesis is to address the way in which the audit committee 
functions and interacts within corporate governance structures and, in turn, the wider internal and 
external corporate systems. Moreover, this study aims to better theoretically understand the 
governance phenomenon by adopting and reflecting on elements from both the agency and 
institutional theoretical lens. Hence, the ontological assumption embraced in this study is that reality 
is subjective and multiple. With this view of the ontological assumption, the governance 
phenomenon can be addressed through the adoption of either the agency or institutional 
orientations or both.  
Other aspects of the philosophical assumptions underlying this study are, first, epistemologically, the 
researcher attempts to lessen the distance between him and that being researched by engaging with 
participants and documents in the field. Second, in terms of the axiological assumption, the 
researcher acknowledges that this thesis is reliant on a limited number of participants and 
documents, so the subjectivity involved in gathering, synthesising and interpreting the evidence will 
be subjected to the values and biases of the researcher. Third, in terms of the rhetorical assumption, 
the use of first-person voice and limited definitions is not, however, strongly followed by the 
researcher. The text of interviews with participants is not directly quoted but rather is paraphrased 
in order to convey a more succinct and integrated understanding of the participants’ views and 
comparative positions. Also definitions of concepts drawn from agency and institutional theories 
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need to be carefully defined when undertaking a critical discussion of how they apply to case-based 
practices and other phenomena observed in this thesis.   
To guide and direct the thesis an inquiry paradigm or world view is also considered. Creswell (2007, 
p.248) identifies an inquiry paradigm as the basic set of beliefs which guide actions, it defines the 
“nature of the world, the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that 
world”. It is the net which contains the social researcher’s philosophical assumption. According to 
Creswell (2007) multiple inquiry paradigms may be adopted. He identifies four common paradigms: 
post-positivism, constructivism, advocacy, and pragmatism.   
This thesis adopts multiple inquiry paradigms, namely, post-positivism, constructivism and 
pragmatism. In post-positivism, researchers adopt a scientific approach to qualitative research which 
has the elements of being “reductionistic, logical, an emphasis on empirical data collection, a cause-
and-effect oriented, and deterministic” (Creswell 2007, p.20). This study examines empirical data on 
the corporate governance phenomena in a somewhat reductionist and deterministic way drawing on 
concepts and theoretical assumptions from prior theories. Additionally, this study embraces social 
constructivism which involves the researcher relying on the various participants’ views of the 
situation, from which the researcher develops subjective meanings. From a constructivist viewpoint, 
this study is underpinned by the notion of multiple realities as per the varied perspectives of 
participants.  Finally, this study also simultaneously adopts a pragmatist’s inquiry paradigm which 
focuses on “the actions, situations, and consequences of inquiry … rather than antecedent 
conditions” (Creswell 2007, p.22). This study pays attention to the practical interaction of 
governance actors. In summary, the study adopts multiple inquiry paradigms because it seeks to 
understand corporate governance (with particular emphasis on the interactions of the audit 
committee within the firm’s internal and external systems) as a phenomenon that is bounded by 
causality and shaped by prior events and theories, yet it remains simultaneously evolutionary.  
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In addition to these inquiry paradigms or worldviews, this study associates with a particular so-called 
‘interpretive community’, in order to further shape, narrow and direct the thesis. Interpretive 
communities operate at a less philosophical level, each community with a distinct body of literature 
and unique issues of discussion. These interpretive communities provide a pervasive lens or 
perspective on all aspects of a qualitative research project (Creswell 2007). The most common 
interpretive communicates include: (1) post-modernism (or postmodern perspective), the concept is 
that knowledge must be within the conditions of the world today and in the multiple perspectives of 
class, race, gender, and/or other group afflictions; (2) feminist theories, issues of gender equality; 
and (3) critical theory (or critical race theory), issues of human empowerment to transcend 
constraints placed on them by race, class, and gender (Creswell 2007). This thesis identifies with the 
post-modernism interpretive community, as the concept of governance must be within the 
boundaries of the modern business world which incorporates the multiple perspectives of group 
afflictions.  
3.3 THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The purpose of this section is to provide insight into the initial research strategy adopted for the 
study. Once the social researcher has decided upon the research design, the decision must then be 
made about the research strategy or approach (Creswell 2007; Denscombe 2007; Denzin and Lincoln 
2005). The research strategy is influenced by the research design and may be regarded as a micro 
examination of the methods of data collection and analysis. Typical qualitative research strategies 
include ethnography, case study, action research, clinical research, phenomenology, historical 
research and narrative research (Creswell 2007; Denscombe 2007).  
Similarly to Gendro and Bedard (2006), Sarens et al. (2009), and Turley and Zaman (2007) this thesis 
adopts the case study research strategy, as the aim of the study is to provide in-depth details on the 
ways governance actors interact (i.e., engage with each other and behave) within their firm’s 
corporate eco-system. It aims to understand and to get as close as possible to the reality of 
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governance actor behaviours, with a vested interest in audit committee operations. Additionally, the 
case study strategy is useful for describing, exploring, comparing, explaining, or illustrating a 
particular phenomenon, individual, event, process or relationship (Denscombe 2007). Thomas (2011, 
p.23) offers the below definition for case study research: 
“Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, 
institutions or other systems which are studied holistically by one or more methods. 
The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena 
that provides an analytical frame-an object – within which that study is conducted 
and which that case illuminates and explicates”. 
Moreover, the case study strategy will enable this study to undertake an in-depth holistic view of the 
audit committee in particular, by examining the organisational structures and networks in which it 
resides. Case study research can probe the relationships and interactions of and within a particular 
firm (Denscombe 2007). However, Thomas (2011) believes that case studies serve the particular and 
not the general, i.e., the researcher generally cannot draw out generalisations about the phenomena 
studied from the case study strategy. On the other hand, the case study strategy allows the use of 
multiple data sources (Denscombe 2007). This enables the validation of data through triangulation 
(Denscombe 2007). Thomas (2011) presents a taxonomy for the undertaking of a case study 
strategy. This taxonomy is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Case Study Taxonomy  
 
Source: Thomas 2011 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the case study taxonomy developed by Thomas (2011). Each of the four stages 
in Figure 3.1 is now explained in turn. The first stage involves determining the case subject; i.e., the 
social researcher is to determine the sampling frame of the case (Thomas 2011). The social 
researcher is to decide whether the case study will be an outliner case, depicting something 
interesting because of its divergence from the norm; a key case, something which is exemplary; or a 
local knowledge case, something which is based on personal experience or knowledge that the 
researcher wants to explore further (Stake 2005; Thomas 2011).  
In the second stage the social researcher will identify the purpose of the case (Thomas 2011). The 
purpose for the case study may be: 
Akeel M. Lary 
88 
 Intrinsic, the study is undertaken to better understand a particular case, and therefore the 
case itself is of interest;  
 Instrumental, the study is to provide insight into a particular issue, the case study acts in an 
instrument which facilitates the understanding of the issue;  
 Evaluative, the study is undertaken to evaluate how something is working or has worked;  
 Explanatory, the study serves as a means of providing an explanation for some kind of 
paradoxical finding; or  
 Exploratory, the study serves as a means of further exploring the ‘what and why’ of a known 
problem (Thomas 2011).  
In the third stage the social researcher decides how to approach the study (Thomas 2011). The 
researcher’s approach may be: 
 Theory testing: the research relies on some previously established explanatory framework 
for the phenomenon, the researcher is to make a number of assumptions based on 
literature and their own knowledge;  
 Theory building: the researcher is to develop some form of explanatory framework from 
scratch which explains the phenomenon, without relying on pre-existing ideas, models or 
frameworks;  
 Illustrative: the researcher uses pictures to illustrate a phenomena;  
 Interpretative: the researcher observes, examines and then interprets the events or the 
journey which leads up to the phenomenon in natural settings, this approach is similar to 
and may be called ethnography; or 
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 Experimental: this approach is considered an non-textbook case study as it involves some 
form of trail, traditional experiments involve some form of ‘control and compare’ or 
‘repeated measures’, the experimental case study approach is concerned with the ‘repeated 
measures’ as it focuses on the phenomena in its natural setting (Thomas 2011). 
The final stage involves the social researcher deciding on the process for the case study; including 
the analysis method (Thomas 2011). Therefore, the researcher will decide whether the study will 
encompass a single case study, multiple case studies or nested case units (Stake 2005; Thomas 
2011). A single case study may be further segmented into three types. The first is retrospective, 
involving the collecting of data relating to a past phenomenon, situation or event. Second is the 
snapshot, involving a ‘here and now’ study in which the case it bound by time rather than a 
phenomenon, situation, event or being. The third type is diachronic, involving a study which reveals 
differences as it proceeds, i.e., shows change over time (Thomas 2011).  
A multiple case study process may be segmented into two types. First is a parallel case study in 
which cases are simultaneously occurring. Second is a sequential type involving cases that occur 
sequentially, i.e., what happens in one affects the other (Thomas 2011; Yin 2003).  
A nested case study gains its completeness from a wider case. Each individual case unit is part of the 
wider case, i.e., each case is embedded in the wider case (Thomas 2011; Yin 2003). Figure 3.2 
illustrates the difference between a single case study, multiple case studies and a nested case study. 
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Figure 3.2: Difference between Case Study Processes  
 
Source: Thomas 2011 
Returning to the stages required to undertake case study research as shown in Figure 3.1, the 
specific approaches chosen for this study regarding the sampling frame, purpose, approach, process 
and evidence gathering are now detailed.  
3.3.1 Stage One: Sampling Frame 
The first step in adopting the case study strategy is to select specific cases which investigate and 
clarify a phenomenon and not rely on random sampling techniques (Thomas 2011).  It is important 
to note that the purpose of a case study is not to identify a case which demonstrates the quality of 
the whole but rather of a particular (Thomas 2011). Consequently, this study adopts the key case 
sampling method, as the key case method will seek the selection of an exemplar case which appears 
to have very sound governance practices.  To identify such a key case company, a preliminary review 
can be made of the comprehensiveness of disclosures of corporate governance practice through 
annual reports and other governance disclosers (e.g., audit committee charter, board charter, 
governance policies). The selection of a case company that has comprehensive disclosure of sound 
governance policies is an indication that the case company is perceived as having a strong 
commitment to the protection of shareholder interests. In addition, the key case company should be 
listed on the ASX 300 index. This will mean it is drawn from companies that are required to have an 
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audit committee and, because it is amongst the larger listed companies in Australia, its audit 
committee will operate within a relatively complex corporate eco-system. 
3.3.2 Stage Two: The Purpose 
From the taxonomy in Figure 3.1, this thesis will classify its case study purpose as instrumental, 
explanatory and exploratory. Consequently, the case firm serves as an instrument which facilitates 
the understanding of the governance phenomenon (Thomas 2011). Additionally, the purpose of the 
case-study approach in this thesis has an explanatory element. The key case firm can serve as a 
means of discovering and interpreting circumstances that could explain the conflicting findings 
found in the quantitative governance literature (Thomas 2011), as earlier discussed in Chapter 2, the 
literature review chapter. Finally, the case study approach would have an exploratory purpose of 
serving as a means of further exploring the ‘what and why’ of the governance phenomenon so it 
may be better theoretically defined (Thomas 2011).  
3.3.3 Stage Three: The Approach   
The case study approach to be used for this thesis is characterised as theory testing and interpretive. 
It has a theory testing aspect because it relies on concepts and assumptions from previously 
established conceptual frameworks (i.e., agency theory and institutional theory). The interpretive 
aspect is also part of the case study approach for this thesis, as the aim is to examine and then 
interpret the governance phenomena in natural settings (Thomas 2011). Therefore, while interviews 
and document gathering will require access to a large volume of textual data from the case 
company, the interpretation of this textual data will be critical.  
3.3.4 Stage Four: The Process 
The thesis will adopt a nested case unit process, as it focuses on the interface of governance 
structures and the interactions of actors within a wide corporate eco-system. The case firm is merely 
to facilitate the understanding of the interactions of governance structures and their actors within 
the wider internal and external corporate eco-system. In this sense, it acts as a single case unit that 
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is nested within a wider case. Consequently, the case study gains its completeness from the wider 
case.  
3.3.5 Gathering Evidence 
Thomas (2011) notes the difference between data and evidence; he defines data as bits of 
information while evidence is derived from the data to support or refute a proposition. Further 
Thomas (2011, p. 162) states that a “case study without a tightly constructed theory or set of 
propositions … will seek data … which emerge as the study progresses”. However, a case study with 
clear hypotheses or a well-defined theory will have propositions which will be either supported or 
refuted by the gathered data, suggesting the researcher will seek evidence (Thomas 2011).  In this 
thesis, the intention is to seek evidence to the extent that data will draw out the prevalence or 
absence of well-defined theoretical assumptions deemed to underlie various practices and policies. 
A case study researcher could have many forms of evidence gathering methods (Creswell 2007; 
Thomas 2011; Yin 2003). These include but are not limited to interviews, focus groups, observation, 
diaries, questionnaires and surveys (Creswell 2007; Denscombe 2007; Thomas 2011). This thesis will 
conduct interviews as its primary approach because interviews are able to provide insights into 
opinions, feelings, emotions and experiences; as they are able to provide insider type information 
(Denscombe 2007). An interview may be structured, semi-structured or unstructured; in addition 
they may be conducted on a group, one-on-one or panel basis (Denscombe 2007). In this study, 
evidence on the interactions of governance structures and actors (with an emphasis on the audit 
committee) is gathered through a series of semi-structured single-sitting panel interviews. These 
semi-structured interviews will remain theme structured, yet simultaneously unstructured and 
conversation-like to allow for the discussion of emergent issues and further probes (Thomas 2011). 
The interviews are to be single-sitting panel interviews because gaining second interviews with 
company directors and senior management has proven difficult. To gain the most from single-sitting 
interviews, the approach in this study has been to use two interviewers for each single interviewee. 
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This improves the conducting of the conservation-like interviews and is more likely to gather and 
deliver the desired quality of evidence.  
In this study, my senior supervisor, Professor Dennis Taylor, BEc(Hons), MBA, PhD, chose to be the 
second interviewer who accompanied me in conducting each of the interviews. He has international 
standing in the field of corporate governance research. Having the supervisor as second interviewer 
provides several advantages.  First, when interviewing the chosen directors and top executives, the 
presence of a professor gives appropriate authority to the interview team. Second, two interviewers 
with intimate knowledge of the research project enables in-depth questioning arising from open-
ended questions to be more completely pursued.  Third, the time during interviews can be more 
efficiently used because, when one interviewer is leading the questioning, the other can be taking 
notes or checking the audio-recorder. 
Given, the case study strategy, multiple data sources need to be collected to improve the validity of 
the data (Denscombe 2007; Thomas 2011). In addressing validity, potential interview participants 
will include current or former directors (i.e., audit committee, board, or any other board sub-
committee members), executive managers and auditors of the chosen ASX 300 listed company. 
Additionally, current or former directors, executive mangers and auditors of other ASX 300 
companies or local governments may also be interviewed. In addition to the semi-structured 
interviews, other evidence will be gathered through various public disclosers, i.e., annual reports, 
charters of the board and its sub-committees, media releases, or other available documents.  
Denscombe (2007) noted that the concern over validity is about dealing with the accuracy and 
precision of evidence. Denscombe (2007) suggests that in addressing the validity problem the 
researcher may improve finding validity by respondent validation and triangulation. Respondent 
validation is the processes where the researcher is submit findings to participants, so they may check 
their factual accuracy (Denscombe 2007). Triangulation is the process which aims to strengthen the 
research design by using contrasting sources for evidence to bolster confidence in findings by 
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considering a contrasting view (Bitsch 2005; Denscombe 2007; Thomas 2011). In addressing 
triangulation, this thesis preforms ‘between-methods triangulation’, this is achieved by using 
contrasting methods in gathering evidence; i.e., evidence is gathered from semi-structured 
interviews and both internal and external documents (Denscombe 2007). Further, it performs ‘data 
triangulation’ by using a contrasting source of evidence from a different cultural, social or 
geographic context; i.e., the key corporate case being contracted by the local government case and 
previous literature (Denscombe 2007). However, key methods and analysis should be mapped out to 
ensure the issue of reliability is addressed (Denscombe 2007). Consequently, the primary purpose of 
this chapter is to address this reliability issue. 
3.4 IDENTIFYING THE CASE UNITS  
This section explains the methods and strategies used in gathering evidence. In identifying potential 
case firms, certain considerations were taken into account in order to ensure the feasibility of 
completing the case study. In addition to selecting a firm demonstrating sound governance practices 
and a listing on the ASX 300 index, the case firm needed to have its head office based in Melbourne. 
The Melbourne location is required because firm directors and their executive team hold busy 
schedules and arranging of interview times would prove to be problematic if the interviewers were 
required to take multiple trips interstate.  
In relation to the case firms’ compliance with the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations, this will increase confidence that the selected firm is 
transparent to allow for an academic probe. The selected firm must comply with principles 1, 2, 4, 5, 
7 and 8 of the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (refer to Table 3.3 for the principles) because compliance with these principles is 
likely to indicate that the firm is serious about ensuring its governance structures and policies are 
committed to the protection of shareholder interests. Consequently, selecting such a firm will certify 
its ‘key case’ status within the wider case of ‘best practice’ firms. In relation to principles 3 and 6 
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given in Table 3.3, these principles are considered to be beyond the scope of the thesis; therefore it 
is not essential for the case firm to comply with these principles. However, sub-section 1 of principle 
3 is considered within the boundaries of the study. Therefore the case firm must also comply with 
principle 3 sub-section 1. While these are merely recommendations to all listed companies, ASX 300 
listed firms must comply or given just reason why they have deviated from compliance, which 
suggests a higher degree of regulative coercive isomorphic pressure on top-300 companies.  
Table 3.3: ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
ASX Principle 
Principle 1 Lay solid foundations for management and oversight 
1.1 Companies should establish the functions reserved to the board and those delegated to senior 
executives and disclose those functions. 
1.2 Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the performance of senior executives. 
1.3 Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 1. 
Principle 2 Structure the board to add value 
2.1 A majority of the board should be independent directors.  
2.2 The chair should be an independent director.  
2.3 The roles of chair and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the same individual. 
2.4 The board should establish a nomination committee. 
2.5 Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the performance of the board, its 
committees and individual directors. 
2.6 Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 2. 
Principle 3 Promote ethical and responsible decision making 
3.1 Companies should establish a code of conduct and disclose the code or a summary of the code 
as to the: 
 practices necessary to maintain confidence in the Company’s integrity 
 practices necessary to take into account their legal obligations and the reasonable 
expectations of their stakeholders 
responsibility and accountability of individuals for reporting and investigating reports of 
unethical practices 
3.2* Companies should establish a policy concerning diversity and disclose the policy or summary of 
that policy. The policy should include requirements for the board to establish measurable 
objectives for achieving gender diversity and for the board to assess annually both the 
objectives and progress in achieving them. 
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3.3* Companies should disclose in each annual report the measurable objectives for achieving 
gender diversity set by the board in accordance with the diversity policy and progress towards 
achieving them. 
3.4* Companies should disclose in each annual report the proportion of women employees in the 
whole organisation, women in senior executive positions and women on the board. 
3.5 Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 3. 
Principle 4 Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
4.1 The board should establish an audit committee. 
4.2 The audit committee should be structured so that it:  
 consists only of non-executive directors 
 consists of a majority of independent directors 
 is chaired by an independent chair, who is not chair of the board  
 has at least three members 
4.3 The audit committee should have a formal charter. 
4.4 Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 4. 
Principle 5 Make timely and balanced disclosure 
5.1 Companies should establish written policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance 
with ASX Listing Rule disclosure requirements and to ensure accountability at a senior executive 
level for that compliance and disclose those policies or a summary of those policies. 
5.2 Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 5. 
Principle 6* Respect the rights of shareholders 
6.1* Companies should design a communications policy for promoting effective communication with 
shareholders and encouraging their participation at general meetings and disclose their policy 
or a summary of that policy. 
6.2* Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 6. 
Principle 7 Recognise and manage risk 
7.1 Companies should establish policies for the oversight and management of material business 
risks and disclose a summary of those policies. 
7.2 The board should require management to design and implement the risk management and 
internal control system to manage the Company’s material business risks and report to it on 
whether those risks are being managed effectively. The board should disclose that 
management has reported to it as to the effectiveness of the Company’s management of its 
material business risks. 
7.3 The board should disclose whether it has received assurance from the chief executive officer 
(or equivalent) and the chief financial officer (or equivalent) that, the declaration provided in 
accordance with section 295A of the Corporations Act is founded on a sound system of risk 
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management and internal control and that the system is operating effectively in all material 
respects in relation to financial reporting risks. 
7.4 Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 7. 
Principle 8 Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
8.1 The board should establish a remuneration committee 
8.2 The remuneration committee should be structured so that it:  
 consists of a majority of independent directors 
 is chaired by an independent chair  
 has at least three members 
8.3 Companies should clearly distinguish the structure of non-executive directors’ remuneration 
from that of executive directors and senior executives. 
8.4 Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 8. 
Source: ASX 2010a, pp. 12-14 
*Principles are considered as unnecessary for the boundaries of the thesis and in addressing the research 
problem.  
 
Principles 1 and 2 will ensure that the case firm will disclose board and executive management 
functions. In a broader sense, principles 1 and 2 add substance to the expectations of the corporate 
eco-system as to the way boards and executive management should function. In respect of 
compliance with principle 4, this will ensure that the case firm has established an audit committee. 
Principles 5, 7 and 8 will ensure that information is relevant and timely; additionally it will ensure 
that the case firm discloses much of the evidence required for the write up of the firm as a case unit 
in this thesis.   
The first stage of selecting a ‘key case’ has involved a trawl of ASX 300 listed firms. These firms were 
first checked to identify the location of their head office. Once established that the firm’s head office 
is located in Melbourne, the firm’s annual report was sought to ensure its compliance with the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. An initial 
fifteen potential case firms were identified. Of these firms it was decided to approach and engage 
five firms at a given time, until one granted access. After ethics was sought and approved. The 
engagement strategy involved making the initial contact with the company secretary, as the contact 
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details of company directors and executive managers is not readily available.  A call was made to the 
potential case firm’s head office, and a request to speak with the company secretary was sought. 
Once contact was made with the company secretary, the research overview was verbally presented 
and a formal research proposal and ethically approved invitation was emailed. This invitation 
contained the interview schedule (see Appendix One for the invitation).  
Of the potential case firms, six firms rejected via a return email or on the second engagement 
attempt. However, two potential case firms agreed to participate, one fell through due to time 
constraints and busy scheduling. 
The remaining participating firm agreed to an initial audio-taped interview to be conducted with the 
company secretary. This interview was scheduled for one hour to be conducted at the firm’s head 
office (see Appendix One for interview question schedule). At the end of the interview additional 
interview participants were requested. Requested for interviews with the external and outsourced-
internal audit partners and audit committee chair were particularly sought. The company secretary 
was happy to provide the contact details of the audit partners and make the arrangements for the 
interview with the audit committee chair. The audit committee chair agreed to the taped interview 
and the company secretary made all the arrangements. The interview was conducted at the firm’s 
head office and scheduled for an hour.  
Subsequently, contact was made with the audit partners. The external audit partner agreed to a 
taped interview, while the internal auditor politely but firmly declined the interview request. The 
interview with the external audit partner was conducted at the office of the big-4 audit firm and was 
also scheduled for an hour. Additional interviews were sought with the CFO and board chair. 
However, despite all efforts by the researcher and supervisor, the interview requests were declined. 
The consistent reason given was busy scheduling.  
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These additional two top level interview participants would have provided enhanced evidence for 
this case study. However, given the considerable depth and breadth of information obtained from 
the already conducted interviews with the key governance players (i.e., the company secretary, 
audit committee chair/independent director, and the external audit partner), the researcher 
proceeded with this ASX 300 company as the ‘key case’. Apart from the interviews obtained, 
multiple sources of documentary information on the governance of this company, including audit 
committee agenda papers, charters and policy statements were accessed. It was believed that 
saturation of information for this case study had been largely reached for qualitative analysis of data 
from the three key interviewees and various company documents. 
Saturation is regarded to be the point of diminishing returns, where there becomes little need for 
more sampling (Mason 2010; O’Reilly and Parker 2012). In summary, saturation is the point where 
new evidence or data and their sorting only confirm the categories, themes and conclusions already 
reached; i.e., evidence should be collected until little that is new can be generated (O’Reilly and 
Parker 2012). This point of saturation, according to Strauss and Corbin (cited in Mason 2010) is a 
matter of degree based on the researchers’ subjective judgement. As such, the number of 
participants required is dependent upon two main factors: the nature of the topic and the resources 
available (O’Reilly and Parker 2012). This is guided by two key considerations appropriateness and 
adequacy of data; i.e., saturation (O’Reilly and Parker 2012). 
The empirical findings in this study have been structured to flow as a narrative story which includes a 
qualitative analysis of the text obtained from publicly available company documents (annual report, 
board and board sub-committee charters, governance policies), interview notes and transcripts, and 
audit committee meeting agendas. Table 3.4 (below) presents a summary for the sources of 
evidence used for the case unit write up. Upon the formal write up of the firm as a case unit, it was 
sent to the participants for their review and possible additions and corrections. The case unit write 
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up was sent back with minor adjustments made. The empirical findings of this key case unit are 
presented in the next chapter.  
Table 3.4: Summary of Evidence Used for Firm Case Unit  
Acquisition Method Sources of Evidence 
Semi-structured interviews Firm directors Audit committee chair  
Executive management  Company secretary 
External audit  External audit partner 
Documents  2011 Annual report   
2005 Board and 2010 board sub-
committee charters 
 
Various governance policies (from 2009)  
The 2011 and 2012 agenda’s for audit 
committee meetings 
 
See Appendix 5 for the array of documents analysed under each case and the theme(s) derived, in whole or part, from 
content in the related document 
  
In terms of the research strategy for this study, it sought the possibility of a comparative case study 
approach using multiple case studies. Other ASX 300 listed firms were approached to obtain initial 
interview participants. In particular a potentially comparable case firm by size and industry was 
identified. However they declined an interview. What was interesting about this particular case firm 
was that unlike the participating case firm, it failed to meet the ASX 300 listing requirements. In 
particular it did not meet principle 2, sub-section 3; “roles of chair and chief executive officer should 
not be exercised by the same individual” (ASX 2010a, p. 12). The inference is that access to company 
corporate governance-related inside information is problematic for non-compliant ASX 300 
companies. 
Co-operation from the Institute of Internal Auditors – Australia (IIA) was obtained in seeking 
potential interviewees who hold an appointment as an audit committee member (see Appendix 
Two). During 2012 the IIA held a formal member dinner, where an opportunity was presented to 
interview an audit committee chair from local government. The interview with the local government 
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audit committee chair revealed insightful perspectives. Therefore, additional interview participants 
were sought to gain additional evidence on governance policies, practices and interfaces of local 
governments, as the purpose of this case study is to gain insights into the governance phenomenon. 
Subsequently, to gain a wider understanding of the governance phenomenon additional local 
government audit committee chairs were sought in order to develop a nested case of local (city) 
governments centred on the audit committee and its interfaces to the wider governance system. 
The first interview participant arranged for an additional two interviews to be held with other local 
government audit committee chairs. One accepted, while scheduling issues forced the cancelation of 
the other.    
Both local government audit committee chairs have extensive experience and hold multiple 
engagements in various local governments and have previously held senior management and leading 
audit roles. Therefore, the interviewees’ knowledge arises from their varied experiences and 
opinions regarding governance ‘best practices’ and governance actor interactions from both their 
experiences in local governments and ASX 300 firms.  Both these interviewees were audio-taped and 
scheduled for an hour. However, due to their interest in this research each lasted for an average of 
an hour and a half. Further, both interview participants had amalgamated their responses drawing 
from their multiple experiences. Additionally, the interview participant referred to as PH has 
previously served on the Australian auditing standards board. These two interviews provided facts 
and reflections that both complemented and broadened the evidence obtained from the ‘key case’ 
company. This further helped in striving for saturation due to the multiple sources of collected 
evidence. 
Given the use of a nested case study process, the additional interviews with the local government 
audit committee chairs are able to serve as another individual case unit within the wider case. Since 
it serves as a supplementary case unit it is based on the general governance nature of local 
governments. Therefore, the company case unit can act as the key case unit as it demonstrates, 
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through its disclosers, a comprehensively documented and professionally managed governance eco-
system, while the local government case unit serves as a supplementary case unit. This will also 
enhance the validity of the second step analysis of the empirical findings through triangulation 
(Denscombe 2007).   
The empirical findings from the local government case have been structured to flow as a narrative 
story, similar to the company case. For comparability reasons, this includes a qualitative analysis of 
the text obtained from publicly available documents as well as interview transcripts. Upon the 
formal write up of the city governments case unit, it was sent to the participants for their review and 
possible additions and corrections. Researcher received no response; therefore agreement with the 
narrative story for city governments was implied. The empirical findings of this city governments’ 
case unit are presented in chapter 6.  
Table 3.5 (below) summarises some of the key similarities and differences between corporate 
entities and local governments to mainly illustrate their structural similarity. The table is structured 
around the agency concepts as depicted in Figure 2.3 of Chapter 2. This allows for an easier 
intergration of local government and corporate concepts and structures into Figure 3.5. In summary, 
Table 3.5 shows that there is a strong structural similarity between the governance mechanisms of 
corporate entities and local governments. Therefore, the local government case unit can provide an 
alternative perspective on the governance phenomenon.  
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Table 3.5: Key Similarities and Differences between Corporate Entities and Local Governments 
Corporate Entities   Local Governments Similarity 
Firm City Council An Entity 
Decision Control   
Board Council Governing body equivalent 
Directors  
Elected business politicians – 
directors are nominated by the 
board, but are elected by 
shareholders  
Councillors  
Elected politicians – councillors 
may be self-nominated, but are 
elected by residents 
Equivalent, except for specialised 
knowledge and experience. 
Board Chair Council Mayor Role equivalence 
Independents and executive 
members  
Pure independents by definition Governing body composition  
CEO is a member of the Board  CEO is not a member of Council 
but is the interface 
Equivalent relationship 
Audit Committee 
composed of board members 
Audit committee 
composed of independent advisors 
and councillors 
Established to assist the governing 
body (Advisory) 
Decision Management   
Executive management  City management  Role equivalence 
Principal   
Shareholders – generally 
concerned about capital return 
Residents – generally concerned 
about sustainable living and 
efficient services 
Relationship equivalence 
Source: Interview with PH on 10th May 2012; Interview with JA on 27th March 2012; Department of Planning 
and Community Development 2012e 
 
3.5 EVIDENCE CODING AND ANALYSIS APPROACHES 
As stated earlier this thesis adopts a qualitative approach for its evidence collection and presents the 
thesis as a case study. Consequently, the thesis also adopts a qualitative approach for the coding and 
analysis of its evidences. The coding and analysis approaches are outlined in Figure 3.3 and discussed 
in the next sub-sections. As Figure 3.3 shows, the thesis adopts a three stage coding scheme and a 
two-step analysis approach. Reviewing the raw evidence’s (i.e., review interview audio-tapes, annual 
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report, charters, etc.) at the end of each coding stage and analysis step (MacFarlane and O’Reilly-de 
Brun 2012; Neuman 2011).  
Figure 3.3: Adopted Approaches for Evidence Coding and Analysis 
 
3.5.1 Three Stages of Coding 
As mentioned above, this thesis adopts a three stage coding scheme. Neuman (2011) suggests that 
there are three stages in qualitative coding and, at each stage a different coding approach is to be 
used. At the first stage an open coding approach is usually adopted (Neuman 2011). Open coding 
attempts to condense the raw evidence into broad preliminary categories (Neuman 2011). These 
broad preliminary categories or themes are based on a low level of abstraction, and may come from 
initial research question(s), concepts embedded in the literature or stimulated by evidence 
immersion (Neuman 2011). In open coding the researcher moves back and forth between abstract 
concepts and specific details focusing on the actual evidence (Neuman 2011). This back and forth 
ensures that the raw evidence is not forced into predetermined categories (MacFarlane and O’Reilly-
de Brun 2012). The goal of open coding is not on the predetermined categories, but rather, on 
evidence interpretation and category development primarily driven by the conceptual patterns in 
Akeel M. Lary 
105 
the evidence (Kendall 1999). Kendall (1999) identifies open coding as an approach which aims to 
generate an emergent set of categories. Consequently, the approach therefore remains inherently 
inductive. 
The second coding stage adopts an axial-thematic coding approach, because in axial-thematic coding 
the focus is simultaneously on the categories or themes and on the evidence (Neuman 2011). 
Therefore, the primary concern in this coding stage is on making connections among the previously 
emerged inductive themes from the first coding stage and looking for new themes between themes 
(Bitsch 2005; Neuman 2011). It “focuses on the relationships between categories and subcategories, 
including conditions, cause-and-effect relationships, and interactions” (Bitsch 2005, p. 79). In 
summary, the researcher is: (1) to look for categories or themes which cluster together; (2) to divide 
existing themes or categories into subcategories; and (3) to combine several closely related concepts 
(Neuman 2011). Incorporating the thematic coding with axial coding will ensure that emergent 
themes are important to the description of the phenomenon and are evidence driven (Fereday and 
Muir-Cochrane 2006; MacFarlane and O’Reilly-de Brun 2012). Therefore, the axial-thematic coding 
approach will ensure that the initial categories are reviewed to make further comparisons which 
describe the relationship between categories (Jones and McEwen 2000). 
The final coding stage adopts an theory-driven selective coding approach, because this mixed coding 
approach is better suited for addressing this thesis’s research questions and objectives (MacFarlane 
and O’Reilly-de Brun 2012; Neuman 2011). Selective coding involves rescanning the raw evidence 
and previous codes to look for selective cases which support the developed conceptual coding 
(Neuman 2011). To better address research questions and objectives, this third coding stage is 
adapted to shift its focus from the raw evidence to the empirical findings of the first step analysis 
(MacFarlane and O’Reilly-de Brun 2012). This theory-driven selective coding approach is a process 
which integrates previous categories into a selection of core categories which are determined as 
central to theoretical constructions (Kendall 1999). Therefore, in this study, the empirical findings 
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represent mappings from a deductive prior theoretical template of codes approach (Fereday and 
Muir-Cochrane 2006; MacFarlane and O’Reilly-de Brun 2012). 
3.5.2 Two-steps of Analysis 
The first step of the two step analysis adopts a narrative-network analysis based on the inductive 
axial-thematic coding, i.e., the first and second coding stages. Adopting this form of coding and 
analysis will ensure that empirical findings are evidence driven (MacFarlane and O’Reilly-de Brun 
2012). Neuman (2011) describes the narrative as a type of writing which tells a story and presents a 
linked chain of events in which individual or collective social actors have an important role. The 
narrative analysis is a way to examine the world as a set of connected relationships among parts 
which form part of a plot (Neuman 2011). It serves as an outline for organising and explaining the 
evidence (Neuman 2011). While the network analysis aims to discover, analyses and then display 
sets of relationships (Neuman 2011), it also helps to show and understand the structure of complex 
social relations (Neuman 2011). Therefore combining both these forms analysis will ensure that at 
the empirical findings from the first step analysis is an inductive story of complex social relations.  
Further the inductive axial-thematic coding scheme applied ensures that the analysis is based on the 
emerged themes and categories (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). 
The second and final analysis step involves mapping the findings of the first step narrative analysis 
into theory-driven selective narrative analysis (MacFarlane and O’Reilly-de Brun 2012). In this thesis, 
the assumptions underlying agency theory and institutional theory, respectively, are selected for the 
illustrative-narrative analysis. Therefore, the findings from the first stage of network-narrative 
evidence analysis are to become the evidence’s for the second stage of illustrative narrative analysis 
(Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). In summary, the thesis adopts an illustrative-narrative analysis 
method. The illustrative method is a form of qualitative evidence analysis which takes theoretical 
concepts and treats them as empty boxes which need to be filled by using specific empirical 
examples and descriptions (Neuman 2011). It applies theory to a social setting by organising 
evidence based on theory (Neuman 2011). Consequently, pre-existing theory provides the 
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conceptual categories which are filled with empirical evidence (Neuman 2011). Adopting this two-
step analysis method will ensure that the second step empirical findings are guided by theoretical 
assumptions while being simultaneously organised and explained in a story like manner. 
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a summary into the research design and strategy adopted for this study. It 
further explains the methods used to gather evidence. This study adopts a qualitative research 
design, as the research problem resides more towards the qualitative end of the methods 
continuum. The qualitative research approach provides an enhanced means of exploring and 
understanding the interactions of governance structures within a corporate eco-system.  
An interpretivist ontological philosophical assumption is adopted, as the study seeks to embrace the 
notion of multiple realities in addressing the corporate governance phenomenon. With the 
interpretivist stance the governance phenomenon can be theoretically defined by adopting both or 
either the agency or institutional theoretical lens. The study adopts multiple inquiry paradigms, post-
positivism, constructivism and pragmatism, to address the research problem. Consequently, the 
governance phenomenon is bounded by causality and is shaped by prior events and theories, yet it 
remains simultaneously evolutionary. Further, it is underpinned by the notion of multiple realities as 
per the varied perspectives of participants. 
The study adopts the case study research strategy, because this will enable an in-depth holistic focus 
on the governance relationships and interactions within a particular firm by examining its corporate 
eco-system. The sampling frame adopted for the study is the key case method, as it will ensure the 
selected case demonstrates sound governance practices and models and by inference, a strong 
commitment to the protection of shareholder interests. The purpose of the case study is a 
combination of instrumental, explanatory and exploratory. In this thesis the approach of the case 
study is theory testing and interpretive, where the researcher relies on agency theory and 
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institutional theory to interpret the governance phenomenon. The thesis adopts a nested case unit 
process; therefore it will gain its completeness from the wider case.  
The evidence obtained from the main case unit is sourced using semi-structured audio-taped 
interviews conducted with the company secretary, audit committee chair and external audit partner. 
Additionally, evidence is collected from multiple documents available online. The complementary 
case unit’s evidence has also been collected from semi-structured audio-taped interviews conducted 
with two local government audit committee chairs. In coding and analysing this evidence, the thesis 
adopts a three stage coding scheme and a two-step analysis approach. 
 
“The ancient teachers of this science … promised impossibilities, and performed 
nothing. The modern masters promise very little … [but] performed miracles” (Shelley 
1818, p. 36) 
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“On every point of general literature he displays unbounded knowledge, and a quick 
and piercing apprehension” (Shelley 1818, p. 189). 
CHAPTER FOUR 
A CASE STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 
AND PRACTICES FOCUSING ON THE AUDIT 
COMMITTEE 
CHAPTER FOUR: A CASE STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOCUSING ON THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed understanding of the policies, practices and 
interfaces of key governance actors and mechanisms within their corporate eco-system of a listed 
Australian company. The focus is centred primarily on the audit committee of the board of the case 
company. These policies, practices and interfaces will be interpreted from alternative theoretical 
perspectives drawn from agency and neo-institutional theories, as reviewed in Chapter 2. This 
theory-grounded interpretative stage will be undertaken in Chapter 6.  
This chapter presents the empirical findings on the case company from a narrative-network analysis 
of the text obtained from company documents and interview transcripts. It is based on information 
extracted from the various public disclosures made by this Australian listed company readily 
available through its website. Additionally, it is based on information extracted from semi-structured 
interviews conducted with the audit committee chair, company secretary and external audit partner.  
It was a formal condition and request that the name of the company and identities of participants be 
kept confidential. As such the company shall be referenced as Case One. Given the qualitative nature 
of this study this chapter acknowledges the sources of the various information presented, however 
withholds from formally referencing due to confidently and ethical purposes. This Chapter extracts 
information from Case One’s 2011 annual report; board charter; audit, business risk and compliance 
committee charter; nomination committee charter; remuneration committee charter; risk oversight 
and management policy; continuous disclosure policy; and the audit, business risk and compliance 
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committee’s policy on non-audit services and auditor rotation. These various sources ensured that 
saturation reached. 
This chapter is structured to flow as a story which begins by introducing the company (i.e., Case 
One), its directors, executive management and auditors. The story continues by describing the 
responsibilities and functions of the board, the audit, business risk and compliance committee, the 
remuneration committee, the nomination committee and audit programmes. It concludes by 
describing some of Case One’s key corporate governance policies.   Through this structure, a detailed 
understanding can be gained about the policies, operations and interactions of Case One’s corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
4.2 THE COMPANY 
Case One is an ASX 300 listed company operating in the ‘Retailing’ GICS Industry Group. Case One’s 
principle activity is the management of consumer brands and outlets, with a net asset worth of 
approximately 1.8 billion, a net debt/equity ratio of approximately 19%, and a return on capital of 
approximately 13.5% (Case One 2011a).  
Case One, was selected as its approach to corporate governance is one that complies with the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. In 
addition its public disclosures and reports demonstrate high standards of ethical and corporate 
governance excellence and the ease of access implies transparency. Case One highlights its 
commitment to sound governance practices in its governance statement which states that the 
directors and management are committed to conducting the Company’s business ethically and in 
accordance to the highest standards of governance (Case One 2011a). In addition it notes that good 
governance structures encourage companies to create value for shareholders through the 
promotion of sensible risk taking, while providing the accountability and systems of control to match 
the risks involved (Case One 2011a).  
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4.3 BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
The Case One board is currently composed of six directors, one executive and five non-executive 
independent directors (Case One 2011a). A brief background of current Case One directors is 
provided below.  
4.3.1 Jay 
Jay is currently the board chair and is an independent non-executive director; Jay joined Case One 
mid-2008 and was appointed as chairman late-2008 (Case One 2011a). A Fellow Chartered 
Accountant (FCA) with previous experience as a partner in one of the big four audit firms in Australia 
and Asia (Case One 2011a). Table 4.1, lists some of Jay’s current and previous directorships.  
Table 4.1: Jay 
Directorships Position  GICS Industry Group Appointment  
Current  Chair Real Estate 2005 
Chair Materials Mid 2009 
Director Consumer Services Early 2008 
Previous  Director Software & Services 2006 to 2008 
Director Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 2002 to 2008 
Director Diversified Financials 2005 to 2007 
Director Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 2005 to 2006 
Director Health Care Equipment & Services 2004 to 2005 
Director Real Estate 2001 to 2005 
Source: Case One 2011a; ASX 2012 
4.3.2 June 
June is currently the chair of the audit, business risk and compliance committee, further June is an 
independent and non-executive director; June joined Case One mid-2009 (Case One 2011a). June 
has extensive experience on boards, having served as a non-executive chair and director of various 
companies from a range of Industry Groups in public, private, and government sectors (Case One 
2011a). Further, June is a Fellow of the Australian Institute of Company Directors (FAICD) and an 
Associate Professor of business from a major Australian University (Case One 2011a). Table 4.2, lists 
some of June’s current and previous directorships.  
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Table 4.2: June 
Directorships Position  GICS Industry Group Appointment  
Current  Director Insurance  2003 
Director Materials  2005 
Director Telecommunication Services  2010 
Previous  Director Materials  2000 to 2007 
Director Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences  2005 to 2007 
Director Capital Goods  2000 to 2009 
Source: Case One 2011a; ASX 2012 
4.3.3 Sam  
Sam is the CEO and an executive director; Sam joined Case One in 1996 as general manager of 
various Case One divisions, Sam was appointed as CEO early-2008 (Case One 2011a).  
4.3.4 Ben 
Ben is an independent and non-executive director; Ben joined Case One mid-2010 (Case One 2011a). 
Previously Ben ran a strategic consultancy business for six years with clients from various GICS 
Industry Groups, which include transportation, telecommunication services, media, and consumer 
services (Case One 2011a). Table 4.3 lists some of Ben’s current and previous directorships and 
senior executive engagements.  
Table 4.3: Ben 
Directorships Position  GICS Industry Group Appointment  
Current  
and Previous  
Executive Household & Personal Products  
Executive Household & Personal Products  
Executive Energy  
Executive Food, Beverage & Tobacco  
CEO Household & Personal Products  
CEO Consumer Services 2003 to 2010 
Director Food, Beverage & Tobacco  
Director Consumer Services  
Director Food, Beverage & Tobacco 2005 to 2009 
Source: Case One 2011a; ASX 2012 
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4.3.5 Ken 
Ken is an independent and non-executive director; Ken joined Case One late-2009 (Case One 2011a). 
Ken is a FAICD and has over 25 years’ experience with multi-national corporations (Case One 2011a). 
Below is Table 4.4 which lists some of Ken’s current and previous directorships.  
Table 4.4: Ken 
Directorships Position  GICS Industry Group Appointment  
Current  Director Retailing  2003 
Director Consumer Services  2004 
Director Diversified Financials  2007 
Previous  Managing 
Director 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco   
Managing 
Director 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco   
Source: Case One 2011a; ASX 2012 
4.3.6 May 
May is an independent and non-executive director; May joined Case One early-2010 (Case One 
2011a). May has over 25 years’ experience as a senior executive in various industries (Case One 
2011a). In addition, May is a FAICD, holds a Masters of Business Administration and a Bachelors of 
Commerce (Case One 2011a). Table 4.5 lists some of May’s current and previous directorships.  
Table 4.5: May 
Directorships Position  GICS Industry Group Appointment  
Current  Director Materials  2011 
Director Real Estate   
Previous  Director Real Estate  2007 to 2008 
Director Transportation 2006 to 2007 
Director Energy  1999 to 2006 
Managing 
Director 
Banks 10 years 
Source: Case One 2011a; ASX 2012 
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4.4 SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
4.4.1 Sam  
As mentioned earlier under the previous section (under the company’s directors), Sam is the CEO 
and an executive director; Sam joined Case One in 1996 as general manager of various Case One 
divisions, Sam was appointed as CEO early-2008 (Case One 2011a).  
4.4.2 Tim 
Tim is the CFO and Chief Operating Officer formally the Chief Financial and Operating Officer (CFOO); 
Tim joined Case One Mid-2009 (Case One 2011a). Prior to Tim’s appointment at Case One, Tim 
served as a Chief Strategy Officer (CSO) at CompOne which operates in the Food, Beverage & 
Tobacco GICS Industry Group, Tim’s responsibilities included corporate strategy and financial 
planning (Case One 2011a). Tim has considerable experience in retailing and diversified financials 
GICS industry groups, having held senior consultancy roles in strategy, operations and finance at a 
major management consultancy firm and one of the big four audit firms (Case One 2011a). 
4.4.3 Joe  
Joe is the general counsel and company secretary of Case One and was appointed this role in late-
2003 (Case One 2011a). Prior to Joe’s appointment Joe held senior corporate legal roles and an eight 
year career with a major Australian law firm (Case One 2011a).  
The company secretary should have a legal background as the company secretary is a 
statutory officer under the Corporation Act. The company secretary is also the board 
secretary. The role of a board secretary is a boarder role as opposed to being the 
secretary to a board sub-committee. As secretary to the board have a duty to assist 
the directors in fulfilling their legal obligations under the Corporations Act, source 
outside advice in fulfilling their roles as directors, advise on technical legal papers 
presented to the board, assist and advise the board in relation to the legal 
implementation of remuneration policies. The role as the secretary to a board sub-
committee, it is more of an administrative role; duties include taking minutes at 
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meetings, aiding in the preparation of meeting agenda, the distribution of meeting 
papers and agenda, and organising meetings. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
The role of the company secretary is an interesting balancing act due to its dual 
accountabilities one as a company employee who is to report to the CEO and CFOO 
and two as a statutory officer (with obligations to and an instrument of the board) 
under the Corporations Act. The company secretary does not have a separate formal 
accountability to board sub-committees, accountability remains to the board as a 
statutory officer. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
4.5 THE AUDITORS  
4.5.1 Outsourced-Internal Auditor Partner  
Lee is the outsourced-internal auditor partner of Case One. Lee is a partner at one of the big four 
audit firms and was appointed in 2010 as part of Case One’s evolving corporate needs which 
required the establishment of an internal control framework (Interview with Joe on 8th March 
2012). 
4.5.2 External Auditor Partner 
Cat is the external auditor partner at Case One, Cat was appointed in 2011 (Interview with Cat on 
01st May 2012). Cat has over 18 years’ experience as a partner at one of the big four audit firms in 
risk and audit advisory services (Audit Firm 2004). Cat brings a wide range of expertise in accounting, 
assurance and advisory, and due diligence investigation (Audit Firm 2004). Cat’s experience includes 
external audit; review of internal controls, fraud assessment and budgeting processes; due diligence 
investigation and joint venture reporting; and advice and implementation of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (Audit Firm 2004). 
4.6 THE BOARD  
The board is committed to maximising operational performance, financial returns and creating 
shareholder value (Case One 2011a). The board is also committed to ensuring that its constitutional 
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powers and responsibilities are exercised and discharged, adopting best practice governance 
principles and applicable laws (Case One 2005; 2011a). The board retains the ultimate responsibility 
for the strategic direction and control of Case One (Case One 2005). 
The board is responsible for ensuring Case One is properly managed to protect and enhance 
shareholder interests, and that directors, officers, and employees operate in a sound governance 
environment (Case One 2011a). The board is responsible for the review and oversight of the 
administration, management, and governance of Case One (Case One 2005). The board has the 
ultimate responsibility over setting and ensuring policies regarding the business and affairs of Case 
One are to the benefit of shareholders and stakeholders, however the board remains accountable to 
shareholders regarding the overall performance of Case One (Case One 2005; 2011a).   
4.6.1 Key Board Roles and Responsibilities 
 Protection of shareholder interests, through the adoption and maintenance of best practice 
governance standards; 
 Ensure the establishment, monitoring and review of a risk management and compliance 
framework; 
 Authorise Case One accounts policies and annual financial statements; 
 Approve annual budgets; 
 Approve significant acquisitions and divestments; 
 Approve the Strategic direction of Case One;  
 Engage, appointment, review, and when necessary replace the CEO; 
 Ensure executive management and director succession planning; 
 Establish goals for management and monitor their achievement; and 
 Evaluate and review Case One performance against strategies and budgets (Case One 2005; 
2011a). 
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4.6.2 Key Director Responsibilities 
 Act honestly, fairly, and diligently;  
 Abide to laws, regulations, and Case One policies; and 
 Avoid potential conflicts of interest by promptly disclosing interests in contracts, other 
directorships or offices held, possible related partly transactions, and the sale or purchase of 
Case One shares (Case One 2005). 
4.6.3 Composition 
The board is to be composed of a minimum of six directors to a maximum of ten directors, in the 
event of the identification of an outstanding candidate or when additional expertise are required to 
diligently discharge board responsibilities and functions  (Case One 2005). In addition, the board is to 
be composed of directors with an appropriate range and mix of qualifications, expertise, and 
experience which will enable the effective functional discharge of board responsibilities (Case One 
2005; 2011a). Further, it is to be composed of a majority of independent and non-executive directors 
(Case One 2005).  
An independent director is a director who is not and was not within the last three years a member of 
executive management; and is free from any business, affiliation or engagement which could or be 
reasonably perceived to materially interfere with his or her ability to, execute an unfettered and 
independent judgment or act in best interest of Case One (Case One 2005; 2011a). The materiality of 
any engagement or relationship is considered on a case by case basis based on adopted materiality 
guidelines (Case One 2011a). The guidelines define a material engagement or relationship as: (1) 
holding ≥ 5% of Case One shares; or (2) a business affiliation accounting for ≥ 5% of Case One’s 
revenue or expenses (Case One 2011a). However, ultimately the board will make an qualitative 
assessment of any factors and considerations which may be reasonably perceived to materially 
interfere with a directors ability to, execute an unfettered and independent judgment or act in best 
interest of Case One (Case One 2005; 2011a).   
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As an additional safeguard in preserving its independence, the board chair is to be an independent 
and non-executive director (Case One 2005; 2011a). The board chair acts as the official 
spokesperson of the full board, unless the full board determines otherwise (Case One 2005). In the 
absence of the board chair another director may should they choose chair all or part of the Board 
meeting (Case One 2005).  
All directors expect the CEO are subject to shareholder re-election every three years (Case One 
2011a). A director should not hold office for more than nine years, unless under the board 
determines otherwise due to exceptional circumstances (Case One 2005).  
4.6.4 Board responsibilities and Functions 
Below lists some key responsibilities and functions of the board: 
Executive Appointments 
 The appointment, authority delegation, and performance review of the CEO; 
 The appointment and performance review of other executive directors; 
 Ratification of the hierarchical matrix for executive management includes the CEO (Case 
One 2005). 
The Board and Executives 
 Approve the terms of appointment of executive management; 
 Executive management evaluation and remuneration, including their incentive policies; 
 Executive management and director succession planning; 
 The performance assessment of Case One and its board and directors, including the 
CEO; 
 Ensure the continuous education and information follow to directors regarding:  
o The various businesses of Case One, and  
o The board’s  role and its functions and obligations; 
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 The performance evaluations of individual directors prior to their standing for re-
election (Case One 2005). 
 The Strategic Direction 
 Approve the strategic plan and budget; 
 Evaluate the performance of Case One against its business strategies and plans to: 
o Monitor the performance of executive management delegated functions; and  
o Assess Case One’s sustainability and suitability of its overall resource allocation 
and business strategies and plans; 
 Approve the capital and operating expenditure budget, including any modifications; 
 Approve all significant and material mergers, acquisitions or divestitures; 
 Approve significant leasing or purchase of buildings or property; and 
 Approve any capital and operating expenditure or any other material transaction outside 
the boundary of the budget or ordinary course of business (Case One 2005). 
 Financial Accounts and Reporting 
 Approve Case One’s annual accounts and directors’ reports; 
 Approve accounting policies; 
 Approve the audit plan of both the internal and external audit; 
 Approve audit reports including management letters; and 
 Approve any borrowings or the use of Case One assets as security (Case One 2005). 
 Miscellaneous 
 Approve the use of the company seal or execution without the seal; and 
 Approve donations and sponsorships if above approved limits (Case One 2005). 
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4.6.5 Authority Delegation  
As noted earlier the board has retained the ultimate responsibility for the strategic direction and 
control of Case One, however the board delegates the day-to-day management of Case One 
resources to the executive management, including the CEO (Case One 2005; 2011a). In addition, the 
board may delegate some its responsibilities and functions to its sub-committees (Case One 2005).  
4.6.5.1 To the Executive Team  
The board delegates the day-to-day management of Case One’s resources to the executive 
management team under the leadership of the CEO, to deliver the strategic direction and goals of 
Case One as determined by the board, however agreed between the board and executive 
management (Case One 2005; 2011a). A key board function is to monitor the executive 
management team’s performance in regards to deliverance of the strategic direction and goals of 
Case One (Case One 2005; 2011a). The Executive management team’s annual performance 
evaluation occurs in accordance with the processes described in Remuneration report (Case One 
2011a).   
The board will monitor the decisions and actions of the CEO and the overall performance of Case 
One to gain assurance that process is being made towards the attainment of approved strategies, 
goals and plans (Case One 2011a). The CEO however will conduct a formal review each year, which 
assesses the overall performance of the executive management team and report back to the board 
(Case One 2005). 
4.6.5.2 To Board Sub-committees  
The board may establish sub-committees to streamline the discharge of its responsibilities and 
functions (Case One 2005). Each standing sub-committee is to adopt a formal charter which sets out 
matters regarding its composition, responsibilities, functions and administration (Case One 2005). In 
addition, each board sub-committee is to be composed of a minimum of three non-executive 
directors, majority of which are independent and further the chair is to be an independent and non-
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executive director and shall not be the chair of the board (Case One 2011a). Currently the board has 
established three sub-committees: 
 Audit, business risk and compliance committee; 
 Nomination committee; and  
 Remuneration committee (Case One 2005; 2011a). 
The board may also delegate specific functions or issues to these sub-committees on an as needs 
basis, any additional powers to be delegated to these sub-committees will be determined in board 
resolutions (Case One 2005). Any other governance issues not specifically dealt or delegated to one 
of these sub-committees is the responsibility of the full board (Case One 2011a).   
In relation to issue delegation to a board sub-committee, if an identified issue is 
delegated to a board sub-committee. That sub-committee is then responsible for 
making a recommendation to the board therefore executive management is to deal 
with the sub-committee regarding the issue and not the board. As such executive 
management have indirect accountabilities to board sub-committees. Interview with 
Joe on 8th March 2012 
4.6.6 Board Processes 
The board is to determine its meeting schedule at the beginning of each year and it currently 
schedules nine meetings per year (Case One 2005; 2011a). It is Case One practice that one or more 
of these meetings coincide with site visits at key operating sites, to assist the board in its 
understanding of operational issues and to continually educate and inform directors regarding 
various Case One businesses (Case One 2005; 2011a). The company secretary is to attend all board 
meetings as a minute secretary (Case One 2005). Members of the executive team may be invited to 
attend all or part of meetings whenever the board requires their involvement of assistance in 
consideration of issues before the board (Case One 2005). A majority presence of board members 
shall form a quorum (Case One 2005). 
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The meeting agenda of the board is prepared by the company secretary in conjunction with the 
board chair, CEO and the CFOO with periodic input from the full board (Case One 2011a; Interview 
with Joe on 8th March 2012). All board papers are to be distributed prior to board meetings (Case 
One 2011a). Further, whenever necessary the board may hold additional meetings to address 
specific issues which arise and require attention between scheduled meetings (Case One 2005; 
2011a). The meeting agenda of board sub-committees is similarly prepared by the company 
secretary in conjunction with the respective chair (Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012). The 
frequency of Board meetings and that of its sub-committees is largely dependent on the issues 
raised and their complexity (Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012). 
All directors and other attendees of board meetings are as fiduciaries and officers of Case One, they 
are required to keep all written or oral information presented or discussed at board meetings 
confidential (Case One 2005). All the minutes of board sub-committees are to be entered into the 
minute book, which is open for inspection by any director, further the minutes are to be signed by 
each board sub-committee chairs as a true and correct record (Case One 2005).  
It is good practice to have the CEO lead the discussion at the start of board meetings by 
providing a summary regarding the issues faced by the company and the manner in which 
these issues have been translated into the financial results and statements. Interview with 
June on 27th March 2012 
4.6.7 Access to Information and Independent Advice  
Each director has the right to access Case One information and Case One’s executive management, 
external advisors and auditors (Case One 2011a). Further, directors may also seek independent 
professional advice at the expense of Case One, however seeking such advice requires a formal 
request issued to the board or its chair (Case One 2011a). In the event that the board chair requires 
such advice a formal request shall be made to the chair of the audit, business risk and compliance 
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committee (Case One 2011a). All Directors shall also have full access to all documents presented or 
prepared for meetings of the board or its sub-committees (Case One 2011a).  
4.6.8 Conflict with Executive Management 
Conflict between the board and executive management are generally in relation to 
when issues should be disclosed rather than what or how. Further, the board is 
prepared to take a different view from that executive management in these conflict 
situations. Directors drawn upon their knowledge and experience in executing their 
judgement, for example if the issue was a matter of goodwill write-down, directors 
would consider whether the materiality of the goodwill value. The board is a 
collegiate body. If a decision could not be reached at the meeting it would be 
deferred and raised at the next meeting. It would never force a resolution and see 
who had the most votes by the end.  Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
4.6.9 External Communication 
Board directors do not have direct communication with external regulators or 
parties, except for the board chair who will have external communication to and with 
major shareholders. External communication from regulators to board directors is 
through the company secretary, and the secretary is to pass the information down to 
directors. There is no direct communication between directors or regulators, unless 
the regulatory body demanded direct communication. Interview with Joe on 8th March 
2012 
4.6.10 Review 
The Case One board with the assistance of the nomination committee and an external advisor will 
bi-annually, review the performance, membership and charters of the board and its sub-committees 
to determine their adequacy in the then current circumstances and to determine whether their 
processes are adequate to ensure they are able to carry out their functions in the most effective 
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manner (Case One 2005; 2011a). This review will include individual performance evaluations for the 
board chair and each director (Case One 2011a).     
As part of the 2011 review process, all directors completed a questionnaire in which they were able 
to make comments and raise issues relating to the operation of the board or its sub-committees 
(Case One 2011a). In addition, executive management input was also sought and included in the 
review process (Case One 2011a). This information was then analysed adopting both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, in which the results were compiled into a report prepared by an external 
adviser (Case One 2011a). The external adviser in conjunction with the board chair provided 
feedback to the board and privately to individual directors (Case One 2011a).  
Each director is required to undergo a performance review prior to their standing for election (Case 
One 2011a). This review is performed by the board chair in consultation with other directors, while 
the board’s chairs performance review is performed by a board chosen non-executive director (Case 
One 2011a). The details of the executive management performance review processes are disclosed 
in the remuneration Report (Case One 2011a).  
4.7 AUDIT, BUSINESS RISK AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE 
Table 4.6: Members of the audit, business risk and compliance committee 
Members Non-executive and Independent  Meeting frequency  
June (Chair) Yes  5 of 5 
Ben Yes 4 of 4 
Ken Yes 5 of 5 
Jay (Board Chair) Yes 5 of 5 
Source: Case One 2011a 
4.7.1 Purpose 
The primary purpose of the audit, business risk and compliance committee (ARC) is to assist the 
board in the effective discharge of its responsibilities across board delegated functions (Case One 
2010a; 2011a). Delegated functions cover the vetting of financial reporting processes and the 
oversight of the financial risk framework includes compliance, internal controls, the maintenance of 
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the insurance and assurance provided by the internal auditor, and the relationship with external 
auditors (Case One 2010a).  
It is important to note that the primary purpose of the ARC is to assist the board. It is 
not a decision making sub-committee nor is it to make decisions on behalf of the 
board. Its role is to assist the board in the discharge of its responsibilities across 
functions delegated by board.  As a non-decision making committee, the ARC is to 
make key recommendations around financial processes and reporting, internal 
controls, risk management framework and both the external and internal audit 
programmes. In doing so, the committee needs to work hard to ensure potential or 
bubbling issues are identified and acknowledged, this is achieved by constructing a 
culture which allows executive management to raise issues early. This will ensure 
that management raises these issues early and directors are kept up to date. 
Information papers are prepared and made available, and information secessions are 
organised and conducted prior to ARC meetings. Therefore board meetings are as 
per agenda and free of surprises. This will ensure a comprehension of issues, 
consequently the recommendation of the ARC and ultimately the decision of the 
board will be based on a comprehensive comprehension of issues. Interview with June 
on 27th March 2012 
The ARC’s primary purpose is to make recommendations to the full board which 
benefit for all stakeholders in relation to the financial statements, internal controls 
and risk management framework. The ARC is to oversee: (1) the internal control 
structure and framework to ensure that financial records are maintained; (2) the 
financial statements which are an output of those records are true and correct; and 
(3) the risk framework which is a broader role as it includes financial risk and 
environmental and social compliance which indirectly have a financial element. As 
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the business of Case One is about brands and intellectual property and through poor 
environmental and social compliance; brand damage is inevitable and Case One may 
lose its ability to supply retailers and considering the current technological social age 
the end consumer may boycott brands, as such Case One considers good 
environmental and social compliance practices as a core business element. Interview 
with Joe on 8th March 2012 
In comprehending the purpose of the ARC, it is apparent that the ARC’s sole 
accountability is to the board, its purpose is to assist and provide support to the 
board. The ARC’s oversight function is to provide the board with recommendations; 
because the board has retained the ultimate responsibility and accountability over 
the oversight function. The ARC does not have a separate accountability to 
shareholders or other stakeholders; however ARC members have separate and direct 
accountabilities, not as ARC members but as directors of a corporate entity. Interview 
with June on 27th March 2012; Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
4.7.1.1 Importance of an ARC 
 An Audit Committee can be considered as a key governance mechanism second to 
the board, especially if it is an audit and business risk committee which would have 
its claws in every element of a company’s operations except for the people element. 
The ARC looks at, considers and makes a recommendation to the board in relation to 
the overall director report including the remuneration report, further, it receives 
assurance from the remuneration committee that it supports the remuneration 
report. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
4.7.1.2 The Role of the ARC Chair 
The chair of an audit committee should be cautious not to pre-empt the audit 
committee in making a decision; as the chair is not the committee’s decision maker. 
Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
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The main role of the ARC chair is to facilitate the work of the ARC and to act as a 
bridge between ARC and non-ARC directors and the external auditor, internal 
auditor, and executive management. As the bridge the ARC chair should meet with 
key presenters prior to ARC meetings (pre-meetings), to go through information 
papers, request for addition papers, identify issues, raise questions, and make a 
judgement to facilitate information sessions. These pre-meeting provide the 
opportunity for a pre-discussion over financial processes and reporting, internal 
controls, risk management and the external and internal audit programmes. This 
provides the benefit of freeing up meeting time to allow other ARC members to raise 
issues and concerns and have the presenters address their issues and concerns. 
Presenters may include executive management, auditors, or other persons requested 
to address the ARC. Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
An observed informal activity of the ARC chair is the chair’s willingness to meet with 
key presenters prior to ARC meetings to stay on top of issues (usually comprising of 
the ARC chair, board chair, external auditor, internal auditor and CFOO). This activity 
is critical to overall ARC success as these pre-meetings provide the opportunity for 
executive management, the external auditor and the internal auditor, to refine 
proposals, documents or information papers to better target and address potential 
ARC or director concerns. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012; Interview with Cat on 
01st May 2012 
Pre-meetings act as a tool which ensures any bubbling issues are identified and acknowledged. This 
ensures that board and ARC meetings remain free of surprises. Pre-meetings also enable the 
preparation and distribution of information papers and the potential conducting of information 
sessions.      
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Acting as a bridge to management is not a threat to director independence but 
rather an opportunity for a more brutal battering and probe of flaky proposals, 
without the embarrassment of having it done in front of a broader forum, i.e., in 
front of full ARC or board. This provides executive management with the opportunity 
for an early reaction and probe; not to false stage manage but to: (1) be across any 
bubbling issues; and (2) assist executive management to better respond to ARC 
concerns. This ensures a productive and detailed presentation, followed by a 
thorough discussion. Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
The ARC chair can be considered to have an informal accountability to executive 
management in assisting executive management (1) in the preparation of the board 
agenda; and (2) to better comprehend what the ARC is looking for and what it needs 
to perform its role. This is to ensure that executive management presents and 
distributes information papers in a clear and comprehensive yet concise manner 
which meets the needs of all directors and not only those of the ARC. If ARC directors 
have any issues in relation to the distributed papers, they are free and advised to 
directly contact members of executive management to seek clarity, justifications or 
request for additional papers and information. Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
An observed informal role of the ARC chair is as a coach to executive management. 
Through this informal coaching role the ARC chair is able to aid executive 
management in the improvement in the quality of distributed financial papers and is 
better able to improve director issue comprehension, through the ARC chair’s pre-
meetings and ability to recognise the potential need for information sessions. 
Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
A major informal role of an audit committee chair is to ensure clarity of expectations 
and understanding in relation to the purpose and role of an audit committee, not 
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only to its members but the broader forum, i.e., non-audit committee directors, 
executive management and the auditors. A major concern of the ARC chair is that 
implicitly there may be greater, unrealistic and inappropriate expectations in the 
minds of non-audit committee directors regarding the purpose of audit committees’ 
and that its presence alters their roles and responsibilities as directors over the 
integrity of financial reports. As such, these directors are potentially more likely to 
ignore certain director responsibilities particularly those over the integrity of 
financial accounts and reporting. It is important to note that the integrity of company 
accounts is the responsibility of all directors and not only of those of the audit 
committee. Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
4.7.2 Composition 
All persons appointed to the ARC must have the ability to comprehend and interpret financial 
statements (i.e., be financially literate) and have sufficient financial knowledge and understanding to 
allow for the diligent discharge of ARC functions and responsibilities (Case One 2010a). The board 
shall appoint the ARC chair and its members or by resolution remove and replace members (Case 
One 2010a). The ARC is to be comprised of a minimum of three members, all of whom shall be 
independent non-executive directors, unless the board determines otherwise (Case One 2010a). 
Further, the ARC chair cannot be the board chair (Case One 2010a). 
The presence of the board chair as a formal member of the audit committee is 
common practice. Further, if the board chair is not already a formal member of the 
audit committee, the board chair does and should regularly attend Audit Committee 
meetings, in particular those regarding the year-end accounts. Interview with June on 
27th March 2012; Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
The board chair’s addition on the audit committee could potentially improve the audit committee’s 
ability to perform its oversight function, by informally strengthening the audit committee through 
Akeel M. Lary 
130 
the board chair’s authority and influence. However, the board chair should be able to comprehend 
the potential financial issues that an audit committee may potentially face, i.e., ideally the board 
chair should be financially literate.   
The role of the ARC secretary is a process type role and does not require an 
accounting expert. The role involves working with the ARC chair to determine 
agenda, take minutes during ARC meetings and assist the finance team with ARC 
papers. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
4.7.3 Meetings   
The ARC will meet at least four times per year, or as often as the ARC deems necessary to fulfil its 
responsibilities and objectives (Case One 2010a). Two ARC members shall form a quorum for ARC 
meetings and the company secretary shall act as the ARC secretary (Case One 2010a). The ARC 
secretary will arrange ARC meetings as directed by the ARC chair or at the request of any other 
director (Case One 2010a). 
The Meeting frequency of this and other audit committees is largely dependent on the 
complexity of the issues and also the way in which both the board and audit committee 
meetings are structured and organised. Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
The frequency of ARC meetings is dependent on the issues raised and their 
complexity. Very issue raised constitutes both an informal and formal process. The 
informal process involves discussions regarding the issue(s) between the key persons 
(typically including the ARC chair, board chair, CFOO and external audit partner). The 
ARC chair will then advise on the preparation of papers to be brought to the ARC and 
inviting persons of interest to ARC meetings to discuss issues with ARC directors so 
they may gain clarity on issues. The formal process involves the ARC directors 
reaching a decision at an ARC meeting, and the chair making a formal 
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recommendation to the board at the next board meeting. Interview with Joe on 8th 
March 2012 
The CEO, senior risk executive, CFOO, head of internal audit (whether in-house or outsourced) and 
external audit partner may by invitation, attend ARC meetings (Case One 2010a). The non-ARC non-
executive directors are free to attend ARC meetings (Case One 2010a). The ARC is to meet with the 
external and/or internal auditors in the absence of executive management whenever it is deemed 
appropriate but not less than twice a year to ensure that the auditors have had the full cooperation 
of executive management in conducting the audit, in addition to providing each auditor with the 
opportunity to raise matters of concern (Case One 2010a; 2011a).  
Informal ARC meetings are not considered a good practice as ARC members would 
meet in absence of auditors raises issues. Further informal meetings in the presence 
of auditors is also bad practice as they are external professionals who need time to 
prepare nor should one spring or bounce between issues. However the chair of the 
audit committee should meet with key presenters prior to audit committee meetings 
to go over papers. Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
The ARC had four meetings this year two were around the half and full year results, 
the other two were in-between to address various issues. Meetings last for about 
three hours which move at a reasonable pace. However everyone is expected to 
have read and digested papers. The CEO, CFOO, and the risk officer regularly attend 
ARC meetings; other members of the executive team by invitation attend to address 
particular issues. In addressing issues raised at ARC meetings the ARC chair will say 
“right we have heard what management has had to say, would any director like to 
make a comment?”, from there the ARC chair will action a resolution. Both the board 
and the ARC are a collegiate body, i.e., if votes were hung, the issue(s) would be 
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deferred to the next meeting, and the directors would not base a decision on 
majority rules basis. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
4.7.3.1 ARC Meetings Structure    
ARC meetings are structured as follows: 
1. Discussion of the previous meetings minutes lead by the ARC chair; 
2. The ARC chair will run through the action items for the meeting; 
3. The executive management team will go through their papers, agenda items may include: 
a. Review of accounting issues;  
b. Review of financial statements; 
c. Dividends; and 
d. Accounting standards update (lead by the external auditor’s assistant);  
4. The external auditors will present agenda items typically regarding: 
a. External Audit update or report; 
b. Non-audit service review; 
c. Independence statement (CFOO as presenter); 
d. Management letters; 
e. Audit Plan; and 
f. Engagement letter and fee proposal; 
5. The General Manger of Risk and Internal Auditor will lead the risk and compliance agenda 
items, that typically includes: 
a. Report on risk and social and environmental compliance; 
b. Risk control plan and strategy; and 
c. Internal Audit update and report; 
6. The CEO and CFOO will lead the investor communications agenda items, which typically 
include draft ASX releases and investor presentations; and 
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7. The ARC chair will commence the private session, with both the internal and external 
auditors to attend (Case One 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2012).  
It is beneficial to have any executives, including the company secretary and any executive 
directors, leave at the end of an agenda, to commence a closed private session between 
the non-executive directors and the lead internal auditor and external audit partner. This 
provides the opportunity for the non-executive directors to probe auditors and provides 
these auditors the opportunity to raise concerns in the absence of executive 
management. The next part of the process is to ask the lead internal auditor to leave, 
and continue the private session between the non-executive directors and external audit 
partner. Finally, the external audit partner is to leave to allow for a private session 
between the non-executive directors.  No minutes should be taken during these closed 
private sessions. The formal documentation and distribution will require vetting from the 
auditors which may cause restrictions in the discussion during these sessions. This may 
potentially obstruct the purpose of these sessions. Sessions are kept open to allow the 
expression of human emotion. However the chair of the audit committee should take 
notes on issues and concerns, not names, in order to organise and facilitate appropriate 
follow-ups. This may include debriefing executive management. Interview with June on 
27th March 2012 
The director private session is a formal process of the ARC to eye-ball the Auditors to 
ensure that the auditors have nothing else to add in the absence of executive 
management. It should not be a scary process for executive management if appropriate 
controls and processes are in place. Further it is expected that if the auditors have had 
any concerns they would have been already escalated through the appropriate channels. 
Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
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4.7.4 Responsibilities and Functions 
The ARC’s key responsibilities and functions are to review, oversee and report to the board on the 
following: 
Financial Processes and Reporting  
 Ensure processes are in place to provide shareholders with financial information which is 
accurate, complete and reliable in all material aspects;  
 Evaluate the processes in place which ensure that accounting records are properly 
maintained and are in accordance with statutory requirements; and   
 The overall accounting policies and financial accounts and reporting of Case One (Case One 
2010a, 2011a). 
Audit Programmes  
 The scope of both the internal and external audit programmes, their function and 
performance, and any other material issues arising from these audits; 
 The performance and relationship with the external auditor, including their independence 
and determining rotation procedures for personnel of the external auditor; 
 Review the reports of the internal auditor and oversee managements implantation of 
internal audit recommendations; and 
 Make a recommendation to the board regarding the appointment, termination and fees of 
the external audit (Case One 2010a; 2011a). 
The practice is that the ARC is to make a recommendation up to the board regarding the 
external audit firm and partner which covers their appointment, termination and fees. 
Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
While it is the audit committee’s role to oversee the independence of the external 
auditor and this overwhelming concern (as with Case One) is valued and beneficial, as it 
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reinforces the client’s commitment to ensuring the highest quality external audit. 
However, as auditors we should ever be vigilant and concerned with maintaining our 
independence. The reason is a loss of independence threatens and damages the integrity 
of the client company’s accounts and the audit firm, including the professional 
reputation of the lead auditor and colleagues. Further, if an audit committee is to ever 
lose trust in or distrusts their external auditor, the external audit engagement is likely to 
be discontinued and a valuable client lost. Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
The company outsources the internal audit function and it is a management 
engagement. However this union would not take place without the express blessing or 
agreement of the ARC. Therefore in a sense the ARC has an informal decision making 
authority regarding the appointment of the outsourced-internal audit function. Interview 
with June on 27th March 2012 
Internal Controls and Risk Management  
 Case One’s accounting systems and internal controls; 
 The processes used by the executive management team to monitor and ensure compliance 
with laws, regulations, ethical guidelines and other requirements that relate to the 
preparation and reporting of external financial information;  
 Assess the adequacy of processes and controls established by the executive management to 
identity and manage actual or potential risk exposures and safeguard Case One assets;  
 Review the process which provide assurance to the certifications provided by executive 
management; 
 The risk management framework, which includes the identification and management of 
actual or potential material risk exposures; and 
 The social compliance policies and practices (Case One 2010a; 2011a). 
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Executive management has a formal accountability to the ARC for ensuring an 
appropriate risk and internal control framework is designed and put in place. The general 
manager of risk and internal auditors also have an accountability to the ARC, as the ARC 
relies on the risk framework and internal controls information provided by the general 
manager of risk and internal auditor.  The testing and assessment of the internal controls 
is the primary function of the internal auditors, while the external auditor is charged with 
compliance testing. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012; Interview with June on 27th March 
2012 
Miscellaneous 
 Any other matter the board determines appropriate to be referred to the committee; and 
 Review the appointment and dismissal of the general manager of risk and any outsourced 
internal audit function (Case One 2010a). 
In terms of the scope of responsibilities, audit committees are already overburdened 
with numerous formal roles and responsibilities. Therefore the audit committee chair 
should to some extent avoid accepting additional functions delegated by the board chair 
which are not necessarily performed by an audit committee. Unless, the audit committee 
is clearly the ideal candidate for these additional functions based on expertise, 
experience or are remotely related to the formal functions of the audit committee. 
Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
4.7.5 Reporting  
The ARC chair will report to the board following each ARC meeting (Case One 2010a). A copy of ARC 
meeting minutes shall be included with the board papers at the next scheduled board meeting 
following the ARC meeting (Case One 2010a).  
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4.7.6 Authority 
ARC is to have the authority to directly discuss with the auditors (in the absence of executive 
management if the ARC deems necessary) and executive management any issue within its remit 
(Case One 2010a). The ARC is also able to request reports, explanations and information in relation 
to any Case One activity, process, procedure or account (Case One 2010a). The ARC may also seek 
the advice of Case One’s auditors, solicitors or any other independent adviser(s) regarding as to any 
matter pertaining to the powers, its duties or responsibilities, as the ARC may require (Case One 
2010a).  
The board is in sync with the ARC on issues. As such the board is prepared to take a 
different view than executive management in situations where the ARC makes a 
recommendation which opposes the view of executive management. Interview with 
Joe on 8th March 2012 
4.7.7 Tension with Executive Management 
Similarly to the board tension between the ARC and executive management is 
generally in relation to when issues should be disclosed rather than what or how. 
Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
4.7.7 Review 
 The ARC will review its performance and charter at least once a year (Case One 2010a). 
4.7.8 ARC Policy on Non-audit Services and Auditor Rotation  
A key responsibility and function of the ARC is to oversee the relationship with the external auditor, 
which includes their independence and procedures for the rotation of external audit personal (Case 
One 2009a). This policy is intended to guide and assist the ARC in fulfilling its role of maintaining 
external auditor independence by regulating the provision of non-services, in reference to: (1) 
services the auditor may not provide; and (2) services the auditor may provide subject to the ARC’s 
approval (Case One 2009a). As a general principle the external auditor is prohibited from providing 
any non-audit service which would create a perceived or real threat to their independence (Case 
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One 2009a).  Further, the policy defines the term non-audit services to encompass any service the 
auditor may provide which is not necessarily incidental to or included in the terms of the audit 
engagement (Case One 2009a). 
As the ARC chair have a clear view on what is acceptable in relation to non-audit 
services as it may potentially threaten auditor independence, therefore, black and 
white on the issue, there always exists that loving tension between auditors wanting 
to do more non-audit work. Interview with June on 27th March 2012 
4.7.8.1 Services requiring approval  
The policy recognises that there may be circumstances where the auditor may perform non-audit 
services without creating a perceived or real threat to their independence (Case One 2009a). Such 
circumstances may include situations where the auditor is uniquely positioned to perform such a 
services or minor tasks of assurance and compliance (Case One 2009a). However, such tasks are 
subject to the below approval limits (Case One 2009a).  
 Where the engagement fee for the non-audit service does not exceed $25,000 it may be 
approved by the CFOO and advised to the ARC chair; 
 Where the engagement fee for the non-audit service exceeds $25,000 but less than 
$100,000 it may be approved by the CFOO and the ARC chair; 
 Where the engagement fee for the non-audit service exceeds $100,000 is to be approved by 
the ARC; and  
 In addition, to the above approval limits, where the annual fees for all non-audit services 
exceeds or is likely to exceed 50% of the annual audit fee (i.e., non-audit service fee ratio of 
>50%), approval must be sought from the board to ensure the independence of the external 
auditor is not compromised (Case One 2009a).  
For the 2011 financial year Case One’s non-audit service fee ratio was 8.8%, i.e., total non-audit 
service fees to total audit service fees (Case One 2011a). 
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 4.7.8.2 Prohibited services 
Unless otherwise determined by the ARC, the auditor is prohibited from providing the following 
services: 
 Financial system design and implementation; 
 Appraisal or valuation services and fairness opinions; 
 Internal audit services; 
 Tax advisory or IT services; 
 Executive recruitment or extensive human resources; 
 Deal structuring advice or related documentation; 
 Broker-dealer, investment advisor or underwriter; 
 Legal services, including litigation; and 
 Corporate strategy or other non-audit expert service (Case One 2009a). 
4.7.8.3 Role of the Auditor 
Unless otherwise determined by the ARC, the auditor may not: 
 Authorise or execute a transaction and exercise authority on behalf of Case One or have the 
authority to do so; 
 Report to the board or its sub-committees in a role belonging to executive management; or 
 Engage in any other activity prohibited by legislation (Case One 2009a).  
4.7.8.4 Auditor Rotation 
The managing audit partner of the external audit is to be rotated every 5 years from date of 
appointment (Case One 2009a).  
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4.8 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
Table 4.7: Members of the Remuneration Committee 
Members Non-executive and Independent  Meeting frequency  
Ken (Chair) Yes  4 of 4 
Jay (Board Chair) Yes 4 of 4 
May Yes 4 of 4 
Source: Case One 2011a 
 
The role of the remuneration committee (RC) is to assist and advise the board on matters relating to 
the appointment and recruitment, remuneration and succession planning of the executive team 
which includes the CEO and employees of Case One (Case One 2010c; 2011a). The RC is primarily 
responsible for:  
 Overseeing the selection and appointment practices for executive management including 
the CEO; 
 Overseeing the development of succession plans by the CEO for the CEO’s executive 
management team; and 
 Assisting the board in determining remuneration policies for all Case One employees (Case 
One 2010c). 
4.8.1 Key responsibilities and functions 
The RC’s key responsibilities and functions are to: 
 Review and make recommendations to the board in relation to the total remuneration 
package including short and long term incentives of the CEO; 
 Review and approve recommendations of the CEO in relation to the total remuneration 
packages including participation in short and long term incentives of the CEO’s executive 
management team; 
 Review the performance targets of the CEO’s executive management team; 
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 Review the policies and practices regarding human resources and remuneration of Case One 
brought forward by the CEO or the human resource manager and where appropriate 
recommend adoption by the board; 
 Review the general management succession planning of Case One, but specifically for 
executive management including the CEO; 
 Oversee the selection and appointment practices of the executive management team; and 
 Review the appointments and terminations of the executive management team (Case One 
2010c; 2011a). 
4.9 THE NOMINATION COMMITTEE 
Table 4.8: Members of the Nomination Committee 
Members Non-executive and Independent  Meeting frequency  
Jay (Chair and Board Chair) Yes 1 of 1 
June Yes 1 of 1 
Source: Case One 2011a 
 
The role of the nomination committee (NC) is to assist and advise the board on matters in relation to 
the appointment and recruitment, remuneration and succession planning of Case One non-executive 
directors (Case One 2010b; 2011a). In making recommendations the NC is to periodically assess the 
mix of skills, experience and expertise required by the board and access the extent to which these 
mix of skills, experience and expertise are represented on the board (Case One 2011a). In addition 
the NC is to account for qualitative factors such as diversity and cultural fit, however nominations for 
appointment are approved by the board (Case One 2011a). The NC is primarily responsible for:  
 Reviewing, assessing and making recommendations to the board on the necessary and 
desirable competencies for the non-executive members of the board; 
 Overseeing the appointment and selection practices for the non-executive members of the 
board; 
 Developing succession plans for the non-executive members of the board; and 
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 Assisting the board in determining appropriate remuneration policies for the non-executive 
members of the board (Case One 2010b). 
4.9.1 Key responsibilities and functions 
The NC’s key responsibilities and functions are to: 
 Review and make recommendations to the board in relation to the total level of 
remuneration of non-executive directors, including: 
• Individual fees of non-executive directors and the board chair; and 
• Any additional fees payable for membership to board sub-committees; 
 Oversee, review and make recommendations to the board in relation to the selection and 
appointment practices of non-executive directors, including: 
• Periodically assessing the appropriate mix of skills, experience and expertise 
required on the board and the extent to which these mix of skills, experience and 
expertise are represented on the board; 
• Establish identification processes of suitable candidates for appointment to the 
board, including: 
o Establishing the criteria of board membership; 
o Engaging appropriate recruitment or search firms to assist in identifying 
potential candidates; and 
o Nominating appropriate candidates for non-executive directorship; 
 Establish processes for reviewing the performance of non-executive directors, the board  
and its sub-committees; 
 The design of induction, ongoing training and education programs for the board to ensure 
non-executive directors are provided with adequate information regarding business 
operations, the industry and their legal responsibilities and duties; and  
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 Monitor current non-executive board members length of service, considering succession 
planning issues and identifying the likely order of retirement by rotation (Case One 2010b; 
2011a). 
4.10 THE EXTERNAL AUDIT  
The main purpose of the external audit is to form and provide an objective view on 
the published financial reports. It is to form views on company process and controls 
which lead to reliable financial systems, which ultimately lead to reliable financial 
reports. While the role of the external auditor is to form an objective view and 
provide feedback to the board on published financial reports, it is also to provide 
constructive feedback to executive management in relation ways to improve the 
quality of management reports and papers. Therefore, in a sense the purpose of the 
external auditor is to form a trusted relationship with the board and executive 
management. As Audit professionals “our goal is to build trust”. Interview with Cat on 
01st May 2012 
The audit committee chair typically signs the external audit engagement letter and 
an audit committee is expected to rely on the audit work performed by external 
auditors. Therefore, there is an existence of a formal relationship and front-line 
accountability to an audit committee. However the ultimate responsibility and 
accountability of the external auditor is to the board and its directors not just the 
audit committee. In relation to shareholders, the external auditor’s responsibility is 
to provide an objective view on the published financial reports. Interview with Joe on 
8th March 2012; Interview with June on 27th March 2012; Interview with Cat on 01st May 
2012 
In conducting the external audit, audit firms typically use Best Practice Templates 
which are developed by the audit firm, and it is the lead audit partner’s responsibility 
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to tailor these Best Practice Templates for their client. The external audit should only 
be focused on the audit process. The external audit typically has two main tasks, the 
financial papers and financial reports. Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
Major conflict with executive management typically surrounds disclosure issues, not 
what or how but rather when. It is in such conflict situations an audit committee is 
fundamental in ensuring financial reports are true and fair, as the audit committee is 
the ultimate authority for the external auditor. However, it is better to try to 
convince executive management than use an audit committee as an authority, 
because this may ruin the relationship with executive management. It is critical for 
the audit committee and the full board to ensure that executive management is and 
remains open towards the external auditor. However, the external auditor should 
have a trusted relationship with executive management particularly with the CFO, as 
too much independence is not a good thing for the external audit because the 
purpose of the external audit is to form and provide an objective view on the 
published financial reports, and this view requires a trusted communication with 
executive management. Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
… I am from a view that some non-audit tasks should not be performed by the 
external auditor. However there are situations which arise which is it better for the 
external auditor to perform typical non-audit tasks for productivity reasons, as long 
as these tasks are audit related and independence is maintained. As stated earlier I 
do not consider it the main task of an audit committee to monitor auditor 
independence as it is an auditor’s fundamental responsibility and duty whether 
external or internal to maintain independence; the main reason being professional 
integrity and reputation. Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
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The external audit also serves as a means of board member education and 
development. As part of the audit report to the board we: (1) highlight and explain 
new accounting and governance regulatory changes; (2) provide feedback to the 
board on their governance practices; and (3) provide advice on the governance 
practices of other companies. Accounting or governance regulatory practice updates 
or changes (i.e., changes mandated by the ASX or Australian Accounting Standards 
Board) are typically passed through by the audit firm to executive management 
(typically CFO). Executive management should debrief the board in relation to these 
changes as executive management could tailor the secession to company operations. 
However at times we may pass this information directly to the directors. Interview 
with Cat on 01st May 2012 
The external auditor’s role is to keep both company directors and its executive 
management in good shape, as audit professionals we have a professional reputation 
to maintain. Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
The audit fee is typically a circular communication channel between the CFOO, 
external audit partner and ARC. In determining the audit fee the CFOO will typically 
try to keep the fee as low as possible, while the ARC will look at the scope of the 
audit and determine whether it is satisfactory. The ARC is concerned with the quality 
and scope of the audit program and is unwilling to compromise quality to keep audit 
fees down. Every director is mindful of their personal liability and damage, and as 
such they want to ensure a detailed audit. Once the ARC is satisfied with the scope of 
the audit program it will make a recommendation to the board. Interview with Joe on 
8th March 2012 
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4.11 THE OUTSOURCED-INTERNAL AUDIT  
In my view the internal audit program is more of a tool of executive management 
rather than a tool of the ARC or the board. It aids and supports the ARC’s assessment 
of the internal control framework. However its scope is developed in consultation 
with executive management based on their view of risk. Interview with June on 27th 
March 2012 
An outsourced-internal audit program in my view works well as it provides good 
structure and discipline. However, it may be better to have both an in-house and 
outsourced internal audit function especially for corporations who operate in various 
countries. Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
The scope of the internal audit program does not ordinarily overlap with that of the 
external audit. The internal audit has a strong focus on internal controls and 
executive management’s decisions and implementation of internal controls. 
However in situations when the scope of the audit programs does overlap, the 
external audit is able to rely on the working papers of the internal auditor which is 
agreed upon in initial external audit engagement and subject to the rules in relation 
to reliance on another auditor’s work. Interview with Cat on 01st May 2012 
Summarily to the engagement of the external auditor, the engagement of the 
outsourced-internal auditor is to be approved by the ARC. Its scope is developed in 
consultation with executive management, after which, the outsourced-internal 
auditor is to present their scope and fee to the ARC; and the ARC is to not 
recommended to the board but approve the fee. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
The benefit of sourcing an outsourced-internal audit program is it narrows the focus 
of the external audit program to the actual audit. The external auditor is able to 
better rely on the audit work performed by the internal auditor, and perform less 
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compliance testing. In addition, it also provides Case One with access to a broader 
range of expertise than could be provided by solely an in-house internal program. 
Each audit firm has particular areas of expertise in addition to resources which are 
used to provide a better scope of internal audit program and framework for internal 
controls. With an outsourced-internal audit program executive management and the 
board are able to gain access to relevant experts rather than executive management 
outsourcing for specific expertise. Interview with Joe on 8th March 2012 
4.12 KEY GOVERNANCE POLICIES 
4.12.1 Risk oversight and management Policy  
4.12.1.1 Purpose 
This policy is intended to set out, formalise and communicate Case One’s approach to risk oversight 
and management (Case One n.d). The policy is to provide an effective framework for the 
management of risk (Case One n.d). Further it is also to demonstrate compliance with Principle 7 of 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations, which requires the establishment of a framework for risk oversight, 
management and control (Case One n.d; 2011a). In meeting this principle the board and executive 
team have implemented a formal risk management framework (Case One 2011a). It services to: 
 Provide a formal framework and methodology for determining Case One’s risk profile; 
 Facilitate organisational wide awareness and adoption of risk management culture; 
 Ensure both strategic and operational risks are formally and regularly assessed; and 
 Provide the management process and infrastructure for the review and monitoring of 
controls, risks and management incentives for improving risk management (Case One 
2011a). 
Material business risks are documented in a risk control plan along with mitigation priorities and 
planned management actions, this plan is monitored by the ARC (Case One 2011a). In order to 
properly determine and maintain an acceptable risk profile, Case One is committed to the ongoing 
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processes of identification, assessment, monitoring and management of risk and for the reporting 
and consolidation of risk assessments to the board and the ARC on a consistent presentation basis 
(Case One n.d). Further Case One has adopted a range of policies to address key risk areas such as 
capital management, stock control and treasury (Case One n.d).  
4.12.1.2 The roles and accountabilities of key mechanisms within the risk management framework 
 
The Board 
The oversight of the risk management framework is the responsibility of the board (Case One n.d).  
The Audit, Business Risk and Compliance Committee 
The ARC’s role is to advise and assist the board in fulfilling its risk management and oversight 
responsibilities (Case One n.d). The ARC is charged with the oversight of risk management processes, 
it is: (1) to monitor and review Case One’s risk profile; and (2) the progress and performance of risk 
management strategies (Case One 2011a). 
Executive Management  
Executive management team and the CEO are responsible and accountable for ensuring that 
systems, procedures, and controls are in place for the management of risks to an acceptable level 
(Case One n.d). The general manager of risk (riskGM) holds the functional responsibility of the risk 
management framework and it to report to the CFOO (Case One 2011a). The riskGM is responsible 
for: (1) assisting in the development of risk management methodologies and processes for corporate 
functions and operating groups; and (2) advising and monitoring their ongoing implementation (Case 
One 2011a).  
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External Audit  
External audit is responsible for reviewing compliance with internal controls and assessing their 
effectiveness (includes specific risk policies and procedures) and providing an opinion regarding the 
truth and fairness of annual financial reports (Case One n.d). As such the Case One ARC has adopted 
a policy on the provision of non-audit services and rotation of external audit personnel to ensure 
and maintain their independence; details of this policy are provided earlier in this Chapter in section 
4.7.8 (Case One 2011a).  
Internal Audit  
The internal audit function is performed by a major accounting firm. The role of the internal audit 
function is to: (1) assess risks and controls; (2) enhance processes; and (3) monitor controls to 
provide assurance to the board and the ARC that there is an effective system of internal controls 
designed to ensure material risks are being managed and compliance obligations are met (Case One 
2011a). The lead internal auditor and riskGM have access to the ARC and its chair (Case One 2011a). 
The internal audit plan is reviewed bi-annually, the review is directed at: (1) reviewing controls 
which may materially impact operations; and (2) ensuring appropriate action by the executive 
management is undertaken upon an identified risk (Case One 2011a). 
4.12.1.3 Reporting Requirements  
Any and all risks with a pre-tax earnings impact greater than $250,000 that have not been brought to 
account, must be reported to the group chief accountant and general managers (Case One n.d). 
Therefore, these managers through a Controls Assurance Checklist must quarterly certify that all 
financial systems and controls are operating effectively and as designed in accordance to Case One 
policies and procedures (Case One n.d). Reports regarding business risks and management strategies 
employed to mitigate risks are received by the ARC (Case One 2011a). 
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Bi-annually the executive team mainly the CEO and CFOO are to provide compliance certificates to 
the ARC in relation to the integrity and compliance to relevant accounting standards of Case One’s 
financial and reporting control systems and financial records and results (Case One n.d; 2011a). In 
addition, the executive management team also provides a declaration in relation to Case One’s 
financial statements and to the board that in their opinion Case One (1) has a sound system of risk 
management and internal compliance and control; and (2) the system is operating effectively in all 
material aspects regarding financial reporting risks, therefore financial statements and notes present 
a true and fair view of Case One’s financial position and performance (Case One 2011a).  
Declarations are based on attestations of signoffs made by each operating group’s general manager 
and their commercial finance group manager; i.e., through the Controls Assurance Checklist (Case 
One n.d; 2011a). 
4.12.1.4 Internal control framework 
Internal controls are processes designed to address risks and provide reasonable assurance that in 
pursuing its objectives Case One is complying with applicable laws and regulations and safeguarding 
resources against loss, damage and misuse (Case One 2011a). 
The internal controls cover a broad platform, including people, policies and processes across the 
operating structure, which underpin the integrity of risk management processes and ultimately 
financial reporting (Case One 2011a). Within internal control framework Case One has established 
policies and practices designed to ensure: 
 Business transactions are authorised and executed by delegated authorities and limits; 
 Financial reporting accuracy and compliance; 
 Ethical practice and conduct for suppliers; and 
 Environmental regulation compliance (Case One 2011a). 
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A Code of Conduct has been adopted to illustrate Case One’s commitment to maintaining high level 
of integrity and ethical standards in all business practices (Case One 2011a). The Code of Conduct 
sets out the standards of behaviour for all directors, executives, employees and contractors (Case 
One 2011a).      
4.12.1.5 Access to and Review of the Risk Oversight and Management Policy  
This policy is to be made available for viewing by any person through Case One’s website (Case One 
n.d). The Policy is to be subject to a regular review by the board and shall be amended, as 
appropriate to continually reflect current best practices and changes in regulatory requirements 
(Case One n.d).  
4.12.2 Continuous disclosure and keeping shareholders informed 
Case One aims to ensure shareholders are well informed of all major developments affecting state of 
affairs of Case One (Case One 2011a). It aims to ensure shareholders can gain access to a wide range 
of information regarding Case One’s operations through its website (e.g., annual report, key policies, 
governance documents, relevant ASX industry announcements and media releases) (Case One 
2011a). In addition, Case One invites the external auditor to attend Annual General Meetings to 
address shareholder concerns in relation to the audit in addition to the preparation and content of 
the Auditors Report (Case One 2011a).    
Case One had adopted a policy that establishes procedures that ensure directors and management 
are aware of and fulfil their obligation regarding to the timely disclosure of material price-sensitive 
information. Directors and executive management must notify the company secretary as soon as 
they are aware of such information. The company secretary is responsible for communicating to ASX 
or the CFOO in the absence or inability of the company secretary to perform his or her 
responsibilities (Case One 2009b; 2011a).  
The company secretary will: (1) review material information; (2) determine in consultation with the 
CFOO, CEO, board chair, other members of the executive management team which the company 
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secretary deems necessary to reach a decision to whether the information is truly material, required 
and should be disclosed to ASX; and (3) coordinate the actual disclosure with the CFOO, CEO and 
board chair (Case One 2009b).  
4.12.3 Ethical standards and Code of Conduct  
The board deems it necessary to provide employees or agents with a clear set of values that 
highlight ethical conduct, sound business practices and promote a culture of strong governance 
(Case One 2011a).  The key highlights of the Code of Conduct are that directors, agents or employees 
are to:  
 Behave with integrity in their dealings with customers, shareholders, suppliers and other 
Case One stakeholders; 
 Act in best interest of Case One and avoid perceived or real conflicts of interests; and  
 Protect Case One assets under their control and not use assets for personal use without 
approval (Case One 2011a).    
4.12.4 Fraud and Corruption 
 The Implementation of fraud and corruption controls is part of good governance and management 
practice, such controls minimise risk of financial loss and damaged to Case One reputation and that 
of its board, executive management and employees. As reinforcement to the Code of Conduct, Case 
One has developed and implemented a separate policy for fraud and corruption, a key objective of 
this policy is to support and enable an organisational culture which proactively prevents fraud and 
corruption. This policy is aligned with the risk management framework (Case One 2011a). 
4.13 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an introduction to Case One, its directors, executive management and 
auditors. It then described the responsibilities and functions of the board, the ARC, the RC, NC and 
audit programmes. It concluded by describing some of Case One’s key corporate governance 
policies. Its purpose has been to provide a detailed understanding about the policies, operations and 
Akeel M. Lary 
153 
other practices and interfaces of Case One’s corporate governance mechanisms and their actors 
with Case One’s corporate eco-system. 
Chapter 6 will present an interpretation and evaluation of Case One’s governance mosaic as 
presented in this chapter. Overall this chapter presents a picture of a company that has in place a 
comprehensively documented and professionally managed governance system with particular 
reference to its audit committee. Following the empirical findings as presented in this chapter, 
governance mechanisms operate within a bureaucratic governance structure, however interactions 
appear to be interdependent. The establishment of governance mechanisms appears to be in 
response to both compliance pressures and productivity improvement. Further, actors appear to 
hold their professional reputation in high value.        
The information presented in this chapter has been extracted from the various public disclosures 
made by Case One available through its website in addition to semi-structure audio-taped interviews 
conducted with the audit committee chair, company secretary and external audit partner. This 
chapter acknowledges the source of the information presented, however withholds from formally 
referencing for confidently and ethical reasons.  
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“The resources of his mind on this occasion were truly astonishing: his conversation 
was full of imagination” (Shelley 1818, p. 57). 
CHAPTER FIVE 
A CASE STUDY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOCUSING ON THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
CHAPTER FIVE: A CASE STUDY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOCUSING ON THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
5.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed understanding of the policies, practices and 
interfaces of corporate governance mechanisms and actors of four Victorian local governments 
within their corporate eco-system, i.e., superordinate social system. The focus of this case-based 
analysis is centred primarily on the audit committee. The chapter presents the findings from the 
narrative-network analysis of these policies, practices and interfaces; this chapter provides the 
prelude to an illustrative-narrative analysis presented in the next chapter. That is, in the next 
chapter the findings from this chapter will be interpreted from alternative theoretical perspectives 
drawn from agency and neo-institutional theories, as reviewed in Chapter 2.  
This chapter presents the findings on four Victorian local governments from a narrative-network 
analysis of the text obtained from interview transcripts and documents. It is based on information 
extracted from the various public disclosures made by Victorian local governments readily available 
through their websites. Additionally, it is based on information extracted from semi-structured 
audio-taped interviews conducted with the two local government audit committee chairs and 
documents presented during and after the interview.  
It was a formal condition and request that the identities of participants and consequently the names 
of the Victorian local governments be kept confidential. As such the Victorian local governments 
shall be referenced to as CouncilA, CouncilB, CouncilC and CouncilD. Given the qualitative nature of 
this study this chapter acknowledges the sources of the various presented information. However it 
withholds specific names in the referencing due to confidently and ethical purposes. This chapter 
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extracts information from annual reports, audit committee charters, draft audit committee charters, 
audit committee work plans and audit committee information packages. These various sources 
ensured that saturation reached. 
This chapter is structured to flow in a similar manner to the previous case chapter (i.e., the Case One 
case). It begins by providing an introduction to Victorian local governments. It continues by 
describing the responsibilities and functions of the audit committee. It concludes by briefly 
describing the responsibilities and functions of the audit programmes of local governments. Through 
this structure, a detailed understanding can be gained about the policies, operations and 
interactions of corporate governance mechanisms of Victorian local governments. 
5.2 INTRODUCTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS  
In Australia a local government is also identified as a city council. It is a third tier form of government 
after federal and state; it is regarded as the closest level of government to the community (CouncilB 
2012; Department of Planning and Community Development 2012a). A city council is held to be a 
democratically elected governing body which serves a specific municipality within a State 
(Department of Planning and Community Development 2012a). City councils work in partnership 
with federal and state Governments, and other agencies: (1) to provide a municipality’s community 
with services and programs; and (2) to advocate on behalf of the municipality’s residents on a wide 
range of issues (CouncilB 2012). The main purpose of a city council is: (1) to effectively and efficiently 
use resources to ensure that the community is engaged and well-connected; and (2) to work with 
the community to provide the best possible service to residents (CouncilA 2012; CouncilC 2012a). 
City councils are composed of an elected administrative arm, i.e., democratically elected community 
councillors (Council); and an operational or managerial arm, i.e., council staff (Department of 
Planning and Community Development 2012b; Interview with PH on 10th May 2012). The 
managerial arm holds the responsibility for implementing Council decisions (Department of Planning 
and Community Development 2012b). Moreover, the managerial arm houses city council officers 
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who are to implement and manage systems; as well as to provide advice and expertise to aid its 
Council members in forming policy decisions and delivering services for the community (Department 
of Planning and Community Development 2012b).  
While the administrative arm houses elected community representatives; these elected councillors 
are involved in establishing the strategic direction and determining the priorities and policies of city 
council (CouncilA 2012). In broad terms the elected Council sets the overall direction for the 
municipality through long-term planning (Department of Planning and Community Development 
2012b). It adopts a strategic view for the desired future for its municipality and creates plans and 
policies for its achievement (Department of Planning and Community Development 2012b). A 
Council tracks its activities progress through monitoring and reporting processes (Department of 
Planning and Community Development 2012b). A Council's major operational activities include: (1) 
the maintenance and improvement of community services; and (2) the establishment of governance 
and business functions necessary for an effective and publicly accountable body (CouncilA 2012). 
Key Council Roles and Responsibilities: 
 Ensuring responsible and accountable governance;  
 Accounting for the diverse needs of the local community in making decisions; 
 Establishing strategic objectives and monitoring their achievements; 
 Ensuring that resources are managed in a responsible and accountable manner; and 
 Promoting local community interests to other communities and governments (CouncilA 
2012).  
Key Councillor Responsibilities: 
 Review and debate on issues before council and engage in decision making processes; 
 Review council policies and objectives to ensure municipality suitability;  
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 Review council activities, expenditure and resource allocation, against the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service delivery (Department of Planning and Community Development 
2012b). 
The Council is to be composed of elected councillors meeting as a whole; i.e., individual councillors, 
including the mayor do not have individual authority to make decisions (CouncilC 2012a; 
Department of Planning and Community Development 2012b). Provided a quorum is present, 
decisions (known as resolutions) are reached through majority vote during Council meetings, which 
are open to the public unless formally closed under the Local Government Act (CouncilC 2012a; 
Department of Planning and Community Development 2012b; 2012c). Council will typically consider 
the advice from experts, recommendations from Council officers, advice from the audit committee 
and feedback from its community before reaching a resolution (CouncilC 2012a). However, in the 
event of a tied vote the mayor, has a second casting vote; conventionally used to maintain the status 
quo, however the mayor is under no obligation to maintain the status quo (CouncilC 2012a; 
Department of Planning and Community Development 2012d). 
Generally in Victoria, the city mayor is elected each December from and by the municipality’s 
councillors for a one-year term; however, the incumbent mayor may be re-elected each year should 
Council choose (CouncilB 2012; CouncilC 2012a; Department of Planning and Community 
Development 2012b). The mayor holds the responsibility for chairing Council meetings; in the 
absence of the mayor the Council must appoint an acting mayor from its members (Department of 
Planning and Community Development 2012b). The acting mayor is to perform any function and 
exercise any power conferred to the mayor (Department of Planning and Community Development 
2012b). 
The principle function of Council meetings is to consider and exercise decisions on matters that 
impact the municipality and to review the operational and financial achievements against targets 
(CouncilA 2012). Councils typically hold one to two meetings per month, to discharge general city 
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council business (Department of Planning and Community Development 2012d). Each Council is to 
schedule a regular meeting cycle and publicly advertise meeting details (Department of Planning and 
Community Development 2012d). The size of any given Council is dependent on the size of the 
municipality (CouncilA 2012; CouncilC 2012a). 
The Local Government Act requires a Council to: (1) appoint; (2) negotiate the contract of; (3) 
delegate authority to; and (4) annually review the performance of the CEO (CouncilA 2012; CouncilB 
2012; Department of Planning and Community Development 2012c). Accordingly, the CEO is the only 
member of city staff who is directly appointed by, responsible and accountable to, and is formally 
required to report to city council (CouncilA 2012; CouncilB 2012; Department of Planning and 
Community Development 2012b; 2012c). The CEO is to be appointed for no more than five years, on 
a performance based contract; the incumbent CEO may be re-appointed for a further term 
(Department of Planning and Community Development 2012c).  
Consequently, the CEO is responsible for implementing Council decisions, ensuring Council achieves 
its Council Plan objectives, and managing the day-to-day operations, resources and city council staff 
(CouncilA 2012; CouncilB 2012; Department of Planning and Community Development 2012b; 
2012c). Accordingly, the CEO is responsible for the appointment, authority delegation, management 
and dismissal of city council staff and for all other issues in relation to city council staff to enable an 
accountable, efficient and effective function of a city council (CouncilA 2012; CouncilB 2012; 
Department of Planning and Community Development 2012c). City Council officers are accountable 
to Council through the CEO. (Department of Planning and Community Development 2012b) 
Key responsibilities of the CEO 
 Establishing and maintaining an appropriate organisational structure of the city council;  
 Implementation of Council decisions without undue delay; 
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 The day-to-day management of city council operations in accordance with the Council Plan; 
and 
 Providing timely advice to Council (Department of Planning and Community Development 
2012c). 
An interviewee states: 
Similarly to corporate entities city councils have governance guidelines to follow in 
relation to the formation and composition of audit committees. The voluntary 
adoption of audit committees in city councils dates back to 1998. These guidelines 
are merely the extension of the corporate guidelines, but are politically focused. It is 
the general consensus that these guidelines are best practice and therefore should 
be conformed with. Interview with JA on 27th March 2012 
Corporate governance is defined as a process which ensures that a city council operates in a manner 
which is open, honest, communicative and accountable (CouncilA 2012). However, virtuous 
governance is dependent on comprehensive and continuous accountability (CouncilC 2012a). 
Accordingly, sound governance practices guide the way in which a Council represents, consulates 
and communicates with the community; it ensures (1) adherence to legislation; (2) accountable and 
transparent control; and (3) continuous improvement (CouncilA 2012).  
5.3 AUDIT COMMITTEES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
The main purpose of corporate governance in its current form is to project audit 
assurance. Interview with PH on 10th May 2012 
5.3.1 Purpose 
Established by Council, the audit committee is held to be an independent advisory committee 
(CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 2011a; 2011b; Interview with PH on 10th May 2012).The primary role of 
the audit committee is to assist Council in the effective discharge of its corporate governance 
responsibilities over accounting and financial reporting, risk management, governance and reliable 
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internal controls (CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 2011a; 2011b).  The audit committee assists by: (1) 
providing an independent review of its city council’s financial management and reporting systems; 
(2)  ensuring and overseeing an effective and efficient internal and external audit process; and (3) 
developing procedures to promote transparency, accountability and preparedness (CouncilA 2011a; 
2012; CouncilD 2008). The audit committee is to closely monitor the activities of its Council and 
provide it with detailed advice (1) to ensure sound financial management and ongoing legislative 
compliance; and (2) in the development and maintenance of internal controls (CouncilC 2012a; 
CouncilD 2008). 
The audit committee also acts as an effective means of communication between the external 
auditor, internal auditor, city management and Council (CouncilA 2011a; 2012; CouncilB 2011b). The 
audit committee’s role is also to enhance the creditability and objectivity of both internal and 
external financial reports, and enhance the effectiveness of audit functions (CouncilB 2011a; 2011b).  
The audit committee is to work with both the auditors and Council to ensure the municipality 
community’s needs are protected at all times (CouncilD 2008). 
5.3.2 Composition 
Audit committees of city councils typically consists of five members; three independent experts and 
two city councillors (CouncilA 2011a; 2011b; 2012; Council B 2011a; CouncilC 2012a). With all 
members having full voting rights (Council B 2011a). The councillor members are appointed by 
Council for a two year term with one retiring annually (CouncilA 2011a; 2012). Alternatively, some 
city councils appoint the mayor and one other councillor nominated by council (CouncilB 2011a). 
However, the terms of appointment should ensure the continuity and orderly rotation despite 
changes in Council members (CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 2011a). On the other hand, the independent 
members are appointed for a three year term and are eligible for re-appointment (CouncilA 2011a; 
2011b; 2012). Moreover, the appointment of prospective independent members typically involves 
the audit committee chair, mayor, CEO and director of corporate services (CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 
2011a).  
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The role of the independent members is a coaching role to both Council and city 
management, the coaching role involves providing advice based on corporate 
knowledge and experience (Interview with JA on 27th March 2012). The audit 
committee is aiming to build a constructive relationship with city management rather 
than an overly independent relationship (Interview with PH on 10th May 2012). 
As a collective the audit committee is to have a broad range of skills and experience relevant to city 
council operations (CouncilC 2012b). Independent members are to have executive management, 
audit or financial management and reporting knowledge and experience (CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 
2011a, 2011b). Because such knowledge and experience is considered readily transferable, however 
it needs to be merged into the culture (Interview with JA on 27th March 2012). The chair of the audit 
committee is to be an independent member and appointed annually by its members (CouncilA 
2011a; 2011b; 2012; CouncilC 2012b). To be eligible for independent membership, a prospective 
individual must be free from any conflict of interest or any relationship which could or could 
reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with the individual’s ability to act in the best interest 
of Council (CouncilB 2011b). However, being a ratepayer does not constitute a conflict of interest 
(CouncilB 2011b).  
5.3.3 Meetings   
As stated earlier, the principle function of Council meetings is to consider and exercise decisions on 
matters that impact the municipality and to review the operational and financial achievements 
against targets (CouncilA 2012). Accordingly audit committee meetings serve that same principle 
function (CouncilA 2012; CouncilD 2008). Typically five meetings are held annually; the meeting 
schedule is developed and agreed on by its members (CouncilA 2011a; 2011b; CouncilB 2011a). 
Audit committee members are expected to attend every scheduled meeting (CouncilA 2011b). 
The presence of the majority of audit committee members shall form a quorum, unless no councillor 
members are present (CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 2011a; CouncilC 2012b). All members have full and 
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equal voting rights (CouncilA 2011b). Audit committee resolutions (or decision recommendations) 
pass through majority vote (CouncilA 2011b). In the event of the absence of the audit committee 
chair, the audit committee will appoint a chair from its independent members to chair the meeting 
(CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 2011a). 
The CEO, director of corporate services, finance manager, governance manager and internal auditors 
may by invitation attend audit committee meetings (CouncilA 2011a; 2012; CouncilB 2011a). These 
attendees do not have voting rights, attendees are to assist the audit committee in fulfilling its 
purpose by presenting reports, updates or information (CouncilA 2011a; 2011b; 2012). However, it is 
expected that the CEO and internal auditor attend all audit committee meetings unless the  audit 
committee believes that matters should be discussed privately in the absence of one or both 
(CouncilB 2011a).The external auditor attends audit committee meetings to present the external 
audit plan and the audited financial reports (CouncilA 2011a; 2012). At each meeting the audit 
committee is provided with the opportunity to meet with the auditors in the absence of city 
management (CouncilA 2011a; 2012). The audit committee is annually expected to meet with 
external and internal auditors (separately) in the absence of city management (CouncilA 2011b; 
CouncilD 2008).  
The meeting agenda and administration of audit committee meetings is handed by a 
member of city management, that member is responsible for collecting and 
distributing all required documents and specialist reports. Interview with PH on 10th 
May 2012 
The audit committee meets to monitor and review the following matters: internal audit scope and 
reports, external audit reports, implementation status of audit recommendations (both internal and 
external), financial reports, reports on governance, legislative compliance  and risk management 
framework and issues (CouncilA 2010; 2011a; 2011c; CouncilC 2011). 
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Any informal meetings or discussions of the audit committee are between its 
members, and are in relation to agenda items or bubbling issues; they are usually 
held prior or after formal audit committee meetings. Interview with PH on 10th May 
2012 
5.3.3.1 Audit Committee Meeting Agenda items     
Audit committee meeting agenda items include: 
1. Discussion and confirmation of the previous meetings minutes; 
2. Annual review of audit committee performance, composition and charter;  
3. Internal audit and control framework agenda items may include: 
a. Internal audit update and report 
b. Review internal audit scope , performance and audit plan; 
c. Review of internal audit charter and adequacy of resource allocation; 
d. Review of key internal controls, policies, procedures and delegations; and 
e. Assess the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls; 
4. External audit agenda items may include: 
a. Review external audit scope, plan, approach, reports and performance;  
b. Discuss the appropriateness of accounting policies applied in financial reports; 
c. Discuss matters arising from the external audit; 
d. Review city management implementation of external auditor recommendations; 
e. Provide feedback to external auditors on financial reports and compliance with 
accounting standards; 
5. The manager of risk  will lead the risk agenda items, which may include: 
a. Report on risk and social and environmental compliance; and 
b. Risk control plan and strategy;  
6. Council reporting agenda items may include: 
a. Review of financial reports and recommendation to Council; 
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b. Report to Council on significant accounting policies, internal controls and 
performance review of audit programmes; and 
c. Report to Council on matters or findings of audit programmes (CouncilA 2010; 
2011c; CouncilC 2011). 
5.3.4 Responsibilities and Functions 
The key responsibilities and functions of local government audit committees are to review, oversee 
and report to Council on the following: 
Financial Processes and Reporting  
 Annually review the financial reports and provide Council with a recommendation; 
 Ensure processes are in place to ensure financial information is accurate, complete and 
reliable in all material aspects;  
 Evaluate the processes in place which ensure that accounting records are properly 
maintained and are in accordance with statutory requirements;  
 Review, highlight and inform Council in relation to major accounting and reporting issues 
and changes both regulatory and of city management; 
 Advise city management in relation to its responsibility to ensure that Council receives 
financial information which is accurate, complete and reliable;   
 Review and provide Council with a recommendation in relation to the overall accounting 
policies, financial accounts and reporting of city council; and 
 Review the long term financial strategy of Council (Case One 2010a, 2011a; CouncilA 2010; 
2011a; 2011c; CouncilB 2011a). 
External Audit Program  
 The scope of the external audit program, its function and performance, and any other 
material issues arising from the audit; 
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 Review the reports from the external auditor and ensure managements implantation of 
external audit recommendations;  
 Review the audit reports issued by Victorian Auditor-General’s Office; 
 Consider the independence of the external auditor in relation to other services provided to 
city council; 
 Ensure that critical accounting policies and judgements, material adjustments and 
disagreements with city management are discussed with the external auditor;  
 Ensure that the external auditor has access to the audit committee chair when required;  
 Liaison between the external and internal auditors to promote appropriate compatibility and 
reliance; and 
 Meet separately with the external auditor to discuss matters that the audit committee or 
external auditor deem should be discussed privately (Case One 2010a; 2011a; CouncilA 
2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2012; CouncilB 2011a; CouncilC 2012b). 
In relation to the private discussions with the external auditor, it is more form than 
substance; it is to ensure that city management is not intimidating the auditors. 
Interview with PH on 10th May 2012  
Internal Audit Program  
 The scope and fees of the internal  audit program, its function and performance, and any 
other material issues arising from the audit; 
 Consider the independence of the internal auditor in relation to other services provided to 
city council; 
 Annually review the performance of the internal auditor, including their termination upon 
an unsatisfactory audit; 
 Review the reports of the internal auditor and oversee city managements implantation of 
internal audit recommendations; and  
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 Meet separately with the internal auditor to discuss matters that the audit committee or 
internal auditor deem should be discussed privately; 
 Ensure there are no unjustified restrictions or limitations placed on the internal auditor; 
 Liaison between the internal and external auditors to promote appropriate compatibility and 
reliance; 
 Actively engage in and make a recommendation to Council and city management  regarding 
the appointment, termination and fees of the internal audit (Case One 2010a; 2011a; 
CouncilA 2010; 2011a; 2011c; CouncilB 2011a). 
The audit committee regularly receives its reports from the internal audit function; 
therefore the audit committee is heavily engaged in the internal audit work programme to 
either approve or modify. If city management is resistant to modifications, the audit 
committee is able to rely on the authority of the mayor; however the audit committee is 
looking to work constructively with city management and Council. Interview with PH on 10th 
May 2012   
Internal Controls and Risk Management  
 City councils accounting systems and internal controls; 
 The processes used by city management to monitor and ensure compliance with laws and 
regulations, ethical guidelines and other requirements that relate to the preparation and 
reporting of external financial information;  
 Assess the adequacy of processes and controls established by city management to identity 
and manage actual or potential risk exposures and safeguard city council assets;  
 The risk management framework, which includes the identification and management of 
actual or potential material risk exposures; and 
 Ensure social and ethical compliance with best practice guidelines (Case One 2010a; 2011a; 
CouncilA 2010; 2011a; 2011c; 2012; CouncilB 2011a; CouncilC 2012b). 
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Miscellaneous 
 Monitor the statutory compliance and ethical standards of city council; 
 Review the audit committee charter at least every two years and submit proposed changes 
to Council; and 
 Annually undertake a self-assessment and review performance against charter (CouncilA 
2011a; 2011b; 2011c; CouncilB 2011a). 
5.3.5 Reporting  
The audit committee is to regularly report to Council within an advisory capacity, to provide advice 
and recommendations on matters of financial reporting, risk management and the reliability of 
internal controls (CouncilA 2011a; CouncilB 2011a). The audit committee chair is to annually 
summarise audit committee activities, recommendations and key outcomes and report to Council 
(CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 2011a). 
As a governance arm of Council the audit committee is to report, direct its activities 
and provide assurance to Council; accordingly its  accountability is to Council, not the 
municipality’s community nor its management. city management is required to 
handle the administration of and report to the audit committee; however it holds no 
such formal accountability. No structure or mechanism within city councils holds a 
formal or informal accountability to the audit committee. Consequently, an effective 
execution of audit committee responsibilities requires a good relationship, 
communication and cooperation with city management. Interview with JA on 27th 
March 2012; Interview with PH on 10th May 2012 
5.3.6 Authority 
As a formally appointed advisory committee of Council, the audit committee is accountable to its 
Council (CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 2011a; Interview with JA on 27th March 2012). The audit 
committee is responsible for the effective discharge of its responsibilities as defined by its charter, 
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which is approved by Council (Council B 2011a). The audit committee does not have: (1) any 
executive powers; (2) any delegated financial responsibility; (3) authority to direct city council 
resources; and (4) authority to assume any city management functions (CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 
2011a; CouncilD 2008; Interview with JA on 27th March 2012). The audit committee may request 
financial resources (through the CEO) to enable the committee to receive any necessary legal, 
accounting or other professional advice (CouncilA 2001b; CouncilB 2011a). 
In order for audit committees to function effectively, the both Council and 
particularly city management need to be supportive of audit committees and 
governance processes. Particularly, because Council is under no formal obligation to 
act on audit committee advice; however it holds strong persuasiveness as ignoring 
such advice is viewed as negligent. Interview with JA on 27th March 2012 
Council retains the authority to appoint and remove audit committee members (CouncilB 2011a; 
Interview with PH on 10th May 2012). In the event that Council purposes to remove a member of 
the audit committee prior to their term expiry, Council must provide that member with written 
notice and the opportunity to be heard at a Council meeting (CouncilA 2011b; CouncilB 2011a; 
Interview with PH on 10th May 2012). 
As an advisory committee the audit committee holds no executive powers or formal 
authority, however in situations of material disputes they audit committee may rely 
on the formal powers of Council (dispute with city management) and the external 
auditor/ auditor general (dispute with council). Interview with PH on 10th May 2012 
5.3.7 Access to Information and Independent Advice  
The audit committee may seek information and expert advice on matters of concern within the 
scope of its responsibilities subject to approve from the CEO (CouncilB 2011a; CouncilD 2008). 
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The majority of the information which is received by the audit committee is 
developed and provided by city management. However the audit committee may 
request city management to provide additional information. Interview with JA on 27th 
March 2012  
5.3.8 External Communication 
As independent advisers, the audit committee has no direct communication with 
external stakeholders unless legally required. The engagement of the independent 
members with the wider business community is with their capacity as professionals. 
Interview with PH on 10th May 2012 
5.3.9 Review 
The audit committee will annually review its charter and performance (CouncilA 2011a; 2011b). The 
audit committee is also to annually review and approve its work plan (CouncilA 2011a; CouncilD 
2008). 
In general terms the composition for the audit committee of city councils is modelled 
after best practice guidelines, which are modelled after corporate firms. Importantly 
these guidelines are derived from the accounting profession which provides an 
overly accounting perspective (ignores operations and focuses on financials), where 
the accounting firms have a nested interest. However, in regards to the overall 
adoption of these best practices into any entity it is imperative to consider the 
purpose of the guideline(s), what are the guidelines covering and what they do not. 
Ultimately, I am very doubtful about current standards or best practices because of 
accounting failures, why does the accounting fail to pick them up? Interview with PH 
on 10th May 2012  
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5.4 THE EXTERNAL AUDIT  
The external audit program of city councils is governed by the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office 
(VAGO) (CouncilA 2012; CouncilB 2012). The primarily focus of the external audit program is to 
provide an assurance that annual financial reports are fairly presented (CouncilA 2012; CouncilD 
2008). In providing this assurance VAGO will externally contract the external audit function (CouncilB 
2012).  The contracted auditor is responsible for providing a recommendation to VAGO that annual 
financial reports are fairly presented and are in accordance with applicable Accounting Standards 
(CouncilB 2012). VAGO will  in turn, provide the audit report which confirms that annual financial 
reports have been prepared in accordance with relevant legislation and professional standards and 
represent a true and fair view of financial affairs (CouncilA 2012).  
Representatives of the contracted auditor will initially met with the audit committee to brief the 
audit committee on how their audit will be conducted and will finally met with the audit committee 
to report on their findings from their examination of city council’s financial records (CouncilB 2012; 
CouncilD 2008). The external auditor typically reviews the internal audit program to better 
understand the internal control framework (CouncilB 2012). 
Generally speaking the reliance of the external auditor on the work of internal 
auditors is governed by the accounting profession and traditional accounting 
conformism. However internal auditors are far more knowledgeable of day-to-day 
operations than the external auditors. In general terms the external audit function is 
to project assurance, it is more form than real substance; it merely issues an 
assurance opinion as to whether firms are complying with accounting standards. 
Interview with PH on 10th May 2012 
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5.5 THE OUTSOURCED-INTERNAL AUDIT  
The audit committee is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the annual internal audit plan, 
which is developed and approved by Council in consultation with city management based on 
Council’s strategic and operational risks (CouncilA 2012; CouncilB 2012). The internal auditor is 
usually appointed for a three year term with an option for a one year extension (CouncilA 2011a; 
CouncilD 2008).  
The purpose of the internal audit function is to provide Council with an independent review of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of governance, risk management and selected internal control 
processes; and to assist both Council and city management in the achievement of sound municipality 
management and control (CouncilA 2011a; 2012; CouncilB 2012). The scope of the internal audit 
does not involve the day-to-day checking of internal transactions (CouncilB 2012). 
The internal audit function is regarded as a vital component within a city council’s governance and 
risk management framework (CouncilA 2012). The audit committee holds responsibility for the 
annual formal review of the performance of the internal auditor (CouncilB 2012). 
City councils generally always outsource the internal audit function, because this 
tends to be more efficient and cost effective. It strengthens external auditor’s 
reliance on the work of the internal auditors which avoids duplication. The 
outsourced internal auditor is formally appointed by Council, but this decision is 
heavily influenced by the recommendation of the audit committee chair and city 
management. Interview with PH on 10th May 2012 
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an introduction to Australian local governments in Victoria. It then 
describes the responsibilities and functions of the audit committee and audit programmes.  Its 
purpose has been to provide a detailed understanding about the policies, operations and other 
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practices and interfaces of corporate governance mechanisms and actors of Victorian city councils 
within their superordinate social system.  
The next chapter will present an interpretation and evaluation of the governance mosaic of the 
Victorian city councils as presented in this chapter. Overall this chapter identifies that the four 
examined Victorian city councils have in place a professionally managed and comprehensively 
documented governance system with particular reference to the audit committee.         
Following the empirical findings as presented in this chapter, similarly to corporate entities local 
government governance mechanisms operate within a bureaucratic governance structure, however 
interactions appear to be interdependent. However, the establishment of governance mechanisms 
appears to be more of a response to compliance pressures, than productivity improvement. Further, 
actors also appear to hold their professional reputation in high value. Interestingly, is the view of the 
external audit, in terms of its purpose and usefulness. Participants revealed that the external audit is 
more form than real substance. 
The information presented in this chapter has been extracted from the various public disclosures 
made by the city councils available through their websites in addition to semi-structured audio-
taped interviews conducted with audit committee chairs and the documentary information 
presented during or after the interview. Similarly, to the previous chapter this chapter acknowledges 
the source of the information presented, however withholds from formally referencing for 
confidently and ethical reasons.  
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“whither does your senseless curiosity lead you?” (Shelley 1818, p. 188). 
CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND THE GENERATION OF 
AN EXPANDED GOVERNANCE MODEL 
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND THE GENERATION OF AN EXPANDED GOVERNANCE MODEL 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the policies, practices and interfaces that were presented 
as findings in Chapters 4 and 5. These previous two chapters presented the findings of illustrative-
narrative. This illustrative-narrative has been developed from a theory-driven selective coding 
analysis of the text of interviews and source documents from case organisations. The theoretical 
perspectives chosen to drive the selective coding have come from agency and institutional theories.  
In Chapter 2, attention was given to the traditional behavioural assumptions underpinning agency 
theory compared to the traditional behavioural assumptions underpinning institutional theory.  
In this chapter, the sets of assumptions from agency theory and institutional theory, as articulated in 
Chapter 2, will be used to provide the structure for the chapter. As mentioned, this chapter will seek 
to explain and interpret the findings regarding the governance policies, practices and interfaces from 
the case organisations, as presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Hence, this explanation and interpretation 
of findings from Chapters 4 and 5 will be structured around the respective assumptions established 
in Chapter 2. Consequently, this chapter begins by examining each of the agency assumptions in 
terms of what empirical insights the findings can provide. It continues in a similar way with the 
examination of each of the institutional assumptions.  
Once the evidence is interpreted in respect of all of these assumptions, the chapter then re-visits the 
‘The Governance Model’ initially put forward in Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2.  By summarising the 
interpreted case evidence regarding the application of the various behavioural assumptions from 
agency and institutional theories, an ‘Expanded Governance Model’ can be developed in this 
chapter. This expanded model becomes a new dual-theory representation of an exemplar case 
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organisation’s governance policies, practices and interfaces. It is a model that is able to more 
pluralistically address the governance phenomena.  
6.2 AGENCY ASSUMPTIONS  
As stated in Chapter 2, the initial framework for a governance model given in Figure 2.3 was used to 
guide the examination of governance phenomena centred on the audit committee. In doing so, the 
agency assumptions underlying this framework, as drawn from the agency literature, can be 
empirically tested through the gathering and interpreting of evidence about the governance policies, 
practices and interfaces as presented in the case unit chapters (i.e., Chapters 4 and 5). This 
interpretation of evidence from Chapters 4 and 5 is now undertaken in the following sub-sections for 
each agency assumption in turn. 
In the below sub-sections, reference will frequently be made to ‘the evidence’ or ‘the findings’ as a 
recap on relevant paraphrases from the analysis in the previous chapters. Reference to ‘the 
evidence’ or ‘the findings’ indicates that a paraphrased statement has been derived from the source 
interview text, case unit document content or both. Attributing these recapped paraphrases to 
specific interviewees or specific organisation documents is only sparingly undertaken in this chapter 
because several paraphrases are drawn from an amalgam of text from the interviews and case unit 
documents. To make these specific attributions would be tedious, repetitive and distracting to the 
main purpose of this chapter, which is to provide a critical interpretation of ‘the evidence’ presented 
in the previous two chapters. 
6.2.1 Governance actors are self-interested 
As previously mentioned, corporate governance has been driven by financial scandal and corporate 
collapses, seemly due largely to the self-interested decisions and behaviours of control agents 
(Mallin 2010a). That is, these financial scandals and corporate collapses appear to be driven by 
actors reacting to economic self-interested behaviour.  
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Dechow et al. (1996) find no evidence to support the notion that actors manipulate earnings for self-
interest. Moreover, Defond et al.’s (2002) and Srinivasan’s (2005) findings suggest that market based 
institutional incentives (e.g., reputational loss and career stability) outweigh any potential economic 
behaviour. Alternatively, Jensen (2001a) argues that self-interested behaviour is driven by personal 
preference and this preference may be economic, social or political. Consequently, self-interested 
motivations for actor decisions or behaviours are considered to be on a unique continuum; hidden 
from other actors.  
6.2.1.1 Case One 
The policy documents identify the board as being responsible for ensuring Case One is properly 
managed to protect and enhance shareholder interests, and that directors, officers, and employees 
operate in a sound governance environment. Additionally, the documented evidence identifies that 
the adoption and maintenance of best practice governance standards can ensure the protection of 
shareholder interests. Further, the company secretary states that through poor environmental and 
social compliance, brand damage is inevitable and Case One may lose its ability to supply retailers 
and ultimately the end consumer. These items of evidence suggest that the governance actors of 
Case One are not economically self-interested; however they do not imply they are not socially or 
politically self-interested. 
Interview and document evidence identifies the audit committee’s role is to assist the Board in the 
effective discharge of its responsibilities across Board delegated functions. However, the board 
remains accountable to shareholders regarding the overall performance of Case One. Further, the 
board is committed to ensuring that its constitutional powers and responsibilities are exercised and 
discharged by adopting best practice governance principles and applicable laws. These items of 
evidence point to a similar conclusion that the governance actors of Case One are not economically 
self-interested. The interview text also suggests that every director is mindful of his or her personal 
liability and damage, and as such will want to ensure a detailed audit. Once the audit committee is 
satisfied with the scope of the Audit program it will make a recommendation to the Board. This 
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suggests that every director is somewhat self-interested by means of personal preference to reduce 
personal liability. Additionally, the interview and document evidence identifies the importance of 
the audit committee’s role of overseeing auditor independence. It is an auditor’s fundamental 
responsibility and duty to maintain independence; the main reason put forward is professional 
integrity and reputation. An interviewee indicated that the auditor is concerned with maintaining 
independence because a loss of independence threatens and damages the integrity of the client and 
the audit firm. This suggests that the external auditor partner is self-interested in terms of 
maintaining his or her professional integrity and reputation. By being concerned with the integrity of 
the client, the audit firm ensures the maintenance of the auditor’s professional integrity and 
reputation. 
6.2.1.1 Local Government  
Evidence from policy documents reveal that a Council's major operational activities include the 
establishment of governance and business functions necessary for an effective and publicly 
accountable body. Additionally, a key Council responsibility is ensuring that resources are managed 
in a responsible and accountable manner. However, the evidence also identifies that Council is 
under no formal obligation to act on audit committee advice. Nevertheless the audit committee is 
found to hold strong persuasiveness, so ignoring its advice is viewed as negligent by the Council. This 
suggests that there is low or no tolerance for governance actors of city councils to act in their own 
economic self-interested. However the other dimensions of self-interested behaviour are seen in the 
finding that city council actors are concerned with maintaining sound governance practices which 
can both enhance their professional reputation and reduce their personal liability. 
6.2.1.3 Assumption Conclusion  
In summary the Case One evidence identifies that the firm, the board, its various actors and the 
external auditor are concerned with maintaining their integrity and reputation and limiting their 
personal liability. Likewise, the evidence suggests that city councils’ and their actors hold similar 
concerns for maintaining their integrity, reputation and avoidance of personal liability. Such 
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concerns trigger self-preservation behaviours which are regarded as the resulting equilibriumisation 
of the self-interest continuum. While such behaviours do not lead to selfish choices, it is evident that 
actor behaviour or choice is driven by personal preference. Consequently, actors are more likely to 
behave or make choices based on the hidden self-interest continuum. 
Moreover, the establishment and maintenance of effective and accountable governance 
mechanisms are considered the result of the self-interest continuum because such choices improve 
professional integrity and reputation, while reducing personal liability. This supports Carcello et al.’s 
(2002) and Raghunandan et al.’s (2003) findings which identify governance actors as seeking to 
protect their reputational capital to avoid legal liability and promote principal interests.   As further 
support for the interpretation of the finding in this study, Abbott et al. (2003a; 2003b), Fama and 
Jensen (1983) and Sirinivasan (2005) consider governance actors to benefit from prestige, 
reputational enhancement, learning opportunities, networking and liability minimisation. 
Therefore, the agency assumption of the model that governance actors are self-interested is 
supported. Other than the need to avoid direct economic self-interest, no evidence is found to 
suggest that the behaviours and decisions of governance actor are not self-interested.  
6.2.2 Governance actors are solely economic utility maximisers 
As previously mentioned, corporate governance has been driven by financial scandal and corporate 
collapses due largely to the self-interested decisions and behaviours of control agents (Mallin 
2010a). However, as previously discussed in the above section 6.2.1 the evidence identifies that 
governance actors are concerned with maintaining their integrity and reputation while minimising 
their liability. Such behaviours are regarded as the result of the equilibriumisation of the self-interest 
continuum. Therefore governance actors remain self-interested driven by personal preference. This 
preference may be economic, social or political (Jensen 2001a). Jensen’s (2001a) suggestion of social 
or political self-interest could allow the possibility in a business context for rational economic 
self‐interest which does not preclude strategic shorter-term social or political self-serving behaviour. 
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Beasley et al.’s (2000) results suggest that different and unique fraud opportunities exist for each 
industry. Defond and Jiambalvo (1991) find that financial reporting errors appear to be a result of 
managers responding to economic incentives. However, Dechow et al. (1996) find no evidence to 
support the notion that actors manipulate earnings for self-interest. Moreover, Defond et al. (2002) 
and Srinivasan (2005) find that market based institutional incentives (e.g., reputational loss and 
career stability) outweigh any potential economic behaviour.  
Therefore, considering the literature and the evidence, the agency assumption which identifies 
governance actors as being purely economically self-interested is not unequivocally supported.  
6.2.3 The firm (or city council) is a contract nexus, i.e. a series of contractual 
relationships 
6.2.3.1 Case One 
The various document disclosures made by Case One regarding its board reveal that the board is 
responsible for ensuring that Case One is properly managed to protect and enhance shareholder 
interests, and that directors, officers, and employees operate in a sound governance environment. 
As an additional feature of its specified role, the evidence indicates that the board is responsible for 
the review and oversight of Case One administration, management and governance. In terms of 
board composition, it is found that there are six directors, one executive and five non-executive 
independent directors. These facts about the board’s role and composition suggest that the board is 
empowered and structured to perform its wide-ranging responsibilities. This implies the existence of 
contractual obligations. 
The findings also indicate that the audit committee of Case One has a contractual obligation to assist 
the board in the discharge of the board’s responsibilities across functions delegated by the board. 
However, the board remains accountable to shareholders regarding the overall performance of Case 
One. While the audit committees’ sole accountability is to its board, its main purpose is to assist and 
provide support to the board. These document and interview statements suggest the there exists a 
contract between the board and the audit committee and between the board and shareholders. 
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Audit committee members are required to have separate and direct accountabilities to shareholders 
and other stakeholders, not as audit committee members but as directors of a corporate entity. This 
finding suggests that no formal contract exists between the audit committee and shareholders. 
However, there does exist a formal expectation and contract between audit committee members, as 
directors, and the shareholders.  
The audit committee chair is considered by the interviewees, to have an informal accountability to 
executive management in assisting executive management. The chair’s main role following the 
evidence is to as facilitate the work of the audit committee and acting as a bridge between audit 
committee and non-audit committee directors and the external auditor, internal auditor, and 
executive management. It is found that the audit committee chair meets with key presenters prior 
to audit committee meetings, to go through information papers, request addition papers, identify 
issues, raise questions, and make a judgement to facilitate information sessions. This evidence of the 
role and activities of the audit committee chair suggests that the chair has an informal contract with 
executive management to assist with the improvement in the quality of distributed papers by 
meeting with key audit committee meeting presenters prior to the meeting. 
Further, a practice in Case One revealed by the interview evidence is that if the board delegates an 
issue to one of its sub-committees, the executive management team is expected to deal with that 
sub-committee and not the board on that issue. This practice implies that if the board delegates an 
issue to a sub-committee an informal contract is entered into. Additionally, a formal contractual 
requirement adopted by Case One is that both the CEO and the CFO are to provide compliance 
certificates to the audit committee in relation to the integrity and compliance to relevant accounting 
standards in relation to company accounts. Another set of contractual relationships is identified 
concerning all standing sub-committees of the board. Each sub-committee is required to adopt a 
formal charter which sets out matters regarding its composition, responsibilities, functions and 
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administration. Such charters indicate a contractual arrangement with the board because each 
standing sub-committee is under a formal obligation to adopt a charter. 
There are various other governance policies to suggest that Case One is a contract nexus. For 
example the risk oversight and management policy sets out the roles and accountabilities of key 
governance mechanisms within the risk management framework. Further, the continuous disclosure 
policy obligates the company secretary to review all material information to ensure that Case One 
keeps shareholders well informed.  
Another relevant finding concerns the preparation of meeting agendas of the board and its sub-
committees. Board agendas are prepared by the company secretary in conjunction with the board 
chair, CEO and the CFO with periodic input of the full board. Additionally, the company secretary 
prepares the meeting agendas of all board sub-committees in conjunction with the respective chair. 
Clearly there is a formal obligation on the company secretary to prepare the meeting agenda of the 
board and its sub-committees. Preparation of minutes of the board and its sub-committees is also a 
contractual obligation of the company secretary’s office.  
In terms of relationships with governance players external to Case One, the findings reveal there is 
no direct communication between board directors and external regulators, unless the regulatory 
body demands direct communication. External communication from regulators to board directors is 
found to pass through, and be filtered by, the company secretary, i.e., the company secretary is to 
pass the information on to directors if deemed necessary. The practice infers that no direct contract 
exists between directors and regulators. However, it suggests that a contract exists between Case 
One as an entity and regulators, processed in practice through the company secretary. In terms of 
communications with shareholders, it is found that directors do not normally have direct 
communication with individual shareholders, except for the board chair who will have external 
communication to and with major shareholders. While there exists a contractual relationship 
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between directors and shareholders, no direct communication takes place with individual 
shareholders, except by the board chair.  
The external auditor will have a formal audit engagement contract with a client company. It is found 
for Case One that the main purpose of the external audit is to form and provide an objective view on 
financial reports, and to provide feedback to the board and executive management team on 
financial reports. Additionally, the external auditor is responsible for reviewing Case One compliance 
with internal controls and assessing their effectiveness to provide an opinion regarding the truth and 
fairness of financial reports. However, the external auditor is prohibited from providing any non-
audit service which would create a perceived or real threat to their independence, although, the 
audit committee may allow the auditor to provide and perform a non-audit service. Non-audit 
services encompass any service the auditor may provide which is not necessarily incidental to or 
included in the terms of the audit engagement. These findings reveal that there exist contractual 
obligations between the external auditor and the board and audit committee. However, the findings 
identify that the formal contract of the external auditor is only between the external auditor and the 
board. But the findings also identify that the external auditor has a formal relationship and front-line 
accountability to the audit committee, even though its ultimate responsibility and accountability is 
to the board. Within the contract, the external auditor has an obligation to the shareholders to 
provide them with an objective view on the published financial reports.  
In relation to the internal audit, its engagement is similar to the external auditor. However, the 
internal audit function is regarded as a contract with executive management rather than of the audit 
committee or the board. Although, when the scope of the audit programs overlap, the external 
auditor is able to rely on the working papers of the internal auditor as agreed upon in the initial 
external audit engagement, i.e. the formal contractual agreement. 
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6.2.3.2 Local Government 
The findings indicate that a Council's major operational activities include the establishment of 
governance and business functions necessary for an effective and publicly accountable body. This 
suggests that a Council can be regarded as having a contracted function.  
The role of the audit committee, as given in the evidence, is to assist Council by providing an 
independent review of its municipality’s financial management and reporting systems. Further, the 
audit committee is to regularly report to Council within an advisory capacity, to provide advice and 
recommendations on matters of financial reporting, risk management and the reliability of internal 
controls. The findings also identify the audit committee’s accountability is to its Council. It is 
responsible for the effective discharge of its responsibilities as defined by its charter. The audit 
committee does not have any delegated financial responsibilities under its charter. The charter is 
approved by the Council.   This arrangement does indicate the existence of a contract between 
council and its audit committee. This contract, implicit in the charter, identifies the audit committee 
as an advisory committee. It holds no executive powers or formal authority. However in situations of 
material disputes the audit committee may rely on the formal powers of Council for a dispute with 
city management or on the State auditor general for a dispute with Council.  
The findings identify the audit committee as an independent adviser. Therefore members are to 
have no direct communication with external stakeholders unless legally required. This suggests that 
no contract exists between the audit committee and external stakeholders.  
The CEO is found to be the only member of city staff who is directly appointed by, responsible and 
accountable to, and is formally required to report to Council. This suggests that there exists an 
employment contract between the CEO and Council. Under the CEO contract, the CEO is found to be 
responsible for implementing Council decisions, ensuring Council achieves its Council Plan 
objectives, and managing the day-to-day operations, resources and staff of a city council.  
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City management, including the CEO are also found to have the responsibility of handling the 
administration of and reporting to the audit committee. However city management is under no 
formal or informal obligation to be accountable to the audit committee. As such the findings suggest 
that the audit committee seeks to work constructively with city management and Council.  
The purpose of the internal audit function, according to policy documents, is to provide Council with 
an independent review of the effectiveness and efficiency of governance, risk management and 
selected internal control processes; and to assist both Council and city management in the 
achievement of sound municipality management and control. This policy statement suggests that 
there exists a contractual relationship between Council, city management and the head of the 
internal audit function.  
6.2.3.3 Assumption Conclusion  
Following the above interpretations of the findings, the agency assumption which identifies a firm is 
a contract nexus is supported. The evidence identifies both Case One and city councils are contract 
nexuses, composed of both formal and informal contractual relationships. There is evidence of 
explicitly formal contractual relationships (e.g., between the external auditor and the board, and 
between the audit committee and the board). There is also evidence of less explicitly formal 
contractual relationships (e.g., between the company secretary and external regulators, between 
the internal audit function and the audit committee, and between executive management and the 
chair of audit committee).  These less explicit contractual relationships are, nevertheless, often 
documented as roles and responsibilities contained in charters and policies. Therefore, it is 
concluded that actors within a firm or city council while operating collectively towards shared 
organisational responsibilities and objectives, will do so on the basis of their separately designated 
responsibilities and accountabilities as formally and less formally established in a nexus of 
contractual relationships. The agency assumption that a business entity is a nexus of contractual 
relationships is supported. 
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6.2.4 There exists a separation between decision control and decision management 
Fama and Jensen (1983) identify two main types of agents within the contractual nexus of a firm (or 
city council); the decision controllers and the decision managers. The decision controllers hold 
responsibility for the ratification and monitoring of decisions, while the decision managers are 
responsible for the initiation and implementation of decisions (Fama and Jensen 1983).   
6.2.4.1 Case One 
The evidence identifies the board as responsible for ensuring Case One is properly managed in order 
to protect and enhance shareholder interests, and to enable directors, officers, and employees to 
operate in a sound governance environment. Further, the board has the ultimate responsibility over 
setting and ensuring policies regarding the business and affairs of Case One are to the benefit of 
shareholders and stakeholders. Also the policy documents state that the board is responsible for the 
review and oversight of Case One administration, management and governance.  
The need for the board to delegate the day-to-day management of Case One’s resources to the 
executive management team is also identified by the policy documents. However, it is found that the 
board retains the ultimate responsibility for the strategic direction and control of Case One. And the 
board holds responsibility for the establishment of goals for management and monitoring their 
achievement. Therefore the evidence indicates that a key function of the board is to monitor the 
executive management team’s performance. But the board remains accountable to shareholders 
regarding the overall performance of Case One. 
It is evident following these findings that a separation between decision control and decision 
management is embedded in the policies and practices of Case One. Specifically, the board is 
revealed as the decision controller, since its functions are associated with the responsibilities of 
ratification and monitoring. On the other hand, the executive management team is revealed as being 
the decision mangers as their responsibilities are associated with initiation and implementation. 
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6.2.4.2 Local Government  
City councils are seen to be composed of an elected administrative (or legislative) arm and a 
managerial arm. The evidence reveals that the administrative arm holds the responsibility for 
establishing the strategic direction and determining the priorities, policies and the laws of city 
council. Alternatively, the managerial arm holds the responsibility for implementing decisions. 
Council is the elected arm which is responsible for establishing strategic objectives and monitoring 
their achievement. The managerial arm houses city management under the control of the CEO. The 
CEO is identified as ultimately being responsible for the implementation of Council decisions and the 
day-to-day management of city council operations.  
This evidence clearly points to a separation between decision control and decision management in 
local governments. In particular, Council is identified as the decision controller, having functions 
associated with the responsibilities of ratification and monitoring. City management is identified as 
the decision managers, having responsibilities associated with initiation and implementation. 
6.2.4.3 Assumption Conclusion 
In summary the evidence provides support for Fama and Jensen’s (1983) finding and for the agency 
assumption that there exists a separation between decision management and control. Boards and 
councils are found to have responsibility over their organisation’s strategic direction and monitoring. 
Alternatively, executive and city management are responsible for implementing board and Council 
decisions, including the day-to-day management of resources. Based on the case evidence there 
exists a clear separation between the two aspects of control, i.e., decision management (executive 
and city management) and decision control (board and Council).   
6.2.5 The board is the decision controller, and it then delegates the decision management 
and some decision control functions to internal agents 
As established in the previous agency assumption there is a separation between decision control and 
decision management. The board and Council have been identified as the decision controllers and 
executive management and city management have been identified as the decision managers. The 
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purpose this next assumption is to determine whether the board (and Council) is the primary agent 
in the agency separation. The assumption has some parallels with the previous agency assumption in 
terms of its evidence reliance. 
6.2.5.1 Case One 
As previously indicated, evidence reveals the board is responsible for ensuring Case One is properly 
managed to protect and enhance shareholder interests, and that directors, officers, and employees 
operate in a sound governance environment. Within this remit, the board has the ultimate 
responsibility over setting policies for Case One in order to benefit shareholders and stakeholders. 
And the board is responsible for the review and oversight of Case One administration, management 
and governance.  
Further, it has previously been identified from the evidence that the board delegates the day-to-day 
management of Case One resources to the executive management team under the leadership of the 
CEO. The board holds responsibility for the engagement, appointment, review and, when necessary, 
replacement of the CEO. The CEO is required to conduct a formal review each year, to assess the 
overall performance of the executive management team and report back to the board. However, the 
board has retained the ultimate responsibility for the strategic direction and control of Case One. 
The board holds responsibility for the establishment of goals for management and monitoring their 
achievement. Therefore, the evidence makes it apparent that a key function of the board is to 
monitor the executive management team’s performance. Moreover, it identifies the board as 
remaining accountable to shareholders regarding the overall performance of Case One.  
In terms of fulfilling its decision controller role, the board of Case One establishes sub-committees to 
streamline the discharge of its responsibilities and functions. The board is given authority to 
delegate specific functions or issues to these sub-committees on an on-going and an as needs basis. 
The evidence identifies that if the board decides to delegate an issue to one of its sub-committees, 
the executive management team is to deal with that sub-committee and not the board on that issue.  
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Regarding the audit committee, the evidence indicates that this committee is to assist the board in 
the discharge of its responsibilities across particular functions delegated by board. These functions 
involve the reviewing, overseeing and reporting to the board in the following three primary areas: 
financial processes and reporting; audit programmes; and internal controls and risk management. 
However, its primary purpose is to assist the board, it is not a strategic decision making committee 
nor is it to make decisions on behalf of the board. Similarly, in relation to the engagement of the 
external auditor, this engagement decision is to be approved by the board. The board is able to 
engage an external auditor without the audit committees’ approval. However executive 
management cannot engage an internal auditor without the audit committees’ approval.   
It is found that the RC’s responsibility is to assist and advise the board on matters relating to the 
appointment and recruitment, remuneration and succession planning of the executive team 
including the CEO and Case One employees. Similarly, the NC is required to assist and advise the 
board on matters in relation to the appointment and recruitment, remuneration and succession 
planning of Case One non-executive directors. 
In summary the evidence identifies the board as the decision controller, and it delegates decision 
management functions to the executive management team. Also the board delegates some of its 
decision control responsibility to internal agents (i.e., its sub-committees). While the board 
delegates some of its decision control monitoring responsibility to its sub-committees, it still retains 
the overall final decision control over any of its delegated responsibilities or functions.  
6.2.5.2 Local Government  
As previously mentioned, Council is identified as the elected administrative arm, which is responsible 
for the establishment of objectives including monitoring their achievement. In respect of the audit 
committee, it was previously mentioned that the evidence indicates that Council will establish an 
audit committee as an independent advisory committee. Therefore, the audit committee is to assist 
Council by providing an independent review of its municipality’s financial management and 
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reporting systems. The audit committee is to regularly report to Council as to provide advice and 
recommendations on matters of financial reporting, risk management and the reliability of internal 
controls. In line with the private sector (Case One), the evidence identifies that key local government 
audit committee responsibilities and functions are to review, oversee and report to Council in the 
following areas: financial processes and reporting; the external audit program; the internal audit 
program; and internal controls and risk management.  
The audit committee is accountable to its Council. The audit committee is responsible for the 
effective discharge of its responsibilities as defined by its charter, which is approved by Council. The 
audit committee does not have any delegated financial responsibility. Moreover, Council is under no 
formal obligation to act on audit committee advice; however it holds strong persuasiveness as 
ignoring such advice is viewed as negligent. While, the audit committee holds no executive powers 
or formal authority, in situations of material disputes it may rely on the formal powers of Council or 
could even appeal to the State government. However, Council retains the authority to appoint and 
remove audit committee members, provided it maintains a majority of independent experts.  
In summary the evidence identifies the Council as the decision controller, delegates’ decision 
management functions to city management. However, Councils typically delegate some of their 
decision control responsibility in terms of monitoring to external and internal agents. Nevertheless, 
Council retains the final decision control over any delegated responsibility or function.  
6.2.5.3 Assumption Conclusion 
Based on the evidence, the agency assumption that the board or Council is the decision controller 
and it delegates decision management and some decision control functions to internal agents is 
supported. Both boards and Councils were found to delegate the day-to-day management of 
resources to their management teams (i.e., executive management and city management). 
Moreover, both boards and Councils maintain audit committees to review, oversee and report on 
financial processes, regulatory compliance, external and internal audit programmes, internal 
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controls and risk management (primarily monitoring functions). This finding is consistent with the 
findings of DeZoort et al. (2002), Rezaee (2010) and Vera-Munoz (2005). Interestingly however, the 
Case One board delegates some decision control functions to agents internal to the board (i.e., audit 
committee, RC, NC are composed of board members), while Councils delegate the decision control 
functions to agents who are both external and internal to Council (i.e., the audit committee of 
Council is composed of independent advisors and councillor members). 
6.2.6 Governance mechanisms act as monitors  
Collier and Zaman (2005) suggest that the adoption of governance models and mechanisms may be 
a symbolic concept used to signal to stakeholders the addressing of monitoring and control. Further, 
Gendro and Bedard’s (2006) findings suggest that the effectiveness of audit committees is 
dependent on symbolic processes and outcomes. Interestingly, Cohen et al. (2010) find that 
governance mechanisms are regarded as effective monitors as opposed to mere symbols of 
legitimacy based on external auditor experiences. This helps in understanding Turley and Zaman’s 
(2007) finding which identifies the role of the audit committee as one of adaptability - at times it 
may be an ally, arbiter or threat. 
6.2.6.1 Case One 
As noted from the evidence, Case One board is responsible for the review and oversight of the 
company’s administration, management and governance. It is stated in documents and interview 
statements that the board has ultimate responsibility over setting policies of the company and 
ensuring they are to the benefit of shareholders and stakeholders. Therefore, the board remains 
accountable to shareholders regarding the overall performance of Case One. As such, the board is 
also committed to ensuring that its constitutional powers and responsibilities are exercised and 
discharged, adopting best practice governance principles and applicable laws. The adoption and 
maintenance of best practice governance standards is accepted as the way to best protect 
shareholder interests. These articulated board responsibilities suggest that the Board acts as a 
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monitor and though its disclosers it appears to signal its commitment to effective monitoring 
through the adoption and maintenance of best practices.  
Further, it is found that to ensure effective monitoring, each director has the right to access Case 
One information and Case One’s executive management, external advisors and auditors. Moreover, 
the board will bi-annually with the assistance of the NC and an external advisor, review the 
performance, membership and charters of the board and its sub-committees to determine their 
adequacy in the current circumstances. This review seeks to determine whether the board and its 
committee’s structures and processes are adequate for carrying out their functions in the most 
effective manner.  
The evidence, as explained previously, relates to the board’s delegation of day-to-day management 
of Case One’s resources to the executive management team. Hence, a key function of the board is to 
monitor the executive management team’s performance.  In particular, the evidence identifies that 
the board will monitor the decisions and actions of the CEO and the overall performance of Case 
One. Consequently, the board holds responsibility for the hiring, reviewing and replacing of the CEO. 
Through this control over the CEO, the board retains ultimate responsibility for the strategic 
direction and control of Case One. While the evidence identifies the board as a monitor, there is also 
an inference that the board is more of a strategic partner with the CEO rather than solely a monitor; 
supporting Anderson et al.’s (2007) finding. Therefore the board is not purely monitoring. 
The evidence shows that the board determines its meeting schedule at the beginning of each year 
and it currently schedules nine meetings per year. Moving towards the board meeting structure, the 
evidence identifies that in the absence of the board chair another director would be chosen to chair 
all or part of the board meeting. Members of the executive team may be invited to attend all or part 
of board meetings whenever the board requires their involvement or assistance in consideration of 
issues before the board. This further suggests that the board is acting as a monitor and through its 
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disclosures of policies and charters it signals its commitment to effective monitoring through the 
adoption and maintenance of best practice. 
Conflict between the board and executive management is found to be more likely related to the 
question of when issues should be disclosed. Conflict over issues of what or how tend to dissolve, 
often in favour of management’s view. However, the Board is more prepared to take a different 
view from that executive management on issues of when to make public disclosures. Directors draw 
upon their knowledge and experience in executing their judgement. The board is viewed as a 
collegiate body; if a decision is not reached by the end of the meeting, the decision is deferred to the 
next meeting. It is apparent that the Board would rarely, if ever, force a resolution. This latter point 
highlights the boards’ commitment to vigilance in its decision making over monitoring matters. 
The audit committee’s primary purpose, as explained earlier, is specified as assisting the board, but 
not making decisions on behalf of its board. The integrity of company accounts is found to be the 
responsibility of all directors and not only members of the audit committee. Therefore the view is 
that the audit committee’s sole accountability is to the board. However, its members are found to 
have separate and direct accountabilities to shareholders and other stakeholders, as directors of the 
corporate entity but not as audit committee members. With this role in mind, the evidence finds 
that the audit committee endeavours to ensure the early detection and acknowledgement of 
potential or bubbling issues. It has successfully constructed a culture which allows the executive 
management team to raise issues early. Further, it is found that the audit committee chair is focused 
on assisting the board in the discharge of its responsibilities across functions of financial report 
vetting, internal control systems monitoring and external audit quality and independence review. 
Additionally, both the CEO and the CFO are required to provide compliance certificates to the audit 
committee in relation to financial statements and related papers regarding their integrity and 
compliance to relevant accounting standards. 
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Moreover, the policy of Case One reveals that the audit committee will meet at least four times per 
year, or as often as the audit committee deems necessary to fulfil its responsibilities and objectives. 
However, the evidence shows that the meeting frequency of the audit committee is dependent on 
the complexity of issues and the structure of both board and audit committee meetings. At the end 
of the meeting agenda the audit committee will commence a closed private session between the 
non-executive directors and the lead internal auditor and external audit partner. The closed private 
session is a formal process for the audit committee to eye-ball the auditors in the absence of the 
executive management team. It is expected that the audit committee will meet with the external 
and internal auditors in the absence of executive management whenever it deems necessary but not 
less than twice a year.  
To further, feature the monitoring role of the audit committee is the chair’s main role as revealed by 
the interviewees, to facilitate the work of the audit committee and to act as a bridge between audit 
committee directors and non-audit committee directors as well as to the external auditor, internal 
auditor and executive management. As previously indicated, the chair meets with key presenters 
prior to audit committee meetings, to go through their papers, request addition papers, identify 
issues, raise questions, and make a judgement to facilitate information sessions. The audit 
committee chair is found to hold an informal coaching role in aiding executive management with the 
quality and relevance of the meetings financial papers. This coaching role is viewed as an 
opportunity for ‘a more brutal battering and probe of flaky proposals’. This suggests that the audit 
committee chair is monitoring through actively engaging governance actors. This active engagement 
is believed to reflect a strong commitment towards sound governance.  
The weight of evidence is that the audit committee acts as a monitoring mechanism. In particular, 
the audit committee chair is found to be independently participating with executive management in 
order to ensure the effective functioning of the audit committee meetings and ultimately 
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monitoring.  As such the audit committee is found to be effectively monitoring and simultaneously 
signalling its commitment to sound governance. 
The external auditor is responsible for reviewing Case One compliance with internal controls and 
assessing their effectiveness in order to provide an opinion regarding the truth and fairness of 
financial reports. The main purpose of the external audits is to form and provide an objective view 
and to provide feedback to the board and executive management team on financial reports. The 
external auditor is found to have a formal relationship and front-line accountability to the audit 
committee. But its ultimate responsibility and accountability as perceived by interviewees is to the 
board; in relation to shareholders the view is to provide an objective opinion on published financial 
reports.  
Interestingly, the evidence suggests that the external auditor seeks to build trusted relationships 
with executive management. Too much independence of the external auditor from management is 
considered to lead to ineffective monitoring. The reason is that the purpose of the external audit is 
to form and provide an objective view on the published financial reports, which is dependent on 
trusted communication. Further, the view is that it is better to try to convince executive 
management on issues, rather than relying on the audit committee to exert its authority over 
management. The latter course has the potential to damage the trust in the external auditor’s 
relationship with executive management according to the interview statements with the external 
audit partner. While the audit committee is to oversee auditor independence, it is the auditor’s 
fundamental duty to maintain perceived independence in order to preserve professional integrity 
and reputation.  
Based on the evidence, the external auditor can be regarded primarily as a monitoring mechanism. 
However, to enable effective monitoring, the auditor seeks to build trusted relationships with 
executive management and key directors that will determine the external auditor’s re-engagement. 
Hence, the external auditor is considered to have monitoring effectiveness, while maintaining 
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perceived independence but simultaneously actively engaging with executive management and 
directors. In practice the audit partner eventually engages with the audit committee chair and the 
board chair. This active engagement is viewed as a signal of commitment to sound governance.  
6.2.6.2 Local Government 
The evidence identifies a Council's major operational activities as including the establishment of 
governance and business functions necessary for an effective and publicly accountable body. Council 
is responsible for: (1) determining the priorities and policies for the municipality; (2) establishing the 
strategic objectives for the municipality and monitoring their achievement; and (3) ensuring that 
resources are managed in a responsible and accountable manner. Further, the Local Government 
Act requires a Council to delegate authority to the CEO. This suggests that Councils acts as monitors 
and though their disclosures they signal their commitment towards effective monitoring through the 
adoption and maintenance of best practice. 
The audit committee is given the brief to review, oversee and report to Council in areas of financial, 
auditing and risk management areas. The audit committee is to assist Council by providing an 
independent review of its municipality’s financial management and reporting systems. Further, the 
audit committee acts as an effective means of communication between the external auditor, 
internal auditor, city management and Council. Generally, the audit committee seeks to build a 
constructive relationship with city management rather than an overly independent relationship. Its 
rationale is that the effective execution of audit committee responsibilities is dependent on building 
trusted relationships, open communication and cooperation with city management.  This is 
interesting because audit committee members’ may seek information and expert advice on matters 
of concern within the scope of their responsibilities subject to the CEO’s approval. This suggests that 
the audit committee is both acting as a monitoring and signally mechanism through active 
engagement with governance actors. 
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In local governments the external audit program is stated as having the purpose of providing 
assurance that the financial reports are fairly presented. However, interviewees expressed their 
opinion that the external audit is undertaken more for form than real substance; “it merely issues an 
assurance opinion as to whether firms are complying with accounting standards”. The inference is 
that while the external auditor provides a monitoring function for compliance reporting purposes, 
this function appears to signal a failure of effective monitoring from the perspective of the 
interviewees (who are independent audit committee members). 
6.2.6.3 Assumption Conclusion 
Based on the case evidence, the agency assumption which identifies key governance mechanisms of 
the board (or Council), audit committee and external auditor, as acting as monitors is largely 
supported. These governance mechanisms while acting as monitors, also appear to be symbolic 
signally mechanisms. A common governance mechanism for boards and Councils is to delegate to 
their audit committee. Audit committees are given an advisory capacity. Although the board (or 
Council) remains externally accountable, its audit committee is found to act as a key monitoring 
mechanism and facilitates a signalling process amongst other governance actors (e.g., executive 
management team, directors and both external and internal auditors). Governance actors, by 
actively engaging with each other, are identified as fulfilling their monitoring roles and 
responsibilities, while simultaneously signalling to each other their commitment to sound 
governance outcomes and processes. This signalling conclusion is supported in the evidence of Case 
One and city council.  Interestingly, however, it is not backed up in the city council evidence in 
respect to the external audit beyond its narrow role of compliance reporting monitoring.  
6.2.7 Governance mechanisms evolve to better address agency problems  
Dey’s (2008) results support the notion that the evolution, existence and roles of governance 
mechanisms are a function of the firm’s agency conflicts. Accordingly, the literature on audit 
committees consistently finds that those audit committees with greater independence, financial 
literacy, meeting frequency and composed of at least three directors, are better equipped to address 
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agency problems (Abbott et al. 2003a; 2004; Beasley 1996; Beasley et al. 2000; Bedard and Gendron 
2010; Dezoort et al. 2002; Lary and Taylor 2012). However, both Bradbury (1996) and Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1998) contend that audit committees are not voluntarily employed to address the agency 
problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. Collier and Zaman (2005) suggest 
that the adoption of governance models and mechanisms may be a symbolic concept used to signal 
the addressing of agency problems. While, Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) purpose that in situations 
where information is difficult to verify (e.g., by shareholders), agents (e.g., the board or 
management) may mimic quality messages. Moreover, Anderson et al. (2007) find that the role of 
the board is evolving as a strategic partner to management, rather than a monitor of management.  
6.2.7.1 Case One 
The board, according to Case One’s documents, is responsible for the review and oversight of Case 
One administration, management and governance. Further, the board is responsible for ensuring 
Case One is properly managed to protect and enhance shareholder interests, and that directors, 
officers, and employees operate in a sound governance environment. The board is also responsible 
for the engagement, appointment, review, and when necessary replacement of the CEO. The board 
is committed to maximising operational performance, financial returns and creating shareholder 
value. The board is to be composed of directors with an appropriate range and mix of qualifications, 
expertise, and experience which will enable the effective functional discharge of board 
responsibilities.  
It is also documented that the board may establish sub-committees to streamline the discharge of its 
responsibilities and functions, by delegating some its responsibilities and functions to these sub-
committees. Additionally, the board may delegate specific functions or issues to these sub-
committees on an as needs basis. In such an event, the executive management team is to deal with 
that sub-committee and not the board regarding that issue.  
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In relation to the audit committee, to recap, its role is to assist the board in the discharge of its 
responsibilities across delegated functions. These delegated functions are to oversee, review and 
report to the board on financial processes and reporting, audit programmes, and internal controls 
and risk management. Authority is given to the audit committee to request reports, explanations 
and information in relation to any Case One activity, process, procedure or account. However, its 
primary purpose is to assist the board, not to make decisions on behalf of the board.  
In terms of other board committees, it is found that the RC’s role is also to assist and advise the 
board on matters relating to the appointment and recruitment, remuneration and succession 
planning of the executive team including the CEO and Case One employees. Similarly, the NC is also 
to assist and advise the board on matters in relation to the appointment and recruitment, 
remuneration and succession planning of Case One non-executive directors. As such, the board will 
bi-annually with the assistance of the NC and an external advisor, review the performance, 
membership and charters of the board and its sub-committees to determine their adequacy in the 
then current circumstances. This is to determine whether their processes are adequate for carrying 
out their functions in the most effective manner. 
As earlier stated, the evidence shows that the external auditor seeks to build a trusted relationship 
with executive management. Too much independence is considered to lead to ineffective 
monitoring because the purpose of an external audit engagement is to form and provide an 
objective view on the published financial reports, where the view is dependent on trusted 
communication with executive management. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the external 
auditor can maintain a better relationship with executive management by trying to convince 
executive management on issues, rather than resorting to use of the audit committee as an 
authority over executive management.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that the board, audit committee, remuneration RC, NC, external 
auditor and executive management have formal lines of authority that allow responsibilities to be 
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devolved and that need an ethos of engagement and trust in order to address agency problems. For 
example, the board has authority to replace the CEO; the board is able to delegate any functions or 
issue on an as needs basis to its sub-committees; and the board engages the NC in its bi-annual 
review of its own governance structure to determine its adequacy in the then current circumstances. 
The board’s regular (bi-annual) review of governance structures indicates that Case One’s 
governance mechanisms have the means to evolve.  
This ability to evolve is likely to be used in a way that adapts Case One’s governance structure to 
better conform and comply with generally accepted agency-driven governance practices. But the 
evolution is also seen to entail the building of trusted working relationships. Hence, an ability to 
evolve does not assume that evolutions will be exclusively agency driven, nonetheless they still may 
be agency driven. The interview with the company secretary revealed that Case One had over a two 
year period gone through a major change in terms of its governance structure with the replacement 
of most of the directors and replacement of the CEO in an attempt to improve the overall 
governance structure of Case One. This was a case of changing not only the governance structures 
but also the dynamics of the human relationships between the key players. 
6.2.7.2 Local Government 
The evidence identifies that a Council's major operational activities include the establishment of 
governance and business functions necessary for an effective and publicly accountable body. Council 
is responsible for: (1) determining the priorities and policies of City Council; (2) establishing the 
strategic objectives for a municipality and monitoring their achievement; and (3) ensuring that 
resources are managed in a responsible and accountable manner. 
Interestingly, it is found that the audit committee acts as an effective means of communication 
between the external auditor, internal auditor, city management and Council. The independent 
members hold a coaching role to both Council and city management. This coaching role involves 
providing advice based on previous corporate knowledge and experience. Generally, the audit 
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committee aims to build a constructive relationship with city management rather than an overly 
independent relationship. Because the effective execution of audit committee responsibilities is 
dependent on building trusted relationships, there has evolved open communications and 
cooperation with city management.  This is interesting because audit committee members may seek 
information and both internal and external expert advice on matters of concern within the scope of 
their responsibilities subject to CEO approval. Further, similar to corporate entities, local 
governments have governance guidelines to follow in relation to the formation and composition of 
audit committees. These guidelines are found to be merely the extension of the corporate 
guidelines, but are politically focused. There was found to be general consensus that these 
guidelines are best practice and therefore should be conformed with. 
The conclusion is drawn from the evidence that the governance mosaic of local governments has to 
some extent evolved to address agency problems. However, this evolution is not purely agency 
driven. Interestingly, it appears to be driven by conformity. 
6.2.7.3 Assumption Conclusion  
Following the evidence, the agency assumption that governance mechanisms evolve to better 
address agency concerns is partially supported. It is found that governance mechanisms have the 
authority and capability of evolving to better address agency problems. However, this authority and 
capability may also be used to better adapt governance structures towards achieving business 
efficiency, conformity and political needs. An ability to evolve does not assume that evolutions will 
be exclusively agency driven, nonetheless they still may be agency driven. As explained, governance 
mechanisms are found to entail the building and forming of trusted relationships with open 
communication systems as opposed to purely independent monitoring focused relationships. This 
notion of a trusted relationship and open communication systems does not align with the typical 
independent monitoring focused agency solutions. 
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6.2.8 The external audit function is external (independent) yet simultaneously internal to 
the client 
This assumption seeks to identify whether the external audit function is a purely independent 
monitoring focused relationship or whether it remains independent yet fundamentally critical to the 
day-to-day operations of a client. Further, it suggests that while the external audit is internal to the 
contract nexus it remains external. Consequently, this would support Raghunandan et al.’s (2003) 
conclusion that external auditors have an overarching concern over their professional reputation 
which acts as an incentive in maintaining their independence and audit quality. 
6.2.8.1 Case One 
It is found that, in conducting the external audit, the auditor uses Best Practice Templates which are 
developed by the audit firm, and it is the lead audit partner’s responsibility to tailor these templates 
for their client. As previously mentioned, the main purpose of the external audit is to form and 
provide an objective view on financial reports; and to provide feedback to the board and executive 
management team on financial reports. Additionally, the external auditor is responsible for 
reviewing Case One’s compliance with, and effectiveness of, internal controls. This helps to enable 
the external auditor to provide an opinion regarding the truth and fairness of financial reports.  
The external auditor is prohibited from providing any non-audit services which would create a 
perceived or real threat to their independence.  Non-audit services encompass any service the 
auditor may provide which is not necessarily incidental to or included in the terms of the audit 
engagement, unless otherwise determined by the audit committee. In terms of the negotiation of 
the audit fee, this is typically a circular communication channel between the CFO, external auditor 
and audit committee chair. Therefore, once the audit committee is satisfied with the scope of the 
audit program it will make a recommendation to the board. 
In terms of accountability, the external auditor has ultimate responsibility to the board. However, 
the external auditor has a formal relationship and front-line accountability to the audit committee. 
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The external auditor’s accountability towards shareholders is in providing an objective view on the 
published financial reports. 
Moreover, regulatory practice updates or changes are typically passed through by the audit firm to 
executive management (i.e., CFO). In turn, executive management should debrief the board in 
relation to these changes as executive management is in a position to tailor the information to 
company operations. However, at times the external auditor may directly pass this information to 
the directors. Therefore, the external audit function also serves as a means of education and 
development of management and board members. 
At the end of the audit committee’s meeting agenda the audit committee will typically commence a 
closed private session between the non-executive directors and the lead internal auditor and 
external audit partner. The closed private session is a formal process for the audit committee to eye-
ball the auditors in the absence of the executive management team. Regardless of this practice, it is 
expected that if the auditors had any concerns they would have already explicated their concerns 
through the appropriate channels prior to meetings. 
As previously indicated, the evidence shows that the external auditor seeks to build a trusted 
relationship with executive management, to facilitate effective monitoring which is regarded as 
being dependent on trusted communication. While it is the audit committee’s role to oversee 
auditor independence, is an external auditor’s fundamental professional responsibility and duty to 
maintain independence from executive management.  
From the evidence, the external auditor gives high importance to acting with independent in 
carrying out the audit function for Case One. However other evidence suggests that the external 
audit function simultaneously remains fundamentally integral to the day-to-day operations of Case 
One.  As such the external audit activity is external yet internal to the day-to-day operations of Case 
One. 
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6.2.8.2 Local Government  
The evidence identifies the external audit program for city councils as being under the jurisdiction of 
the VAGO. The primarily focus of the external audit program in city councils is to provide assurance 
that the annual financial reports are fairly presented. It is found that the reliance of the external 
auditor on the work of internal auditors is governed by the accounting profession and traditional 
accounting conformism. The view in city councils is that the external audit function is to project 
assurance. It is said to involve more form than real substance. It merely issues an assurance opinion, 
not wider investigative or advisory functions. 
Following the evidence, the external audit function for local governments is found to maintain 
strong independence from the city council’s management and councillors. Unlike corporate entities 
the findings suggest that the external audit function is not integral to the day-to-day operations of 
local governments.  Further, the external audit activity is external to the day-to-day operations of 
local governments. 
6.2.8.3 Assumption Conclusion  
Based on the evidence from Case One, the agency assumption which identifies the external audit 
function as being external yet simultaneously internal to the client is supported. In Case One, the 
interaction of the external auditor is found to be both external and internal to the client. Moreover, 
the external auditor seeks to build a trusted as opposed to an overly independent relationship. In 
contrast, the external audit function for local governments is found to be independent from the day-
to-day operations and is monitoring focused. This is believed to be due to the nature of the external 
audit function of local governments which is determined at a higher-tier government level to be 
governed by VAGO, and Councils must comply. In contrast, with corporate firms the external audit 
function is an interactive communication between auditors, audit committee chair and the CFO 
which allows for a clearer expectation in terms of external audit responsibilities.  
Akeel M. Lary 
203 
6.2.9 Actor interactions and processes are bureaucratic 
Beattie et al. (2011) note that recent governance models show governance actors interacting in a 
more dynamic and interdependent way than a hierarchical or bureaucratic way. This agency 
assumption seeks to identify the way in which governance actors interact, in particular it seeks to 
highlight the bureaucratic functioning of governance mechanisms. Consequently, the evidence used 
may mirrors some of the previous agency assumptions. 
6.2.9.1 Case One  
 It is found that the meeting agenda of the board is prepared by the company secretary in 
conjunction with the board chair, CEO and the CFO with periodic input of the full board. Members of 
the executive team may be invited to attend all or part of board meetings whenever the board 
requires their involvement or assistance in consideration of issues before the board. In the board 
chair’s absence of another director is to chair all or part of the Board meeting.  
External communication to directors from regulators particularly ASIC, is sent via the company 
secretary, i.e., the secretary passes the information down to directors. It is found that direct 
communication does not normally take place between directors and regulators. Accordingly, no 
director has direct communication with external regulators or other external parties, except for the 
board chair who may directly communicate to and with major shareholders. Moreover, the external 
audit partner stated in interview statements that regulatory practice updates or changes are 
commonly passed through by the audit firm to executive management (i.e., CFO). In turn, executive 
management is expected to debrief the board in relation to these changes as executive management 
is better positioned to tailor the information to company operations. However, at times the external 
auditor may directly pass this information to directors. As previously explained, each director at the 
expense of Case One may seek independent professional advice following a formal request issued by 
the board or its chair. 
As previously noted, the board delegates the day-to-day management of Case One resources to the 
executive management team under the leadership of the CEO, but the board holds responsibility for 
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the establishment and monitoring of management goals. Accordingly, the board is found to remain 
accountable to shareholders over the overall performance of Case One. A further bureaucratic 
aspect of Board governance in Case One is the establishment of sub-committees and their obligation  
to adopt a formal charter which sets out matters regarding their composition, responsibilities, 
functions and administration.  
Bureaucratic features are again evident for the audit committee. It has a specific responsibility to 
assist the board in the discharge of responsibilities and functions as delegated by the board. 
However, it is not to make decisions on behalf of the board, its sole accountability is to the board. To 
fulfil its work of supporting the board, the audit committee is required to meet with the external and 
internal auditors in the absence of executive management whenever it is deemed appropriate but 
not less than twice a year. The audit committee chair is expected to report to the board following 
each audit committee meeting. As previously explained the chair is also to facilitate the work of and 
act as a bridge for the audit committee. This involves a relatively dynamic and interdependent 
working relationship between the audit committee chair and executive management. 
Other bureaucratic features are found to be present in the governance structures, designated roles 
and modes of operation of the external auditor and internal audit function in Case One, as 
previously explained. Similarly to the engagement of the external auditor, the engagement of the 
internal auditor is to be approved by the audit committee. However the internal audit program is 
regarded as being more of a tool of executive management than directors. Although, when the 
scope of the audit programs overlap, the external auditor is able to rely on the working papers of the 
internal auditor as agreed upon in the initial external audit engagement. As stated earlier, the 
external auditor is to provide feedback to the board and executive management team on financial 
reports. In fulfilling this responsibility the external auditor seeks to build trusted relationships with 
both the board and executive management. It was found that a successful audit is dependent on 
open communication.  
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In light of the evidence, the interactions and processes of Case One governance actors appears to be 
bureaucratic. However, at times these interactions and processes also appear to be dynamic and 
interdependent. In particular the evidence suggests that actor interactions are more or less dynamic 
and interdependent, while processes and procedures are bureaucratic. 
6.2.9.2 Local Governments 
A Council is composed of elected councillors meeting as a whole. Individual members are found to 
lack the authority to make unilateral decisions. Typically one to two meetings are held per month to 
discharge general city council business. Bureaucratic structures are evident in Council audit 
committees they are to be composed of five members; three independent experts and two Council 
members. Five audit committee meetings are to be held annually. A majority presence shall form a 
quorum, unless no Councillor members are present. In its chair’s absence, the audit committee will 
appoint a chair from its independent members. At each meeting the audit committee has the 
opportunity to meet with both the internal and external auditors in the absence of city 
management.  
In terms of processes, the audit committee acts as a communication means between the external 
auditor, internal auditor, city management and Council. Independent members are found to hold a 
coaching role to both Council and city management. According, the audit committee aims to build a 
constructive rather than an overly independent relationship with city management. Interestingly, its 
independent members may seek information and expert advice subject to the CEO’s approval. 
Consequently, the effective execution of audit committee responsibilities is heavily dependent on 
building trusted relationships and open communication with city management and Council.   
As previously stated, the primarily focus of the external auditor (i.e., VAGO) is to merely issue an 
assurance opinion as to whether local governments are complying with accounting standards. This 
suggests that that external audit function of city council is bureaucratic in terms of its interaction 
and processes. 
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In light of the evidence, the interactions and processes of local government governance actors 
appears to be largely bureaucratic. However, the evidence concerning the activities of the audit 
committee indicates that at times the interactions and processes of governance actors are also 
dynamic and interdependent in local governments. Similarly to Case One the local government 
evidence suggests that some actor interactions are more or less dynamic and interdependent, while 
processes and procedures are bureaucratic. The external audit function determined by VAGO in 
practice is viewed as being purely bureaucratic. 
6.2.9.3 Assumption Conclusion 
Following the discussed evidence the agency assumption which states that actor interactions are 
bureaucratic is largely supported. The evidence identifies that structures and in some situations 
actor interactions and processes are in fact bureaucratic. However, for some actors (especially the 
audit committee chair) part of their role is to pursue base-line dynamic and interdependent 
interactions. Therefore, it is suggested that governance actor interactions and processes are 
bureaucratic at times. This provides support for Turley and Zaman’s (2007) finding which suggests 
that the main role of governance actors is to deal with change and adaptability. 
6.2.10 Overall Agency Conclusion 
Following the conclusions reached about the expanded models’ agency assumptions, it is concluded 
that the governance phenomena can be explained by adopting an agency-based theoretical 
framework. However, singularly adopting the agency perspective does not holistically address the 
governance phenomena. Therefore, it is suggested that agency theory is useful mainly for addressing 
the purpose and function of governance. Adopting a broader behavioural perspective on the ‘self-
interest’ core of agency theory can more pluralistically explain the underlying motivations for 
observed governance policy disclosures and governance actor relationships.  
6.3 INSTITUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
As previously mentioned, the initial framework for a governance model given in Figure 2.3 in 
Chapter 2 is used to guide the examination of the governance phenomena centred upon the audit 
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committee. In doing so, the institutional assumptions underlying this framework, as drawn from the 
institutional literature, can be empirically tested through the gathering and interpreting of evidence 
about the governance policies, practices and interfaces as presented in the case unit chapters (i.e., 
Chapters 4 and 5).  
The interpretation of this evidence from Chapters 4 and 5 is now undertaken in the next sub-
sections for each institutional assumption in turn. Similar to the agency section, reference is 
frequently made to ‘the evidence’ or ‘the findings’ as a recap on relevant paraphrases from the 
analysis in the previous chapters. Reference to ‘the evidence’ or ‘the findings’ indicates that a 
paraphrased statement has been derived from the source interview text, case unit document 
content or both. Attributing these recapped paraphrases to specific interviewees or specific 
organisation documents is only sparingly undertaken in this chapter because several paraphrases are 
drawn from an amalgam of text from the interviews and case unit documents. To make these 
specific attributions would be distracting to the discussion. Moreover, as some of the behavioural 
institutional assumptions are on a continuum with the agency assumptions, some repetition in the 
selection of evidence is unavoidable. That is, some of the behavioural assumptions rely on the same 
evidence.  
6.3.1 Legitimacy is a resource 
This assumption does not seek to address the degree in which legitimacy is a resource. It seeks to 
identify whether legitimacy is viewed and is regarded as a resource by governance actors.  
6.3.1.1 Case One 
As previously identified the board has the ultimate responsibility over setting and ensuring policies 
regarding the business and affairs of Case One are to the benefit of shareholders and stakeholders. 
Further, the board is committed to ensuring that its constitutional powers and responsibilities are 
exercised and discharged, adopting best practice governance principles and applicable laws to 
ensure shareholder value.  The evidence suggests that through poor environmental and social 
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compliance, brand damage is inevitable. This can potentially cost Case One its ability to supply 
retailers and ultimately the end consumer. 
The policies and review processes concerning the board and its sub-committees convey apparent 
perceptions of legitimacy to the board’s environment of institutions. For example, a policy is for the 
board to be composed of directors with an appropriate range and mix of qualifications, expertise, 
and experience which will enable the effective functional discharge of board responsibilities. It is to 
be composed of a majority of independent and non-executive directors. And its chair is to be an 
independent and non-executive director. In a process that conveys a reinforcement of its 
effectiveness, the board meets bi-annually to review the performance, membership and charters of 
the board and its sub-committees to determine their adequacy in the then current circumstances.  
For each standing sub-committee of the board, a formal charter is adopted. These charters set out 
matters regarding the sub-committee’s composition, responsibilities, functions and administration. 
Each sub-committee is to be composed of a minimum of three non-executive directors, a majority of 
which are independent. Other disclosures of policies that represent investments in the 
establishment and maintenance of Case One’s legitimacy include a policy on maintaining ethical 
standards, a risk oversight and management policy and a fraud and corruption policy. 
In terms of the building of a working culture that maintains perceived legitimacy, the audit 
committee is identified as working diligently to assist the board by seeking to ensure that potential 
or simmering issues are identified and acknowledged. This is achieved by constructing a culture 
which allows the executive management team to raise issues early.  In doing so, the audit committee 
chair is found to facilitate the work of the audit committee and to act as a bridge between audit 
committee and non-audit committee directors and the external auditor, internal auditor, and 
executive management.  
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While the audit committee is to oversee auditor independence, it is an external and internal 
auditor’s fundamental responsibility and duty to maintain independence; the main reason being 
professional integrity and reputation. This perception of independence of the external audit function 
in particular, is said by interviewees to be paramount to Case One’s legitimacy in its superordinate 
system. The evidence suggests the external auditor firm will always remain cognisant of protecting 
its perceived independence while building open trusted communications with executive 
management. 
In summary, the evidence suggests that legitimacy is a resource because Case One highlights 
through its charters and policy documents, its sound governance structures and processes. A 
determination is evident in Case One that its governance policies and practices must be exemplary in 
meeting ASX good governance benchmarks and professional auditing ethics.  
6.3.1.2 Local Government 
Councils are found to adopt guidelines and disclose policies that emphasise the establishment of 
governance and business functions necessary for an effective and publicly accountable body. These 
guidelines and policies are identified as adaptions from the corporate sector. But they are more 
politically driven in the sense that they are treated as best practice and therefore should be 
conformed to, to ensure the Council’s legitimacy in its superordinate system. 
In respect of the composition of audit committees, the requirement of a majority of independent 
members (i.e., three outside appointees and two councillors) gives strength to the perception of 
legitimacy in the monitoring of matters concerning accounting and financial reporting, risk 
management and reliability of internal controls. While Council is under no formal obligation to act 
on audit committee advice, it would be perceived as negligent to disregard such advice.  
Like the audit committee in Case One, the building of a working culture that maintains perceived 
legitimacy in governance processes is found to be pursued by audit committees of Councils. Thus, 
the audit committee is aiming to build a constructive relationship with Council and city management 
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rather than an overly independent relationship. At each meeting the audit committee is provided 
with the opportunity to meet with both the internal and external auditors in the absence of city 
management. This evidence implies that the audit committee seeks to legitimatise interactions 
between executive management and auditors by independently assessing the effectiveness of 
monitoring policies and procedures.   
As previously stated, VAGO governs the external audit program of city councils. The external audit 
program is found to be limited to providing an opinion that the annual financial reports comply with 
accounting standards. This suggests that the external audit is a somewhat symbolic practice to gain 
legitimacy. Interestingly, the evidence identifies that the reliance of the external auditor on the work 
of internal auditors is justified by the accounting profession and traditional accounting conformism. 
This is particularly interesting because it suggests that the external auditor is able to almost fully rely 
on the work of the internal auditor to the extent that this reliance can be professionally legitimated 
to stakeholders within local government’s superordinate system.  
6.3.1.3 Assumption Conclusion  
Based on the discussed evidence the institutional assumption which suggests that firms and councils 
consider legitimacy as a resource is supported. The evidence shows that board (and Councils) and 
their audit committee, and internal and external auditors treat their perceived legitimacy within the 
wider superordinate system as a valuable resource to be established and maintained through 
governance policies and procedures that are, to a large extent, in conformity to best practices.  
6.3.2.2 Actors interact in a dynamic and interdependent way 
This institutional assumption seeks to identify the way in which governance actors interact. In 
particular it seeks to determine whether actors’ interactions are more in line with behaviours 
expected under institutional theory as opposed to agency theory. The agency assumption that 
governance actor’ interactions and processes are bureaucratic, as set out in section 6.2.9 (above), is 
at the other end of the behavioural continuum to this institutional assumption that actors 
interactions are dynamic and interdependent. This means that the evidence and conclusion as 
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presented in section 6.2.9 is equally relevant to this section. That is, the evidence in section 6.2.9 
reveals that governance actors do, in several situations, interact in a dynamic and interdependent 
way although at times interactions are bureaucratic. Thus, it is suggested that governance actor 
interactions are both dynamic and interdependent and bureaucratic; i.e., this assumption is similarly 
largely supported. At times governance actors rely on their bureaucratic interactions and processes 
to legitimatise their activities, while at other times governance actors rely on more flexible and 
interdependent interactions and processes to effectively execute their overlapping monitoring and 
assurance responsibilities. 
6.3.3 Firms (or city councils) operate and interact within a superordinate social system 
6.3.3.1 Case One 
At the centre of its endeavours the board of Case One is found to have a commitment to protecting 
its shareholders and other stakeholders by ensuring that its constitutional powers and 
responsibilities are exercised and discharged, adopting best practice governance principles and 
applicable laws. There is evidence of an underlying concern that a perception of sub-standard 
governance would damage the brand of Case One and the reputation of the key governance actors 
(i.e., the board, its committees and its auditors).  Brand and reputation damage to Case One due to 
governance problems could negatively impact on its share price and its supply chain. This suggests 
that Case One is operating within a corporate eco-system.  
In terms of direct interactions with external regulatory bodies, this is organised in a way that ensures 
the company receives formal information and responds to it through a single consistent channel. 
Hence, external communication from regulators (mainly ASX and ASIC) to Case One is channelled 
through the company secretary. No direct communication is found to take place between directors 
and regulators, unless on the rare occasion it is specifically demanded. Additionally, the external 
audit firm provides taxation and accounting standards updates directly to the CFO. In turn, the CFO 
debriefs executive management and directors regarding relevant changes. The company secretary 
and CFO, respectively, are in a position to tailor the incoming information and suggest its 
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implications for company governance policies, financial reporting and other compliance and 
operating practices. Occasionally, the external auditor may directly pass this update information to 
directors.  
Looking into the way in which Case one operates and interacts, it is evident that it is operating and 
interacting within a superordinate social system. This is shown by emphasising its commitment to 
integrity and sound governance to ensure stakeholder protection. Further, as previously identified 
governance actors are seeking to build trusted relationships with one another, this suggests that 
that actors are interacting with one another as distinct institutions. 
6.3.3.2 Local Government  
Like corporate entities, city councils have governance guidelines to follow which are aimed at 
protecting the interests of stakeholders in the superordinate social system. The general consensus 
amongst city councils is that these guidelines are best practice and therefore should be conformed 
with. Hence, city councils clearly recognise that they operate in a superordinate social system. 
In terms of interactions with this superordinate social system, it is found that the audit committee of 
Council has no authority to directly communicate with external stakeholders unless legally required. 
The independent members’ of audit committee, however, engage with the wider business and 
professional communities in their capacity as professionals and not as city council audit committee 
members. Similarly to the Case One evidence local government governance actors are interacting 
within a superordinate social system as a whole entity (i.e., city council), governance mechanism 
(e.g., Council or audit committee) and as individual actors. 
6.3.3.3 Assumption Conclusion  
The evidence provided in this study about the nature and extent of operation and interaction by 
Case One and city councils within a superordinate social system is limited. Evidence has not been 
obtained on the various business, professional and regulator circles that may be regularly 
frequented by the chair of the board, the chair of audit committee, the CFO or other governance 
Akeel M. Lary 
213 
actors in Case One. Likewise, the mayor, councillors and CEO are likely to have regular interactions 
with a wide range of stakeholders at the community level and high-tier government level.  
However, the evidence does reveal that both the board of Case One and its committees are formally 
committed to the interests of shareholders and wider stakeholders, particularly regulators and the 
external auditor. This commitment is evidenced through disclosures in board and board sub-
committee charters and policies, and adherence to these charters and policies in practice. This infers 
that governance actors in Case One place high importance on the need for their firm to operate 
within a superordinate social system. The same formal commitment to the interests of stakeholders 
and compliance to the governance expectations of regulators is found in city councils. Moreover, the 
official interactions with this superordinate social system on matters of corporate governance are 
closely managed. For Case One, direct interactions from and to external regulatory bodies and the 
external audit firm are tightly channelled through the company secretary and the CFO. For city 
councils, communications to and from external regulators is also carefully managed, with restrictions 
being placed on certain governance actors such as the audit committee.  Overall, there is clear 
evidence to support the assumption that firms (and city councils) place high importance on their 
need to operate within a superordinate social system. There is also evidence of formally managed 
processes of interaction of governance actors in these entities with the governance actors in the 
superordinate social system. Following this evidence, it is suggested that superordinate social system 
interaction and operation is on three levels as a single entity, as a governance mechanism and as an 
individual governance actor. 
6.3.4 Firms are closed yet simultaneously open to pressures of the superordinate social 
system and consequently, there exists some form of peer or institutional compliance 
pressures 
This assumption seeks to identify whether Case One and city councils are closed yet open to the 
pressures of the superordinate social system. As stated in Chapter 2, firms may acquiesce; negotiate; 
avoid; defy; or control and manipulate the pressures of the superordinate social system to maintain 
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legitimacy (Oliver 1991). As this study is limited to one corporate case example, the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations presented in Chapter 
3 provide an example of pressure from the superordinate social system. To further illustrate this 
concept of peer compliance pressure, appendices 3 and 4 present an example of a board charter and 
audit committee charter (respectively) of other ASX 300 listed entities. Key concepts from these 
appendices are quoted in this section to illustrate Case One’s similarity to other firms (i.e., other ASX 
300 listed entities) with respect to their superordinate social system. The similarity would imply that 
Case One is open to the pressures of the superordinate social system. 
6.3.4.1 Case One 
The evidence identifies that the board is committed to ensuring that its constitutional powers and 
responsibilities are exercised and discharged, adopting best practice governance principles and 
applicable laws. Additionally, the board is committed to maximising operational performance 
creating shareholder value by adopting and maintaining best practice governance standards. 
Further, the company secretary explained that should there be poor environmental and social 
compliance, brand damage would be inevitable. Such brand damage could result in problems to 
Case One’s core activity of supplying its products to retailers and, in turn, could impact on 
perceptions of the end consumer. Accordingly, responsibility for conformity with best practice 
governance principles and compliance with applicable laws is found to emanate from the board of 
Case One. The Board’s charter requires it to ensure that directors, officers, and employees operate 
in a sound governance environment. It parallel’s the board charter of a comparable ASX company 
which states: 
“The Board … has adopted this Charter to outline the manner in which its 
constitutional powers and responsibilities will be exercised and discharged, adopting 
principles of good corporate governance and practice that accord with applicable 
laws” (Ansell 2010, p.1). 
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“The Board … is ultimately responsible for the oversight and review of the 
management, administration and overall governance … the protection of 
shareholders' interests … authorising policies and overseeing the strategic direction 
… establishing goals for management and monitoring the achievement … *and+ 
engaging, reviewing and replacing the Chief Executive Officer” (Ansell 2010, p.1). 
“… Board has retained ultimate responsibility for the strategic direction and control 
of the Company. The Board delegates management of the Company's resources to 
the executive team under the leadership of the Chief Executive Officer” (Ansell 2010, 
p.4). 
The Case One board’s charter requires that the board be composed of directors with an appropriate 
range and mix of qualifications, expertise, and experience which will enable the effective functional 
discharge of Board responsibilities. Further, it is to be composed of a majority of independent and 
non-executive directors. And the board chair is to be an independent and non-executive director. In 
ensuring its effectiveness, the board will bi-annually, with the assistance of the NC and an external 
advisor, review the performance, membership and charters of the board and its sub-committees to 
determine their adequacy in the then current circumstances and to determine whether their 
processes are adequate. Convergence with board composition and self-review processes found in 
the superordinate system is evident in the statements from a comparable ASX company as follows:   
“The composition of the Board is reviewed on an annual basis *by the NC+ … to 
ensure that the Board has the appropriate mix of skills, expertise and experience 
necessary to fulfil its function effectively” (Ansell 2010, p.2). 
“… the Board comprise a majority of non-executive directors. It is intended that at 
least half of the Board from time to time be independent non-executive directors” 
(Ansell 2010, p.2). 
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“The Board … [will] review the membership and charter of the Board to determine 
their adequacy in the then current circumstances and to determine that the Board's 
processes are adequate” (Ansell 2010, p.6). 
Peer or institutional compliance pressures are also evident in the way Case One’s board has 
established sub-committees. Similar to other larger ASX companies, Case One’s standing sub-
committees are each to adopt a formal charter which sets out matters regarding its composition, 
responsibilities, functions and administration. Additionally, each sub-committee is to be composed 
of a minimum of three non-executive directors, a majority of which are independent; while their 
chair is to be both an independent and non-executive director and shall not be the board chair. For 
example: 
“The Board from time to time establishes Committees to streamline the discharge of 
its responsibilities and, for each standing Committee, adopts a formal charter setting 
out the matters relevant to the composition, responsibilities and administration … 
also delegates specific functions to ad hoc Committees on an "as needs" basis” 
(Ansell 2010, p.4). 
The audit committee is viewed as a board sub-committee which is to assist the Board in the 
discharge of its responsibilities. The audit committee’s key responsibilities and functions are to 
review, oversee and report to the board on the following: financial processes and reporting; audit 
programmes; and internal controls and risk management. Therefore, all persons appointed to the 
audit committee must have the ability to comprehend and interpret financial statements and have 
sufficient financial knowledge and understanding. The evidence shows that that CEO and CFO are to 
provide compliance certificates to the audit committee in relation to the integrity and accounting 
standards compliance of financial papers. As such, the audit committee chair is regarded as having 
an informal accountability to executive management in assisting them in improving the quality of 
Akeel M. Lary 
217 
such papers. The purpose, functions and membership of Case One’s audit committee, parallel’s that 
of other ASX companies. For example:  
“The primary purpose of the Audit Committee is to assist the Board discharge its 
responsibility in … ensuring the Company adopts, maintains and applies appropriate 
accounting and financial reporting processes and procedures … facilitating the 
independence of the external audit process and addressing issues arising from the 
audit process … ensuring the Company maintains effective risk management and 
internal control systems” (Cochlear n.d, p.1). 
“All members shall be independent Non-Executive Directors who possess the 
requisite qualifications and financial literacy” (Cochlear n.d, p.1). 
In using an outsourced-internal audit function, the executive management team and the board are 
able to gain access to relevant experts as opposed to outsourcing for specific expertise. However, 
the internal audit program is regarded as a tool for executive management rather than the audit 
committee or the board, though it aids and supports the audit committee’s assessment of the 
internal control framework. Similarly to the engagement of the external auditor, the engagement of 
the outsourced-internal auditor is to be approved by the audit committee. When the scope of the 
audit programs overlap, the external auditor is able to rely on the working papers of the internal 
auditor as agreed upon in the initial external audit engagement. 
As Case One is an ASX listed company and it is required to comply with the ASX’s best practices 
(these were presented in Table 3.3 of Chapter 3), this creates compliance pressure. In light of the 
above evidence in consideration with appendices 3 and 4, the operations and practices of Case One 
largely suggest that it is closed yet simultaneously open to the pressures of the superordinate 
system. However, the evidence provides stronger support for Case One being open rather than 
closed. While the governance policies and structures of Case One are clearly shaped by an openness 
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to the pressures of the superordinate system, there are also procedures in place that keep the 
governance system closed to these pressures. For example, open communications between 
directors and external regulators is limited and controlled in Case One.  An established process in 
Case One is that notifications to directors by regulators such as ASIC and ASX are received by the 
company secretary who filters this information. Unless directors are referred to in-person in 
communications from and to regulators, then the company secretary deals with pressures from 
regulators and involves management as deemed necessary.  
6.3.4.2 Local Government 
The four city councils reviewed in this study have broad commonalities. They are composed of an 
elected policy-making arm and an appointed management arm. For each city council, evidence 
indicates that city councils are open to pressures from the superordinate system in the way they 
have developed the CEO’s contract of employment.  The CEO is found to hold responsibility for the 
implementation of Council decisions, for ensuring Council achieves its Council Plan objectives, and 
for managing the day-to-day operations, resources and staff of a city council. Additionally, the Local 
Government Act requires a Council to delegate authority to the CEO. The CEO is to be appointed for 
no more than five years, on a performance based contract; the incumbent CEO may be reappointed 
for a further term.  
Further indication of openness of city councils to pressures to converge their governance practices is 
evident in their establishment of audit committees.  Similar to corporate entities, city councils have 
governance guidelines to follow in relation to the formation and composition of audit committees. 
The general consensus about these guidelines is that they are best practice and therefore should be 
conformed with. However the voluntary adoption of audit committees in city councils dates back to 
1998.  
Each of the four city councils has an audit committee with a state primary role of assisting Council in 
the effective discharge of its corporate governance responsibilities over accounting and financial 
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reporting, risk management, governance and reliable internal controls. The audit committee assists 
Council by providing an independent review of its municipality’s financial management and 
reporting systems. However, Council is under no formal obligation to act on audit committee advice. 
In each case, however, it holds strong persuasiveness as ignoring such advice is viewed as negligent. 
Moreover, the audit committee acts as an effective means of communication between the external 
auditor, internal auditor, city management and Council. In each city council case, the audit 
committee is found to work constructively with city management and Council. Further, as 
independent advisers, the audit committee has no direct communication with external stakeholders 
unless legally required. The independent members’ engagement with the wider business community 
is with their capacity as professionals and not as city council audit committee members.  
The external audit program of city councils is governed by the VAGO. The primarily focus of the 
external audit program is to provide assurance that the annual financial reports are fairly presented. 
However, the external audit is viewed as being more form than real substance; “it merely issues an 
assurance opinion as to whether firms are complying with accounting standards”. Interestingly, the 
evidence identifies that the reliance of the external auditor on the work of internal auditors is 
governed by the accounting profession and traditional accounting conformism. This is particularly 
interesting because it suggests that the external auditor is able to rely on the work of the internal 
auditor to the extent that the superordinate social system deems it to be legitimate.  
The amalgamated evidence as summarised in Chapter 5, suggests that governance structures and 
practices in local government are convergent because they are open to the pressures of the 
superordinate social system. Illustrations of convergence of city councils are provided in this sub-
section in the CEO’s employment contract and the extent of the audit committee’s roles and 
influences. The evidence identifies that in terms of the external audit local governments have to 
comply with VAGO’s decision in terms of actual performance.  
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6.3.4.3 Assumption Conclusion  
 Following the evidence, support is given to the institutional assumption which identifies Case One 
and local governments as being open to the pressures of the superordinate social system in terms of 
accepting and, in fact, leading peer or institutional compliance pressures. The evidence shows that 
there exists a form of institutional compliance through the adoption of similar governance 
structures, policies and processes. However, there is also evidence of Case One adopting processes 
that seek to shield directors from pressures of regulators and shareholders in the superordinate 
system. This suggests an element of seeking to be simultaneously closed to the superordinate 
system. Similarly, evidence from the selected city councils indicates that their practices are of a 
confirmative nature as illustrated in Chapter 5. This suggests that both firms and city councils tend to 
conform to the pressures placed on them by the superordinate social system. Further, Case One and 
city council governance actors appear to be the driving force behind these organisations being open 
yet simultaneously closed to the pressures of the superordinate system. 
6.3.5 There exists some institutional homogeneity 
The institutional theory literature contends or assumes that there exists institutional homogeneity. 
This has been found in terms of audit committee characteristics (i.e., independence and expertise) 
and in the external auditors’ provision for non-audit services (Abbott et al. 2003b; 2004; Ashbaugh 
et al. 2003; Beasley 1996; Frankel et al. 2002; Kinney et al. 2004; Lary and Taylor 2012; Raghunandan 
et al. 2003; Xie et al. 2003).  
This assumption seeks to identify the existence of institutional homogeneity within its superordinate 
social system (i.e., both the wider eco-system and the contract nexus). It is closely related to the 
institutional assumption presented in section 6.3.4 above, which sought to identify whether an 
entity is closed yet simultaneously open the pressures of the superordinate social system and 
consequently, there existed some form of peer or institutional compliance pressure. Therefore, in 
light of the evidence presented in section 6.3.4 the institutional assumption which identifies that 
there exists institutional homogeneity is supported. Homogeneity is implicit in the evidence that 
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governance structures and actors appear to be following a similar pattern in terms of their basic 
form, structure, roles and responsibilities. However, the evidence suggests that while there exists 
some degree of non-homogeneity in terms of actual composition, this is due to the individual needs 
of the firm or city council. For illustrative proposes some of this evidence is linked back to the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ACGPR). 
Principle 1 from ACGPR identifies that a listed entity should establish the functions of the governing 
body and those delegated to management (ASX 2010a). The Case One evidence finds the board has 
the ultimate responsibility for the strategic direction and control of Case One. Further, the board will 
delegate the day-to-day management of Case One’s resources to the executive management team 
under the leadership of the CEO. City councils have a different structure but similar strategy-setting 
and delegated management functions. The elected Council (headed by the mayor) holds the 
responsibility for establishing policies and making strategic decisions of the city council, whereas the 
city management (headed by the CEO) holds the responsibility for implementing Council decisions.  
Principle 2 from ACGPR states that the governing body should be composed of an independent 
majority, independent chair and should establish a NC (ASX 2010a). In Case One, the board is to be 
composed of directors with an appropriate range and mix of qualifications, expertise, and 
experience to enable the effective discharge of board responsibilities. Further, it is to be composed 
of a majority of independent and non-executive directors. And the Board chair is to be an 
independent and non-executive director. In city councils, Council is to be composed of councillors 
elected by the residents of the municipality. The mayor is either independently elected or is 
appointed from and by the municipality’s councillors. 
Principle 4 from ACGPR states that the governing body should establish an audit committee; the 
audit committee should have a charter, consist of only non-executive directors, have a majority of 
independent directors, have at least three members, and have an independent chair that is not the 
board chair (ASX 2010a). The Case One audit committee is to assist the board in the discharge of its 
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responsibilities. The audit committee’s key responsibilities and functions are to review, oversee and 
report to the board on the following: financial processes and reporting; audit programmes; and 
internal controls and risk management. Similarly , the primary role of city council audit committees 
is assist Council in the effective discharge of its corporate governance responsibilities over 
accounting and financial reporting, risk management, governance and reliable internal controls. 
Principle 8 from ACGPR states that the governing body should establish a RC that is to consist of a 
majority of independent directors, have at least three members, and have an independent chair that 
is not the board chair (ASX 2010a). The Case One board may establish sub-committees to streamline 
the discharge of its responsibilities and functions. Each standing sub-committee is to adopt a formal 
charter which sets out matters regarding its composition, responsibilities, functions and 
administration. Additionally, each sub-committee is to be composed of a minimum of three non-
executive directors, a majority of which are independent.  Each sub-committee chair is to be both an 
independent and non-executive director. 
Institutional homogeneity through conformity of structures and practices is also seen in the 
engagement of the external auditor. In relation to the external auditor reliance, the Case One 
findings show that when the scope of the audit programs overlap, the external auditor is able to rely 
on the working papers of the internal auditor as agreed upon in the initial external audit 
engagement. Interestingly, the city council evidence identifies that the heavy reliance of the external 
auditor on the work of internal auditors is justified by citing auditing principles of the accounting 
profession and traditional accounting conformism. This infers that the external auditor is able to rely 
on the work of the internal auditor to the extent that the professional bodies in the superordinate 
social system deem it to be legitimate. 
6.3.6 Governance mechanisms are adaptive 
Following the evidence, as presented in section 6.2.7 the agency assumption that governance 
mechanisms evolve to better address agency concerns was partially supported. It was found that 
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governance mechanisms have the authority and capability of evolving to better address agency 
problems; i.e., they are adaptive. Further, governance mechanisms, processes and structures require 
a built-in annually review. This periodic review process will result in modifications, if necessary, to 
the performance targets, charters or composition of governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
governance mechanisms are able to adapt and modify their basic form, structure, purpose and 
responsibilities. Consequently, following this evidence the institutional assumption which identifies 
governance mechanisms as being adaptive is supported.  
6.3.7 Change innovations are driven by performance enhancement and legitimacy 
This institutional behavioural assumption is closely related to the agency behavioural assumption of 
section 6.2.7 which suggested that governance mechanisms evolve to better address agency 
concerns. This improvement through evolution was illustrated when addressing the agency 
assumption of section 6.2.7.  The evidence presented in section 6.2.7 partially supported the 
assumption as governance mechanisms were found to have the authority and capability of evolving 
to better address agency problems. However, this authority and capability may also be used to 
better adapt governance structures towards achieving business efficiency, conformity and political 
needs. This ability to evolve did not concede that evolutions are exclusively agency driven. As earlier 
explained governance mechanisms are found to entail the building and forming of trusted 
relationships with open communication systems as opposed to purely independent monitoring 
focused relationships. This suggests that governance mechanisms may be evolving in an effort to 
improve their productivity and legitimacy. Therefore, using this evidence, the institutional 
assumption that change innovations are driven by performance enhancement and legitimacy is 
similarly partially supported.  
6.3.8 Governance mechanisms are merely symbolic displays for conformity and 
legitimacy 
Gendro and Bedard’s (2006) findings suggest that the effectiveness of audit committees is 
dependent on symbolic processes and outcomes. Likewise, Collier and Zaman (2005) suggest that 
Akeel M. Lary 
224 
the adoption of governance models and mechanisms may be a symbolic concept used to signal the 
addressing of monitoring and control concerns. In contrast, Cohen et al. (2010) find that governance 
mechanisms are regarded as effective monitors as opposed to mere symbols of legitimacy based on 
external auditor experiences. Similarly, Spira (1998) finds that the audit committee will evolve into 
an effective monitoring body over time; the reason for its establishment affects the speed in which 
in becomes effective. However, the literature has also suggested that the governance characteristics 
of audit committees will critically impact their ability to effectively execute their duties (Abbott et al. 
2003b; Lary and Taylor 2012).  
This assumption seeks to identify whether governance mechanisms are symbolic displays for 
conformity and legitimacy. However, given its nature the evidence used will closely mirror the 
evidences used in sections 6.3.4, which sought to identify the existence of compliance pressure. 
Moreover, the evidence is also closely related to the agency assumption of section 6.2.6, which 
sought to identify whether governance mechanisms are monitors.  
6.3.8.1 Case One 
The evidence points to the Case One board taking a genuine monitoring role, although within the 
bounds of conformity with perceived best governance practice. There is little evidence that its 
endeavours to conformity with best practice are currently pursued as a symbolic display for 
legitimacy. The independent director and chair of audit committee of Case One emphasised in 
interview that the board is committed to ensuring that its constitutional powers and responsibilities 
are exercised and discharged, adopting best practice governance principles and applicable laws. The 
board, through its public disclosers, does signal its commitment to effective monitoring using best 
monitoring practices. While such public disclosures may be construed as symbolic displays aimed at 
maintaining legitimacy, the supporting evidence suggests the effective monitoring is their main 
priority. For example, to ensure effective monitoring each director has the right to access Case One 
information and Case One’s executive management, external advisors and auditors.  
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Moreover, as previously mentioned, the board will bi-annually with the assistance of the NC and an 
external advisor, review the performance, membership and charters of the board and its sub-
committees to determine their adequacy in the then current circumstances. This is to determine 
whether their processes are adequate to ensure they are able to carry out their functions in the 
most effective manner. This ensures that the board is composed of directors with an appropriate 
range and mix of qualifications, expertise, and experience. 
The board delegates the day-to-day management of Case One’s resources to the executive 
management team. Accordingly, a key function of the Board is to monitor the executive 
management team’s performance.  Further, the board has retained the ultimate responsibility for 
the strategic direction and control of Case One. This evidence further identifies that the board is 
acting as a monitor.  
Conflict between the board and executive management is found to occur regarding when issues 
should be disclosed rather than what or how. And in such situations the board is prepared to take a 
different view from executive management. Further, the board is also prepared to take a different 
view following a recommendation from its audit committee or other sub-committee. Directors are 
found to drawn upon their knowledge and experience in executing their judgement. 
As stated earlier, the board establishes sub-committees to streamline the discharge of its 
responsibilities and functions. Following a board responsibility delegation to one of its sub-
committees, the executive management team is required to deal with that sub-committee and not 
the board regarding the issues of that responsibility. The evidence shows that each standing sub-
committee is to adopt a formal charter which sets out matters regarding its composition, 
responsibilities, functions and administration.  
In terms of the audit committee, the evidence reveals that the audit committee seeks to construct a 
culture which allows the executive management team to raise issues early. This has enabled more 
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proactive monitoring by the audit committee. Further, the audit committee is found to meet more 
often than the minimum requirement of four times per year. The meeting frequency is dependent 
on the complexity of issues and the structure of both board and audit committee meetings. At the 
end of the meeting agenda the audit committee will commence a closed private session between 
the non-executive directors and the lead internal auditor and external audit partner. The closed 
private session is a formal process for the audit committee to eye-ball the auditors in the absence of 
the executive management team. The evidence shows that the audit committee is expected to meet 
with the external and internal auditors in the absence of executive management whenever it is 
deemed appropriate but not less than twice a year.  
The chair of the audit committee strongly refutes the suggestion that the work of the chair or that of 
the audit committee represents a symbolic display of conformity or legitimacy. The chair perceives 
the purpose of the role as facilitating the effectiveness of the work of the audit committee and 
acting as a bridge between audit committee and non-audit committee directors and the external 
auditor, internal auditor, and executive management. As this bridge the chair will meet with key 
presenters prior to audit committee meetings, to go through information papers, request addition 
papers, identify issues, raise questions, and make a judgement to facilitate information sessions. The 
audit committee chair is found to hold an informal coaching role in aiding executive management. 
Acting as a coach is not considered to threaten the chair’s independence but rather an opportunity 
to probe the rigour of management proposals. This suggests that the audit committee is monitoring 
through actively engaging governance actors. This active engagement is viewed as a signal of the 
audit committee’s commitment towards sound governance, not a symbolic display.  
In respect of the external auditor, the importance of ensuring a perception of independence from 
the executive management of their client, Case One, could be construed as a symbolic display of 
legitimacy. In conducting the external audit, the auditor uses Best Practice Templates which are 
developed by the audit firm. Further, the external auditor is prohibited from providing any non-audit 
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service which would create a perceived or real threat to their independence. Moreover, the external 
auditor is identified as having a formal relationship and front-line accountability to an audit 
committee. However, the external audit partner will also engage with executive management in a 
way that is not a display of perceived independence. The main purpose of the external audit is to 
form and provide an objective view on financial reports; and to provide feedback to the board and 
executive management team on financial reports. In fulfilling its purpose of providing an objective 
view on financial reports and feedback to the board, the external auditor takes the initiative to build 
a trusted relationship with executive management of Case One.  The argument of the external audit 
partner is that too much independence will lead to ineffective monitoring as the purpose of the 
external audit is to form and provide an objective view on the published financial reports, where 
that view is dependent on trusted communication.  
The evidence discussed provides little indication that governance mechanisms are merely symbolic 
displays for conformity and legitimacy. The evidence suggests that governance mechanisms are 
committed to sound governance practices through active monitoring. However, while the evidence 
implies that governance mechanisms are monitoring mechanisms, it also suggests that mechanisms 
can be monitoring mechanisms while simultaneously acting as signals for conformity and legitimacy. 
6.3.8.2 Local Government 
Similar to large corporate entities, city councils have governance guidelines to follow in relation to 
the formation and composition of audit committees, although the voluntary adoption of audit 
committees has applied in city councils. The composition for city council audit committees is 
modelled after best practice guidelines for local government which, in turn, have been modelled 
after private sector corporations.  
Since an audit committee of the Council is deemed to be established as an independent advisory 
committee, does it become a mere symbolic display of conformity and legitimacy? Its stated role is 
to provide an independent review of its municipality’s financial management and reporting systems. 
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But, as an advisory committee, the audit committee holds no executive powers or formal authority. 
However, in situations of material disputes, the audit committee may rely on the formal powers of 
the mayor and Council (dispute with city management) or the auditor general (dispute with Council). 
Nevertheless, its lack of authority is evident in the fact that Council retains the authority to appoint 
and remove audit committee members. Further, Council is under no formal obligation to act on 
audit committee advice; however it holds strong persuasiveness as ignoring such advice is viewed as 
negligent. 
Interestingly, the audit committee acts as an effective means of communication between the 
external auditor, internal auditor, city management and Council. The independent members hold a 
coaching role to both Council and city management, this coaching role involves providing advice 
based on previous corporate knowledge and experience. The interviewees contend that audit 
committees   work constructively with city management and Council. Generally, the audit committee 
is aiming to build a constructive relationship with city management rather than an overly 
independent relationship. The evidence identifies that the effective execution of audit committee 
responsibilities is dependent on building trusted relationships, open communication and 
cooperation with city management. This behaviour cannot be construed as a symbolic display of 
conformism by the audit committee.  
The primarily focus of the external audit program is to provide assurance that the annual financial 
reports are fairly presented. However, the external audit (who is the State government audit office 
or sub-contracted auditor by this government office) is viewed as being concerned with meeting the 
form of the audit, rather than providing real audit substance. To quote an interviewee: “it merely 
issues an assurance opinion as to whether firms are complying with accounting standards”. This is 
significantly different to Case One where the focus of external audit program is to provide an 
objective view and feedback by building trusted relationships. This is interesting because it suggests 
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that the external audit function for local governments is more akin to a symbolic display of 
conformity.  
In summary, the local government evidence suggests that governance mechanisms, especially the 
activities of the audit committee, are substantially committed to sound governance practices 
through active and constructive monitoring. However, there is other evidence that the external audit 
function is substantially concerned with providing a display of conformity and legitimacy.  
6.3.8.3 Assumption Conclusion 
According to the evidence presented in the case chapters and the discussed evidence the 
institutional assumption which identifies governance mechanisms as merely symbolic displays for 
conformity and legitimacy is largely rejected. While some evidence identifies that governance 
mechanisms can at times be symbolic displays of conformity and legitimacy, there is not enough 
support for the assumption that these mechanisms are merely symbolic displays for conformity and 
legitimacy. As explained earlier, the evidence identifies governance actors as fulfilling their 
monitoring roles and responsibilities, while simultaneously signalling the achievement and 
commitment to sound governance outcomes and processes through actively engaging with 
governance actors. Although both boards and Councils delegate some of their monitoring decision, 
control functions remain accountable to main stakeholders. In light of the evidence it is suggested 
that governance mechanisms are monitoring mechanisms while simultaneously acting as signals for 
conformity and legitimacy. 
6.3.9 Governance mechanisms use symbolic gestures to legitimise interactions 
Collier and Zaman (2005) suggested that governance mechanisms and practices may be a symbolic 
concept used to signal the addressing of monitoring and control concerns. This assumption seeks to 
address whether governance actors adopt symbolic practices to ensure their legitimacy to the wider 
corporate eco-system and within their contract system.   
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6.3.9.1 Case One 
As earlier stated, the board is responsible for the review and oversight of Case One administration, 
management and governance. The board is ultimately responsible for setting policies regarding the 
business and affairs of Case One, and monitoring the performance of the executive management 
team so as to ensure these policies are to the benefit of shareholders and stakeholders. Evidence 
was not apparent to indicate that the board used its independent directors or its sub-committees as 
symbolic gestures to legitimise its interactions.  
In terms of the audit committee as a governance mechanism, the use symbolic gestures to legitimise 
its interactions is not evident. As previously explained, the behaviours of the audit committee 
include: (a) being proactive in monitoring emerging issues by constructing a culture which allows the 
executive management team to raise issues early;  (b) conducting a closed private session between 
the non-executive directors and the lead internal auditor and external audit partner; (c) using the 
audit committee’s chair as a bridge between the audit committee and non-audit committee 
directors and the external auditor, internal auditor, and executive management.  
Similarly, the external auditor, as a governance mechanism, does not appear to use symbolic 
gestures to legitimise its interactions.  It has been found that the external audit partner seeks to 
build a trusted relationship with executive management in order to achieve trust in communications 
that can be effective in forming an objective view on the published financial reports. This nurturing 
of trusted communications is pursued by the external auditor subject to the fundamental caveat that 
the external auditor team’s professional integrity and reputation is upheld.  
The evidence discussed suggests that governance actors in Case One are more concerned with 
building trusted relationships to ensure effective monitoring than maintaining symbolic gestures to 
legitimatise their interactions. 
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6.3.8.2 Local Government 
The audit committee is formed as a mechanism to assist Council by providing an independent review 
of its municipality’s financial management and reporting systems. As an advisory committee Council 
is under no formal obligation to act on audit committee advice, although the advice of the audit 
committee is found to hold strong persuasiveness. In practice, the audit committee is found to act as 
an effective means of communication between the external auditor, internal auditor, city 
management and Council. This is especially evident in the advice provided by the independent 
members of the audit committee who are appointed for their professional expertise and external 
experience. The evidence identifies that the effective execution of audit committee responsibilities is 
dependent on building trusted relationships, open communication and cooperation with city 
management.   In summary, the audit committee in local government is found to be engaged in 
building trusted relationships and effective monitoring among governance actors, rather than being 
engaged in symbolic gestures to legitimatise the interactions among governance actors. 
6.3.9.3 Assumption Conclusion 
Based on the evidence the institutional assumption which suggests that governance mechanisms use 
symbolic gestures to legitimise interactions is largely rejected. While the evidence suggests that 
governance actors are more concerned with ensuring effective monitoring through building and 
maintaining trusted relationships.  
6.3.10 Overall Institutional Conclusion 
The conclusion drawn is that some traces of institutional assumptions will underpin the governance 
model. In Chapter 2, the proposed expanded governance model suggested that the governance 
phenomena may be explained by singularly adopting an institutional framework. However such an 
adoption would fail to sufficiently address the governance phenomena. The institutional framework 
is found to be relatively weak in explaining the shaping of the audit committee and external audit 
function as governance mechanisms, as well as the behaviours of actors within those mechanisms. 
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The institutional assumptions may be better suited for addressing a broader range of aspects of the 
governance model where the net is cast to include the legal, social, political and strategic factors. 
6.4 THE REVISED EXPANDED GOVERNANCE MODEL AND ITS ASSUMPTIONS  
Following the evidence it is contended that corporate governance phenomenon can be more 
holistically depicted adopting a mixed theoretical framework consisting of both agency theory and 
institutional theory. As such, Figure 6.1 presents two related aspects of the revised model: the 
graphical depiction of the model itself and the set of assumptions underpinning the model.  
First, in terms of graphical depiction, the previously proposed expanded governance model depicted 
in Figure 2.3 is revised to more pluralistically depict governance phenomena in Figure 6.1. This 
revised model in Figure 6.1 has been designed after reflecting on the evidence presented in Chapters 
4 and 5.  
Figure 6.1: The Revised Expanded Governance Model 
 
The Revised Assumptions of the Expanded Governance Model 
1. The contract nexus operates and interacts within a superordinate social system; 
2. Both mechanisms and actors of the contract nexus are external yet simultaneously internal 
to the contract nexus; 
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3. The contract nexus is closed yet simultaneously open to the pressures of the superordinate 
social system and consequently, there exists some form of peer pressure and institutional 
compliance pressures; 
4. There exists some institutional homogeneity; 
5. Legitimacy is a resource; 
6. Actors of the contract nexus are self-interested; 
7. There exists a separation between decision control and decision management; 
8. The decision controller is to delegate decision management and some decision control 
functions to internal (or external) agents; 
9. Actor interactions are bureaucratic yet simultaneously dynamic and interdependent; 
10. Governance mechanisms act as monitors and signalling mechanisms for legitimacy;  
11. Governance mechanisms are adaptive; and 
12. Governance mechanism innovations are driven by agency conflicts, social legitimacy and 
performance enhancement. 
 
The model in Figure 6.1 renames the external institutional environment as the superordinate social 
system. This is because the literature identifies firms (or Councils) to exist within a superordinate 
social system (Dillard et al. 2004; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Oliver 1997; Scott 1987; Zucker 1987). 
The model further renames the internal institutional environment to become the contract nexus. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) identify a firm (or Council) as a contract nexus. 
Further, the revised model in Figure 6.1 narrows the contact nexus, in order to better depict the 
scope of the contract nexus reflected by the evidence gathered in this study. This narrowing 
identifies that governance mechanisms and their actors are internal yet simultaneously external to 
the contract nexus. In this sense, all of the circles drawn as internal to the contract nexus in Figure 
6.1 are also depicted as interfacing into the superordinate social system. In relation to ‘decision 
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control’, this model depicts in a telescoped circle the composition of the institutional group 
encapsulated by the agency theory notion of decision control. This institutional group centres on the 
board and its sub-committees. The players in this institutional group can comprise non-executive 
directors who are both internal and external agents. In relation to the executive management team, 
they represent players in the institutional group encapsulated by agency theory notion of ‘decision 
management’. They will be linked to the superordinate social system through their professional 
affiliations and dealings with industry competitors and regulators. Likewise, the external auditor, the 
outsourced-internal auditor and the company secretary are also depicted as being internal to the 
contract nexus, but also part of the superordinate social system. Each has strong ethical and 
professional affiliations with their respective professional and regulatory bodies. For example, the 
company secretary is found to be a key tool of communication between internal contract players 
(i.e., directors, executives and auditors) and external corporate governance regulators. Further, the 
outsourced internal auditor, like the external auditor, enters an internal contract with the board and 
performs services for management, but is an entity external to the firm. Consequently, each of the 
types of internal and external agents depicted in Figure 6.1 is positioned to generate both internal 
and external isomorphic pressure on the organisation’s governance system.  
Furthermore, this narrowing of the scope of the contract nexus better depicts the notion of agency 
separation. Thus, internal to the contract nexus, ownership (the principal) is shown in Figure 6.1 as 
not fully separated from the players (the agents) responsible for decision control or decision 
management. Importantly, it also shows an overlap between decision control and decision 
management. This overlap is found in this study in the constructive interactions between audit 
committee (especially the chair) and executive management (especially the CFO). On the other 
hand, the external auditor, the outsourced-internal auditor and the company secretary are found to 
have more independence from players in the organisation’s decision control and decision 
management.  
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While the model only indicatively identifies the external mechanisms of the superordinate social 
system, it may be revised to specifically capture some phenomenon of interest to other researchers. 
Taking the group, ‘regulators’, as a single institution, such a grouping may be split into separate 
institutions (e.g., firm regulators, audit regulators, director regulators). Similarly, the broad 
competitors’ institution may be split into distinct institutions (e.g., hostile competitors, colluding 
competitors). Also the model may be expanded to include other types of institutions or stakeholders 
(e.g., customers, suppliers, lenders) who could exert isomorphic pressure on the governance system. 
In summary, Figure 6.1, which is the expanded model that has been revised in light of the evidence, 
is believed to better reflect the integrating and influencing nature of the key components of a 
corporate governance system. This revised expanded model may be regarded as a theoretical 
Frankenstein as it borrows elements from both agency theory and institutional theory to help 
explain the corporate governance phenomena.  
The second part of Figure 6.1 depicts the set of assumptions underpinning the graphical model. 
These assumptions have been amalgamated from the conclusions arising in discussion of the 
evidence in relation to the separate sets of agency and institutional theory assumptions given in this 
chapter.   
In the list of 12 assumptions put forward in Figure 6.1, the following categorisations are noted: 
 Three agency theory assumptions are retained unchanged. There are assumptions 6, 7 and 
8. However, assumption 8 is slightly qualified to indicate that the decision controller 
delegates to decision managers who are contracted as internal agents within the contract 
nexus, but can be external to the firm (i.e., the external auditor and outsourced-internal 
auditor). 
 Three legitimacy assumptions are retained unchanged. These are assumptions 5, 11 and 12. 
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 Three assumptions are slightly refocused. Assumptions 1 and 3 are changed by replacing the 
word ‘firm’ or ‘organisation’ with the words ‘contract nexus’. This better reflects the 
positioning of governance mechanisms and actors as part of the contract nexus which 
operates and interacts within, and can be influenced by, the superordinate social system. 
Assumption 2 is changed in a similar way. The words ‘external auditor’ and  ‘client’ (in 
reference to the client firm of the external auditor) are replaced with the words 
‘mechanisms and actors’ and ‘contract nexus’ to reflect a broader-base for this agency 
assumption.  
 Three assumptions are created as hybrids of agency and institutional theories. These are 
assumptions 9, 10 and 12. First, assumption 9 becomes a hybrid of actor interactions and 
processes which have been identified as having both ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘dynamic and 
interdependent’ features.  Second, assumption 10 becomes a hybrid of governance 
mechanisms which have been identified as serving the purposes of both strong monitoring 
mechanisms and potent signals of legitimacy. Third, assumption 12 becomes a hybrid of 
innovative change and evolution of governance mechanisms that has been identified as 
both a response to an agency conflict problem and an isomorphic development driven by 
legitimacy considerations. 
6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the findings of the illustrative-narrative analysis based on theory-driven 
selective coding of the narrative-network analysis as presented in chapters 4 and 5. The chapter 
examined the agency assumptions and suggested that while an agency theoretical framework may 
explain the governance phenomena, it fails to holistically address the governance phenomena. The 
agency framework is found to be useful in addressing the purpose and function of the governance 
mechanisms. Further, the behaviours of governance actors within governance mechanisms are more 
pluralistically captured by adopting a broader perspective on the ‘self-interest’ core of agency 
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theory. The chapter then proceeded to examine institutional theory’s assumptions. It was similarly 
suggested that while the governance phenomena could be solely explained by adopting an 
institutional theory perspective, this perspective also fails to holistically address the governance 
phenomena.  
In light of the findings it is concluded that adopting a selection of both agency theory and 
institutional theory assumptions can more holistically explain the corporate governance 
phenomenon. As such, the expanded governance model presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis was 
revised. Further, as the model was revised to incorporate aspects of both agency theory and 
institutional theory perspectives, the original assumptions from these theories were also revised to 
better integrate the two theoretical assumptions into a single theoretical Frankenstein – i.e., 
creating a new living entity. This theoretical Frankenstein presents the revised expanded governance 
model which, it is contended, more holistically captures and explains the corporate governance 
phenomena. 
  
“I had worked hard for nearly two years, for the sole purpose of infusing life into an 
inanimate body … I had desired it with an ardour that far exceeded moderation; but 
now that I had finished …” (Shelley 1818, p. 45). 
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“The astonishment which I had at first experienced on this discovery soon gave place 
to delight and rapture. After so much time spent in painful labour, to arrive at once 
the summit of my desires, was the most gratifying consummation of my toils. But this 
discovery was so great and overwhelming, that all the steps by which I had been 
progressively led to it were obliterated, and I beheld only the result” (Shelley 1818, p. 
41). 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by providing an overview for the thesis and presents the main findings and 
conclusions. It then revisits the research objectives and questions. It continues by addressing the 
limitations of this thesis. A discussion of the implications of the findings is then provided. The thesis 
finishes with suggestions for future research.  
7.2 RESEARCH SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The central proposition of this thesis is that agency theory is an empirically valid perspective to apply 
to corporate governance phenomena only when it is coupled with another grand-theory’s 
perspective that is founded on different, yet complementary, underlying behavioural assumptions. 
The conceptual thinking underlying corporate governance regulations and best practice guidelines 
has been dominated by the agency theory perspective alone. This limits the understanding of 
interactions between governance actors and mechanisms within a wider corporate eco-system. 
Corporate governance is defined as a process set which forms part of the principal’s assurance 
process where corporate ownership is separated from control.  It is claimed that good corporate 
governance practices serve to enhance the credibility of financial reports, safeguard against earnings 
manipulation, and ensure a fair return for investors (Bhagat et al. 2010, Dechow et al. 1996). This 
assurance process is important for firms as they are dependent on external economic resources to 
expand and grow (Davis et al. 1997). Reforms to governance models and mechanisms have largely 
been driven by corporate collapses and financial scandals, while being motivated by investor desire 
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for increased transparency, accountability and market confidence (Collier and Zaman 2005; Mallin 
2010a). Consequently, as stated earlier, the agency paradigm has dominated the rationalisation and 
policy outcomes of corporate governance (Anderson et al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2008). However, the 
agency-theory-driven governance research has revealed inconsistent findings; therefore some 
researchers have subsequently addressed corporate governance through alternative theoretical 
paradigms (Cohen et al. 2008; Mallin 2010a; Todd 2010). These researchers have suggested that 
adopting a pluralistic theoretical framework to better address the corporate governance 
phenomenon (Cohen et al. 2008; Young and Thyil 2008).  
Accordingly, this thesis has sought to examine the interactions of corporate governance mechanisms 
and actors as part of a holistic corporate eco-system. To this end, both agency theory and 
institutional theory are invoked in order to develop a more comprehensive conceptual 
understanding of corporate governance phenomena. The notion of agency separation is identified as 
the driving force behind the governance phenomena. However, its form, integration and evolution 
into a firm as a set of institutions is determined by both agency contracts and their larger social 
system. This set of institutions is more likely to be driven by the notion of legitimacy. 
To examine these interactions, this thesis has used a qualitative research methodology in order to 
provide an enhanced means of exploring and understanding the interactions of governance 
structures within a corporate eco-system. The interpretivist ontological philosophical assumption is 
adopted, to embrace the notion of multiple realities. The post-positivism, constructivism and 
pragmatism inquiry paradigms were adopted to address the research problem. As such, the 
governance phenomenon is assumed to be bounded by causality and shaped by prior events and 
theories, yet it simultaneously remains evolutionary.  
The case study research strategy was adopted, as it enables an in-depth holistic focus on the 
governance relationships and interactions within a particular firm by exploring its corporate eco-
system. The ‘key case’ method was adopted for the sampling frame, based on an exemplar case that 
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can demonstrate high compliance with governance guidelines. The type of case study approach 
taken in this thesis entails a combination of instrumental, explanatory and exploratory purposes. 
Further, the ‘key case’ from the private sector is supplemented with a nested case unit from the 
public sector. This lends greater completeness to the findings from qualitative analysis that seeks 
evidence within governance phenomena on the presence or otherwise of behavioural assumptions 
underlying the agency and institutional perspectives.  
The evidence obtained for the main case unit is sourced from semi-structured taped interviews 
conducted with the company secretary, audit committee chair and external audit partner. 
Additionally, data is collected from multiple documents available online. The evidence for the 
complementary case unit is similarly collected from semi-structured taped interviews conducted 
with two local government audit committee chairs. In coding and analysing the data the thesis 
adopts a three stage coding scheme and a two-step analysis approach. 
The first step is the narrative-network data analysis which is broken into two sections; the corporate 
case (i.e., Case One) and the local government case. The Case One findings show that actor and 
mechanism processes and interactions within the superordinate social system are bureaucratic. 
However actor and mechanism processes and interactions within the contract nexus are both 
bureaucratic and interdependent. Further, actors appear to have a strong sense of professional 
integrity and reputation. The establishment of governance processes, it is suggested, are the result 
of the need for active monitoring and compliance. Overall the findings suggest Case One has in place 
a comprehensively documented and professionally managed governance system. 
The local government case findings show that actor and mechanism processes and interactions 
within the contract nexus are both are similarly bureaucratic and interdependent. Further, the 
findings suggest that actors also have a strong sense of professional integrity and reputation. The 
findings in local government suggest that governance possesses high compliance emphasis. These 
processes in local government are more exclusively concerned with monitoring, compared to the 
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listed company’s emphasis on monitoring and company performance, especially efficiency. 
Interestingly, the external audit for local governments is viewed as a compliance symbol rather than 
providing real audit substance.   
The second step is the illustrative-narrative data analysis which involves an assessment of each of 
the sets of assumptions underlying agency theory and institutional theory in turn. The findings 
regarding agency assumptions of the study are summarised as follows: 
Governance actors are self-interested 
o The assumption is supported. The evidence suggests that actor behaviour is that of 
self-preservation; i.e., maintenance of their integrity, reputation and minimisation of 
personal liability.  
Governance actors are solely economic utility maximisers 
o The assumption is not supported. No evidence is found to suggest that actor 
behaviour is purely based on economic self-interest. 
The firm (or city council) is a nexus of contracts, i.e. a series of contractual relationships  
o The assumption is supported. The evidence identifies many formal and informal 
contractual relationships between governance actors and mechanisms. 
There exists a separation between decision control and decision management 
o The assumption is supported. The evidence identifies that there is a separation 
between the ratification and monitoring functions, and initiation and 
implementation functions. 
The board is the decision controller, and it then delegates the decision management and some 
decision control functions to internal agents 
o The assumption is supported. The evidence suggests that the board and Council 
delegate the day-to-day management of resources to management. However, the 
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board delegates some its decision control functions to internal agents, while Council 
delegates to both internal and external agents. 
Governance mechanisms act as monitors  
o The assumption is only partially supported. The evidence identifies governance 
mechanisms (particularly the audit committee) as actively monitoring and 
simultaneously signalling their achievement and commitment towards sound 
governance. 
Governance mechanisms evolve to better address agency problems 
o The assumption is only partially supported. The evidence suggests that governance 
mechanisms are evolving to address both agency and legitimacy problems. 
The external audit function is external (independent) yet simultaneously internal to the client 
o The assumption is supported. Particularly for Case One as the evidence finds that 
the external auditor seeks to build trusted relationships with governance actors 
rather than an overly independent relationship. However, with city councils the 
external audit appears to be more external and independent. 
Actor interactions and processes are bureaucratic 
o The assumption is only partially supported. The evidence identifies that actor 
interactions and processes are bureaucratic yet at times dynamic and 
interdependent.   
The findings regarding the institutional assumptions of the study are as follows: 
Legitimacy is a resource 
o The assumption is supported. The evidence identifies legitimacy as a resource.  
Actors interact in a dynamic and interdependent way 
o The assumption is partially supported. As stated earlier the evidence identifies that 
actor interactions and processes are dynamic and interdependent yet at times 
bureaucratic.   
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Firms (or city councils) operate and interact within a superordinate social system  
o The assumption is supported. The evidence reveals that Case One and city councils 
intentionally, and unavoidably, operate within a superordinate social system.  
Firms (or city councils) are closed yet simultaneously open to the pressures of the superordinate 
social system and consequently, there exists some form of peer or institutional compliance pressures. 
o The assumption is supported. The evidence shows that there exists some form of 
institutional compliance pressure. 
There exists some institutional homogeneity 
o The assumption is supported. Governance mechanisms are found to following a 
similar pattern in terms of their basic form, structure, roles and responsibilities. 
Governance mechanisms are adaptive 
o The assumption is supported. The evidence identifies that governance mechanisms 
are adaptive. 
Change innovations are driven by performance enhancement and legitimacy 
o The assumption is partially supported. The evidence suggests that innovations are 
aimed at achieving improve performance and legitimacy. 
Governance mechanisms are merely symbolic displays for conformity and legitimacy  
o The assumption is rejected. No evidence is found to suggest that governance 
mechanisms are solely symbolic displays of conformity and legitimacy. 
Governance mechanisms use symbolic gestures to legitimise interactions 
o The assumption is largely rejected. Governance actors are found to be more 
concerned with ensuring adequate monitoring through building trusted 
relationships. 
Following the main theoretical findings, the conclusions drawn from the study are as follows: 
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 To attain a more empirically valid perspective on the practices of corporate governance 
actors and mechanisms, the assumptions underlying and informing the agency theory 
perspective need to be coupled with those underlying and informing the institutional theory 
perspective.  
 The complementary nature of these two theoretical perspectives is highlighted in 
interpretations from findings. The interpretations are that agency theory primarily explains 
the formally espoused policies and procedures concerning the purposes, functions and roles 
of corporate governance actors and mechanisms. On the other hand, institutional theory 
primarily explains the homogeneity of governance structures and interfaces between 
internal mechanisms as well as their evolving and converging nature through behavioural 
relationships between governance actors. 
Further, as a final part to the findings, the expanded governance model as presented in chapter 2 
was revised, in light of the main conclusions drawn from the qualitative findings. The revised 
expanded governance model could be regarded as a theoretical Frankenstein. Shelley’s Frankenstein 
is the story of the piecing together of the vital elements of a human body to bring it to life. This 
thesis has sought to integrate the empirically-supported assumptions of agency theory and 
institutional theory in order to more realistically perceive and explain corporate governance 
phenomena.  
7.3 ADDRESSING RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
This section summarises the research findings in response to the research objectives and questions, 
as stated in Chapter 1.   
Objective 1: Identify a firm’s internal and external actors who function within the 
formal governance structures and the corporate eco-system 
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Following the reviewed literature presented in Chapter 2, seven broad governance mechanisms 
were identified. First, decision management, decision control, ownership, and internal audit where 
the mechanisms considered operating within the contract nexus. Second, regulators and other 
institutions (including competitors) where considered to operate external to the contract nexus and, 
therefore, they operated within the superordinate social system. Third, the external audit was 
regarded as operating both internally and externally to the contract nexus. In terms of the 
mechanism of decision control, the board was considered to be the decision controller and the audit 
committee and other committees were considered to exist as distinct institutions within the 
mechanism of decision control.  
In keeping within the scope of the thesis, five key governance actors were identified as revealed by 
the literature: the CFO from the institution of decision management; the board chair and audit 
committee chair within the institution of decision control; the external audit partner from the 
external audit institution; and the internal audit partner from the internal audit institution. As such 
these governance actors were targeted at the interview stage. The company secretary was also 
sought to initially gain access, however the interview with the company secretary determined that 
he was another key governance actor.   
Consequently, in light of the evidence the seven broad governance actors and mechanisms were 
expanded into eight. The first six became the company secretary, decision management, decision 
control, ownership, external audit, and internal audit, who were now considered to operate both 
internal and external to the contract nexus. The last two were the regulators and other institutions 
such as competitors who were still considered to operate external to the contract nexus. 
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Objective 2: Examine the impact of these actors on the shaping of outcomes within 
the corporate eco-system 
In examining the impact of these actors interviews were conducted. However, due to unavailability 
of all required participants for interviewing, additional documents were sought which provided 
further insights into the way in which governance actors shape the outcomes of the contract nexus 
and the superordinate social system. These findings were presented in Chapter 4 for the company 
case and Chapter 5 for the local government case.    
Objective 3: Develop an integrated model of internal and external mechanisms 
which co-exist within a corporate eco-system 
A model was developed based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. This integrated model shown 
in Figure 2.3 is the expanded governance model which borrowed elements from agency theory and 
institutional theory. This expanded model developed in Chapter 2 could be explained by adopting an 
agency framework, institutional framework or both. Following the interpretive analysis undertaken 
in Chapter 6, the expanded governance model was revised to integrate the interpretations from the 
findings about assumptions into the model. The revised expanded governance model was given in 
Figure 6.1. It is again presented, including the list of its revised empirically-supported underlying 
assumptions, in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: The Revised Expanded Governance Model 
 
The Revised Assumptions of the Expanded Governance Model 
1. The contract nexus operates and interacts within a superordinate social system; 
2. Both mechanisms and actors of the contract nexus are external yet simultaneously internal 
to the contract nexus; 
3. The contract nexus is closed yet simultaneously open to the pressures of the superordinate 
social system and consequently, there exists some form of peer pressure and institutional 
compliance pressures; 
4. There exists some institutional homogeneity; 
5. Legitimacy is a resource; 
6. Actors of the contract nexus are self-interested; 
7. There exists a separation between decision control and decision management; 
8. The decision controller is to delegate decision management and some decision control 
functions to internal (or external) agents; 
9. Actor interactions are bureaucratic yet simultaneously dynamic and interdependent; 
10. Governance mechanisms act as monitors and signalling mechanisms for legitimacy; 
11. Governance mechanisms are adaptive; and 
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12. Governance mechanism innovations are driven by agency conflicts, social legitimacy and 
performance enhancement. 
 
RQ1: To what extent do governance mechanisms and actors interact as part of a 
holistic corporate eco-system? 
Oliver (1997, p.699) notes that “firms operate within a social framework of norms, values, and 
taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic 
behaviour”. Therefore, the literature identifies firms as existing and operating within a 
superordinate social system, i.e., a holistic corporate eco-system (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Within 
such a holistic system, continued growth is dependent on the legitimate utilisation of resources 
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Mallin 2010a). 
The evidence discussed in Chapter 6, determines that governance actors and mechanisms interact as 
part of a superordinate social system. The evidence reveals that both Case One and city councils are 
concerned with maintaining their legitimacy within the superordinate social system where they 
operate. Further, findings suggest that governance actors are concerned with maintaining their 
legitimacy with the other actors within the contract nexus and the superordinate social system. As 
such, the findings identify governance actors and mechanisms as interacting within superordinate 
social system on three levels: as a single entity or contract nexus; as a governance mechanism; and 
as an individual governance actor. 
RQ2: Does agency or institutional theory more pluralistically define the governance 
phenomena? 
Following the discussion of the evidence in Chapter 6, a combination of agency theory and 
institutional theory perspectives is required to more realistically understand governance practices. 
This is consistent with the literature which suggests that combining agency theory with institutional 
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theory may better explain governance phenomena (Beattie et al. 2011; Cohen et al. 2008; 2010 
Kalbers and Fogarty 1998; Turley and Zaman 2007). As such, this thesis contributes a more holistic, 
framework for perceiving governance phenomena based on a combination of empirically-supported 
underlying assumptions. It is labelled the Frankenstein framework because it seeks to integrate 
elements from different paradigms (i.e., agency and institutional perspectives) to create a more 
‘alive’ system.  
7.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This study has relied on the case study method. The features of case study research that provide the 
rationale for its selection, also present certain limitations in it usage. Case study research can 
describe phenomena in richer detail than other methods because it is situated and embedded in 
local contexts and it can provide an understanding and description of people’s personal experiences 
with that phenomenon (Denscombe 2007; Thomas 2011). However, the stages of both designing the 
case study research and collecting and interpreting case data will be influenced by the researcher’s 
personal biases (Thomas 2011). Further, the case study researcher is to determine the degree of 
description, analysis, and summary material for the report (Stake 2005). As explained by Stake 
(2005), the researcher must make a lot of personal judgements. These include  
"a. How much to make the report a story … b. How much to compare with other cases 
… c. How much to formalize generalizations or leave such generalizing to readers … 
[and] d. How much description of the researcher to include in the report” (Stake 2005, 
p. 460).  
An overriding issue faced in case study research is that denial of access to some of the key players 
and documents by the host case organisation can result in the data collection being insufficiently 
exhaustive. Whether the interviews and document analysis undertaken in this study has been 
sufficiently exhaustive to establish support or reject for each one of the pre-specified theoretical 
assumptions is a matter of subjective judgement. This judgement is typically based on whether 
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qualitative data analysis eventually reaches a point of saturation when there is deemed to be 
diminishing returns and little need for more sampling (Mason 2010; O’Reilly and Parker 2012). This is 
the point where new data and their sorting only confirm the categories, themes, and conclusions 
already reached (O’Reilly and Parker 2012). This point of saturation, according to Strauss and Corbin 
(cited in Mason 2010) is a matter of degree. The limitation remains, however, that the case study 
researcher must make a subjective judgement about the sufficiency of saturation in the data 
collection.  
At a broader level, limitations of the case study method are commonly associated with issues of 
reliability, validity, and generalisability. Hamel et al. (1993, p. 23) observe, that  
"… the case study [approach] has basically been faulted for its lack of 
representativeness ... and its lack of rigor in the collection, construction, and analysis 
of the empirical materials that give rise to the case study. This lack of rigor is linked to 
the problem of bias ... introduced by the subjectivity of the researcher and others 
involved in the case”. 
Nevertheless, supporters of qualitative case study research claim that this argument misses the 
point of doing this type of research. For example, Myers (2000) argues that compared to deductive 
quantitative research design the strength of a qualitative case study is that it accounts for and 
includes differences in ideologically, epistemologically and humanity. The Case study design does not 
attempt to eliminate what cannot be counted nor does it attempt to simplify what cannot be 
simplified (Myers 2000).  
However, the generalisability of findings from this study must be acknowledged as an important 
limitiation. The study relies on evidence which is situated in a local context. It is based on the 
knowledge, experiences and qualifications of interviewees concerning a specific corporate entity and 
Victorian local governments. Hence, this evidence is largely non-generalisable to a wider population 
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of private and public sector organisations. However, while the study cannot be generalised to wider 
settings, its findings do have ‘naturalistic generalisability’ to theory (Mysers 2000). In this study, the 
proposed expanded governance model in which key assumptions underlying agency and institutional 
theories are combined, has been tested through this case study approach. This type of testing can 
provide results that are in conceptual accord with the reader's professional experience and 
subsequently provide a natural basis for generalisation (Mysers; Stake 2005).  
In addition to concerns about generalisability, qualitative methodology is rebuked because studies 
are often difficult to replicate. Future researchers may not have access to the same participants or 
subjects, and if other participants are used, results may differ. Participants may openly communicate 
with one researcher and remain distant with others. The aim, therefore, is on producing research 
that can inform and enhance reader's understandings. 
The researcher can use the primarily qualitative method of grounded theory to inductively generate 
a tentative but explanatory theory about a phenomenon. In this study, a grounded theory approach 
has not been adhered to. Rather a deductive logic is first employed to generate a list of assumptions 
underlying agency and institutional theories. These pre-specified assumptions become the set of 
propositions to be assessed. The study then moves to inductive logic in qualitatively analysing the 
case-based data so as to assess the veracity and integration of the assumptions. 
The study is also limited by its scope of selection amongst recognised theories. Other theoretical 
perspectives, such as stakeholder theory (that could include the specific impacts of a wider range of 
stakeholders) and actor network theory (that could perceive the more dynamic nature of 
relationships between actors) have not been addressed. Other research methods, such as a 
structured questionnaire to a wide sample of firms and public sector entities, could have 
corroborated some of the evidence from the case-study approach.  
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The study is limited in terms of the number of interview participants in both case studies (i.e., 
private vs. public sector governance). This is a significant limitation, especially as the type of 
interviewees are not consistent across the cases; hence comparability and validity is severely limited 
in the public sector especially as there is no additional interviewees to help confirm the statements 
made by the two audit committee chairs. Further, the case studies relate to the interpretation of 
issues relating to governance. Both case studies operate under different sets of rules (i.e., private vs. 
public sector governance). These differences could have an impact on the way audit committee 
chairs in both of these sectors respond to issues of governance. 
7.5 IMPLICATIONS 
The study provides a fresh perspective on traditional agency theory’s use in ‘mainstream’ corporate 
governance research. By diverging from traditional economic self-interest to a broader self-interest 
(i.e., economic, social or political), it seeks to more closely resemble the reality of governance 
relationships and actor behaviours.  This can provide new understanding and insight to the reader 
with a professional interest in the workings of audit committees. The reader will need to adopt a 
partially intuitive process in order to recognise the similarities of objects and issues in and out of the 
context of this study. 
The expanded governance model proposed in this study, and the argument and evidence given to 
support this expanded model, have implications for corporate and public sector regulators external 
to the organisation, and the independent directors internal to the organisation. The 
conceptualisation and empirical findings in this study suggest that these regulators and directors 
should re-think any myopic agency theory perspective. They should diverge from developing solely 
agency-based policies for governance mechanisms. For example, this study’s findings suggest that 
governance actors should not be pre-conceived as solely economic utility maximisers or that 
governance mechanisms act purely as monitors. Further, the implication for the relevant regulators 
and directors is that they need to design mechanisms that are structured to accommodate multi-
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layers of homogeneous institutional groups. Also regulations and policies should be oriented to 
achieving the desired effect on the legitimacy standards of the superordinate social system within 
which institutional groups interact under the expanded governance model. 
In terms of theory development, this study contributes to the call for a more pluralistic theoretical 
approach to understand the complexities of corporate governance practices as open systems 
(Roberts et al. 2005). The expanded corporate governance model and the evidence that this model is 
underpinned by the presence of a combination of assumptions drawn from both agency theory and 
institutional theory, points to the need for corporate governance researchers to increasingly adopt 
pluralistic theoretic perspectives if they seek to investigate any forms of governance systems.   
7.6 DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH   
As stated earlier the qualitative case study methodology has been criticised because studies are 
often difficult to replicate (Stake 2005). In replicating this study, future researchers may not have 
access to the same participants, and if other participants are used, results may differ. The aim, then, 
is for further case studies on the corporate governance model presented in this study to produce 
research that can further inform and enhance reader's understandings using different contexts. 
These contexts for further case study research could involve a listed company that has weak 
governance mechanisms, particularly an ineffective audit committee, as benchmarked against ASX 
guidelines. Or it could involve local government(s) from different State jurisdictions. Additionally, 
future case study research could embrace more ethnographic types of methods. That is, not only 
one-to-one interviews, but also focus groups and unobtrusive observations of practices could be 
applied. 
Alternatively, the theoretical framework developed in this study can be tested by a deductive 
hypothesis-driven quantitative approach. The method of gathering data about the concepts 
considered in this study could be extended to the quantification of those concepts as variables 
through a structured questionnaire. That is, this study provides a framework for a future survey of a 
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sample of key corporate governance actors (particularly Audit Committee Chairs, Internal Audit 
Executives and External Auditors) that would seek to measure the extent to which certain agency 
and institutional theory assumptions explain different corporate governance structures and modes 
of behaviour. 
 
“Nothing is so painful to the human mind as a great and sudden change” (Shelley 
1818, p. 178) 
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The table below sets out the array of documents analysed under each case and the theme(s) 
derived, in whole or part, from content in the related document.  
Table A5: Array of Documents Analysed Under Each Case Theme  
Broad Theme Sources of Evidence  
The board/ Council (e.g., role, responsibilities, 
composition and processes) 
Case One: 
Audit committee chair transcript 
Company secretary transcript 
2011 annual report 
Board charter 
Local Government: 
CouncilA and CouncilC audit committee chair transcript 
CouncilB and CouncilD audit committee chair transcript 
CouncilA, annual report 2011-2012 
CouncilB, annual report 2011-12 
CouncilC, annual report 2011-12  
Department of Planning and Community Development, 
how councils work 
Department of Planning and Community Development, 
how councils operate 
Department of Planning and Community Development, 
council administration and staff 
Department of Planning and Community Development, 
council meetings 
Audit committee (e.g., role, responsibilities, 
composition, meetings, reporting, processes and 
governance policies) 
Case One: 
Audit committee chair transcript 
Company secretary transcript 
External audit partner transcript 
2011 annual report 
Audit committee charter 
Audit committee meeting agenda’s  
Audit committee policy on non-audit services and 
auditor rotation 
Risk oversight and management policy  
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Local Government: 
CouncilA and CouncilC audit committee chair transcript 
CouncilB and CouncilD audit committee chair transcript 
CouncilA, annual report 2011-2012 
CouncilB, annual report 2011-12 
CouncilC, annual report 2011-12  
CouncilA, audit committee charter 
CouncilB, audit committee charter 
CouncilC, draft audit committee charter 
CouncilD, audit committee charter  
CouncilA, Audit Committee Work Plan 
CouncilA, Draft Audit Committee Work Plan 
CouncilC, Audit Committee Agenda Plan  
CouncilB, Information Package: appointment of an 
independent audit committee member 
Nomination committee (e.g., role, responsibilities, 
composition and functions) 
 
Case One: 
2011 annual report 
Nomination committee charter 
Local Government: 
Beyond research scope 
Remuneration committee (e.g., role, responsibilities, 
composition and functions) 
 
Case One: 
2011 annual report 
Remuneration committee charter  
Local Government: 
Beyond research scope 
Internal audit (e.g., purpose, function and scope) Case One: 
Audit committee chair transcript 
Company secretary transcript 
External audit partner transcript 
2011 annual report  
Audit committee charter 
Local Government: 
CouncilA and CouncilC audit committee chair transcript 
CouncilB and CouncilD audit committee chair transcript 
CouncilA, annual report 2011-2012 
CouncilB, annual report 2011-12 
CouncilC, annual report 2011-12  
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CouncilA, audit committee charter 
CouncilB, audit committee charter 
CouncilC, draft audit committee charter 
CouncilD, audit committee charter  
External audit (e.g., purpose, function, fee and 
scope) 
Case One: 
Audit committee chair transcript 
Company secretary transcript 
External audit partner transcript 
2011 annual report  
Audit committee charter 
Audit committee policy on non-audit services and 
auditor rotation 
Local Government: 
CouncilA and CouncilC audit committee chair transcript 
CouncilB and CouncilD audit committee chair transcript 
CouncilA, annual report 2011-2012 
CouncilB, annual report 2011-12 
CouncilC, annual report 2011-12  
CouncilA, audit committee charter 
CouncilB, audit committee charter 
CouncilC, draft audit committee charter 
CouncilD, audit committee charter 
 
